Iron Triangles and Issue Networks of Information Policy
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 46, S. 584
ISSN: 1540-6210
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In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 46, S. 584
ISSN: 1540-6210
In: Review of policy research, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 395-412
ISSN: 1541-1338
This paper tests the popular thesis that as a result of various changes over the past decade, the subsystemliron triangle model is no longer the central dynamic in federal water policymaking. A cross section of 30 authorities were interviewed on two aspects of this key dispute: (a) the extent to which iron triangle tenets were either central (traditional viewpoint) or secondary (revisionist viewpoint) to the Carter administrationls 1977 water projects "hit list" 81 defeat, 11 and (b) perceptions of the viability of the leading water alliances in the years since the hit list events. Major findings: (1) Although the two leading water subsystems are portrayed as having been weakened by recent challenges, they are viewed by subsystem insidersll and "outsiders" alike as the most powerful of six alternative explanations for the Carter "defeat." (2) The alliances are largely pursuing a strategy aimed at adapting (Ripley and Franklinls "adapting subsystems") to the threatening political climate based on extensive funding for operations and maintenance. (3) The argument is advanced that the traditional‐revisionist dispute is bridged by cyclical policy dynamics, labeled the policy pacing dimension.
In: Policy studies review: PSR, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 395
ISSN: 0278-4416
In: Policy studies review: PSR, Band 5, S. 349-450
ISSN: 0278-4416
United States; 6 articles. Partial contents: Community values in Southwest water management, by Stephen P. Mumme and Helen M. Ingram; Recent trends in federal water resource management: are the "iron triangles" in retreat? by Tim R. Miller.
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 19-37
ISSN: 0090-5917
IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS, PERHAPS NO OTHER THEORETICAL ISSUE HAS CREATED AS MUCH CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE FEMINIST MOVEMENTS AS THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE FAMILY. FIRST-WAVE FEMINISTS AS VARIED AS KATE MILLET, BETTY FRIEDAN, JULIET MITCHELL, AND SHULAMITH FIRESTONE ALL SHARED AT LEAST ONE COMMON TASK: TO DESANCTIFY THE FAMILY AND DEMYSTIFY MOTHERHOOD. THESE FIRST-WAVE THINKERS CONSIDERED THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE, CAPITALISM, AND THE PATRIARCHAL FAMILY TO BE THREE SIDES OF AN IRON TRIANGLE OF WOMEN'S OPPRESSION. BY THE MID-1970S, LATER FEMINISTS WERE DEEPENING FIRST-WAVE CRITICISM BY FURTHER EXAMINING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND PATRIARCHY, THE FAMILY AND THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION, HOUSEWORK AND SURPLUS LABOR, MOTHERHOOD AND OPPRESSION. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE FAMILY DID NOT FARE WELL UNDER THIS WITHERING CRITICISM. FAR FROM BEING AN IDYLLIC HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD, THE FAMILY APPEARED TO REPRODUCE CAPITALISM AT HOME AND TO SUBORDINATE AND OPPRESS WOMEN ON A DAILY BASIS. BUT THE FAMILY SOON CAME TO HAVE ITS FEMINIST DEFENDERS, AND NOW A BATTLE IS BREWING BETWEEN THOSE FEMINISTS WHO STAND BY THE EARLIER CRITIQUES OF THE FAMILY AND THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT WE MUST RECONSIDER THE VALUE OF THE FAMILY AND MOTHERHOOD FOR FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS.
The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.