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Abstract. The paper addresses five constructs of policy making: policy curtain, iron triangle, issue network, policy community and an iron duet. The five constructs are distinguished on the basis of two variables: exclusion, denoting the degree of openness to new participants, and interdependence, pertaining to relationship between participants. A policy curtain prevails in the pre‐agenda stage denoting both exclusion and lack of dependence. Iron triangle is characterized by exclusion and interdependence; issue network portrays inclusion and lack of interdependence; a policy community features inclusion and interdependence. A fifth construct — an iron duet combines characteristics of an iron triangle, an issue network and a policy community. The paper suggests that the five constructs of policy making are not only products of political environment but are affected by distribution of resources and primacy of values within a specific issue‐area. It further argues that a sequential development may take place following alterations in the division of power between state agencies and organized groups. The involvement of powerful groups of professionals in a policy community, produced by mutual dependence of state and association, may lead to formation of a policy (iron) duet. The historical evolution of specialization entitlement in Israeli health policy serves as a case study to illustrate the major arguments of the paper.

Mit der zugrundeliegenden Frage, wie spezifische Politik-Formationen zwischen Staat und Interessengruppen entstehen, untersucht der Beitrag fünf theoretische Policy-Modelle (policy-curtain, iron-triangle, issue-network, policy-community, iron-duet) auf der Basis der Variablen der Exklusion und Interdependenz. Die historische Entwicklung der Spezialisierungsberechtigung in der israelischen Gesundheitspolitik dient dabei als Fallstudie zur Illustration der Hauptargumente. Im Ergebnis wird die These untermauert, daß verschiedene Formationen und Konstrukte eines Politikprozesses nicht nur Produkt der politischen Umgebung sind, sondern auch der Verteilung von Ressourcen und Werteprimaten innerhalb ihres spezifischen Fall-Bereiches unterliegen. (AuD-Ber)

President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an 'outsider' to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

This paper tests the popular thesis that as a result of various changes over the past decade, the subsystemliron triangle model is no longer the central dynamic in federal water policymaking. A cross section of 30 authorities were interviewed on two aspects of this key dispute: (a) the extent to which iron triangle tenets were either central (traditional viewpoint) or secondary (revisionist viewpoint) to the Carter administrationls 1977 water projects "hit list" 81 defeat, 11 and (b) perceptions of the viability of the leading water alliances in the years since the hit list events. Major findings: (1) Although the two leading water subsystems are portrayed as having been weakened by recent challenges, they are viewed by subsystem insidersll and "outsiders" alike as the most powerful of six alternative explanations for the Carter "defeat." (2) The alliances are largely pursuing a strategy aimed at adapting (Ripley and Franklinls "adapting subsystems") to the threatening political climate based on extensive funding for operations and maintenance. (3) The argument is advanced that the traditional‐revisionist dispute is bridged by cyclical policy dynamics, labeled the policy pacing dimension.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines three distinct images of the policy process. Iron triangles emphasiże stable relations among a limited number of participants in a relatively closed policy area. Issue networks are fragmented, open and extraordinarily complex and are ill-structured for resolving conflicts and reaching authoritative decisions. The neo-corporatist literature posits a mechanistic interpretation of society: hierarchy, discipline, command and stability, though organized through sectors. These three images can be contrasted with an image of cabinet government which stresses the integrative capacities of central government. The United States can be seen to have moved to some degree from a pattern more closely captured by the iron triangle image to a looser, more complex one resembling features of the issue network image. In Britain, it is possible to detect some movement towards the complexity of the issue network approach. Despite some superficial plausibility, the corporatist image does not apply to Britain, which is best described by drawing on elements of the iron triangle and cabinet government images and some of the complexity of the issue network image. Finally, limits to the fragmentation implied by the issue network image are noted.

Argues that as housing policy shifted from `distributive' to `redistributive' due to a curtailment of funding, the housing coalition came under pressure from external forces and ultimately fragmented into competing (rather than cohesive) interests. As a result, the commitment to housing provision was drastically reduced. (Original abstract-amended)

This paper analyzes the changing politics of housing policy during the Reagan administration. The analysis applies the concept of "subgovernments" to the housing coalition. The demise of the housing subgovemment is analyzed within a theoretical framework that includes "policy type" as an important explanatory variable. Specifically, this paper argues that as housing policy shifted from "distributive" to "redistributive" due to a curtailment of funding, the housing coalition came under pressure from external farces and ultimately fragmented into competing (rather than cohesive) interests. As a result, the U.S. commitment to housing provision was drastically reduced.