Do teachers and the public disagree on education reform? We use data from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2011 to identify the extent of the differences between the opinion of teachers and the general public on a wide range of education policies. The overall cleavage between teachers and the general public is wider than the cleavages between other relevant groups, including that between Democrats and Republicans. At least with respect to patterns of opinion on education reform, school politics is largely a conflict between producers within the system and consumers outside it – a classic iron triangle theme.
Abstract. The paper addresses five constructs of policy making: policy curtain, iron triangle, issue network, policy community and an iron duet. The five constructs are distinguished on the basis of two variables: exclusion, denoting the degree of openness to new participants, and interdependence, pertaining to relationship between participants. A policy curtain prevails in the pre‐agenda stage denoting both exclusion and lack of dependence. Iron triangle is characterized by exclusion and interdependence; issue network portrays inclusion and lack of interdependence; a policy community features inclusion and interdependence. A fifth construct — an iron duet combines characteristics of an iron triangle, an issue network and a policy community. The paper suggests that the five constructs of policy making are not only products of political environment but are affected by distribution of resources and primacy of values within a specific issue‐area. It further argues that a sequential development may take place following alterations in the division of power between state agencies and organized groups. The involvement of powerful groups of professionals in a policy community, produced by mutual dependence of state and association, may lead to formation of a policy (iron) duet. The historical evolution of specialization entitlement in Israeli health policy serves as a case study to illustrate the major arguments of the paper.
Evaluation literature has paid relatively little attention to the specific needs of evaluating large, complex industrial and infrastructure projects, often called 'megaprojects'. The abundant megaproject governance literature, in turn, has largely focused on the so-called 'megaproject pathologies', i.e. the chronic budget overruns, and failure of such projects to keep to timetables and deliver the expected social and economic benefits. This article draws on these two strands of literature, identifies shortcomings, and suggests potential pathways towards an improved evaluation of megaprojects. To counterbalance the current overemphasis on relatively narrowly defined accountability as the main function of megaproject evaluation, and the narrow definition of project success in megaproject evaluation, the article argues that conceptualizing megaprojects as dynamic and evolving networks would provide a useful basis for the design of an evaluation approach better able to promote learning and to address the socio-economic aspects of megaprojects. A modified version of 'network mapping' is suggested as a possible framework for megaproject evaluation, with the exploration of the multiple accountability relationships as a central evaluation task, designed to reconcile learning and accountability as the central evaluation functions. The article highlights the role of evaluation as an 'emergent' property of spontaneous megaproject 'governing', and explores the challenges that this poses to the role of the evaluator.
This article examines the economic regulation of a hub European airport and the relationship system between actors involved in, or subjected to, this regulation. Studying the case of Aéroports de Paris, it is argued that airport economic regulation is produced by the strong conjunction of interests between the hub airport's operator, the dominant airline, and public authorities. These three categories of actors form an "iron triangle" framing and shaping the terms of economic regulation to satisfy their interests, and the shift from a cost-plus to a price-cap regulation does not dramatically threaten the maintenance of the triangle. All other actors (nondominant, domestic airlines, and international air carriers) are excluded from the iron triangle even if they remain deeply affected by its decisions. Finally, this article calls for an analytical generalization of this theorization for semiprivatized European hub airports.
President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an 'outsider' to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.
This paper tests the popular thesis that as a result of various changes over the past decade, the subsystemliron triangle model is no longer the central dynamic in federal water policymaking. A cross section of 30 authorities were interviewed on two aspects of this key dispute: (a) the extent to which iron triangle tenets were either central (traditional viewpoint) or secondary (revisionist viewpoint) to the Carter administrationls 1977 water projects "hit list" 81 defeat, 11 and (b) perceptions of the viability of the leading water alliances in the years since the hit list events. Major findings: (1) Although the two leading water subsystems are portrayed as having been weakened by recent challenges, they are viewed by subsystem insidersll and "outsiders" alike as the most powerful of six alternative explanations for the Carter "defeat." (2) The alliances are largely pursuing a strategy aimed at adapting (Ripley and Franklinls "adapting subsystems") to the threatening political climate based on extensive funding for operations and maintenance. (3) The argument is advanced that the traditional‐revisionist dispute is bridged by cyclical policy dynamics, labeled the policy pacing dimension.
