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Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Choosing Prime Ministers: Corruption and Culture -- 3. Japan's Dysfunctional Prime Minister -- 4. Back to the Future -- 5. The Constitution and Democracy -- 6. Bureaucracy-Dominated Iron Triangle -- 7. Forward from Basics -- Conclusion: Shigata ga nai Society -- Notes -- References and Publications Cited -- Index

The author of the bestseller The Iron Triangle untangles a web of political back scratching in one of the world's most powerful companiesHalliburton-a Texas oil-field company Dick Cheney ran before he became Vice President-has courted controversy for the better part of the twentieth century, but only recently has it received intense media scrutiny. In The Halliburton Agenda, Halliburton and its subsidiaries form the foundation of a fascinating story of influence peddling and behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that has only increased in momentum over the last decade-culminating in a firest

What is the government's proper role in the economy? Do free or managed markets best promote economic development? Who can best pick industrial winners and losers, the government or private sector? This book attempts to answer those and related questions by exploring the evolution and results of federal policies towards half a dozen economic sectors. Those policies are largely determined by the representatives of the targeted industry, bureaucrats from agencies and departments that administer that industry, and politicians with firms from that industry in their districts. These 'iron triangles' capture a 'virtuous' political economic cycle in which they use their united power to grant themselves favourable policies which in turn enhances their power. As will be seen, the results of such a politicized industrial policy process varies considerably from one industry to the next

The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.