Suchergebnisse

Kolaps reda i rasprostranjeno nasilje u Albaniji 1997. godine prouzročilo je pad Vlade i smrt oko 2.000 osoba. Neredi 1997. godine bili su posljedica propasti špekulativnih financijskih piramidalnih shema koje su nalikovale ratnoj ekonomskoj strukturi. Tijekom događaja 1997. godine došlo je do konfiskacije i krađe državne imovine velikih razmjera. Tranzicijsko razdoblje Albanije iz komunističkog u demokratski sustav, započeto 1990. godine, dovelo je do uspostave novih struktura za profitiranje od resursa te zemlje. Neke od tih političkih i ekonomskih struktura nestale su kao posljedica događaja 1997. godine, a druge, uključujući njihove strukturalne posljedice, i dalje su prisutne i imaju utjecaj na političku stabilnost i ekonomski napredak zemlje. Danas možemo ocijeniti uspjehe i neuspjehe Albanije na temelju napretka te zemlje od događaja 1997. godine. U članku se analiziraju događaji 1997. godine kao i transformacija albanskih političkih i ekonomskih struktura između 1997. i 2016. godine, uzimajući u obzir postignuća i neuspjehe. Iz perspektive uspješnosti sagledava se način na koji se zemlja nosila s izgradnjom mira i razvojnom agendom nakon 1997. godine. Razmatraju se čimbenici koji su doveli do neuspješnosti države 1997. godine, kao i oni nakon toga, a koji su pridonijeli povijesnoj uvjetovanosti do trenutnog političkog konteksta države. Premda se mnogo pisalo o 1997. godini, vrlo je malo provedenih analiza iz perspektive istraživanja neuspješnih država. U tom kontekstu u članku se pokušava ponuditi Albanija kao primjer studije slučaja transformativnog procesa od ustanka do sadašnje situacije obilježene kao mješavina uspjeha i neuspjeha. U ovom se članku ukazuje na nekoliko pouka koje bi mogle biti od koristi za strategije usmjerene prema procesu transformacije. ; In 1997 Albania experienced a collapse of order and widespread violence, which resulted in a situation where the government was overthrown and some 2,000 people were killed. The 1997 disorder came as a result of the collapse of fraudulent financial pyramid schemes that had all the features of a war-like economic structure. During the 1997 events, large-scale confiscation and stealing of state assets occurred. Albania's transitional period from communism to democracy, which began in 1990, led to the establishment of new structures for profiting from the country's resources. Some of these political and economic structures, in the aftermath of the 1997 events, disappeared and others, including their structural effects, persist and have had an impact on the country's political stability and economic progress. Today, both the successes and failures of the country are assessed based on the progress that the country has made since the 1997 events. The paper analyses the 1997 events and the transformation of Albania's political and economic structures between 1997 and 2016, considering both achievements and failures. It looks at how the country has dealt with the post-1997 peace-building and development agenda from the perspective of it being a success. It looks at the factors that led to state failure in 1997 and at the factors that continue and have generated a path dependency to the current political context of the country. Although a lot has been written concerning the 1997 events, very little analysis has been conducted concerning what it means from the perspective of research on state failure. In this context, the proposed paper seeks to offer Albania as a case study example of a transformation process, from the uprising to the current situation, which is characterized as a mixture of successes and failures. The belief is that the proposed paper will point to some lessons learned for the strategies directed at the transformation processes.

The article puts forward an answer to the following question: why is Iran, thirty years after the 1979 revolution, still at the center of world politics, & why is it, on top of that, a legitimate candidate for the status of one of global powers in the new, multi-polar international order. The author stresses that Iran has been the main obstacle to global ambitions of liberal democracy since 1989, & that it has developed a specific ideological & political system based on the idea of theocratic-republican dualism. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, it was convenient to the West to have Iran as the Antagonistic Other (and vice versa). The relative American failure in the war against Iraq (2003-) opened up for Iran the options of connecting on a wider basis with Russia, China, Venezuela & the countries of "Old Europe" (Germany & France). Since the relatively prosperous neighboring countries -- China & the four Asian tigers -- are also founded on dualistic principles, Iran did not have to be liberalized in the way that Eastern Europe was liberalized after the Cold War. As the author concludes, the election of Barack Obama for American president presents a new opportunity to normalize relations between Iran & the West, but the opportunity will be seized only if the USA is willing to accept the multi-polarity of international relations & to renounce the doctrine of liberal interventionism. Regardless of the outcome, however, there is still a very real danger of a conflict between Israel & Iran. Adapted from the source document.

Članak je nastojanje da se razmisli o budućnosti komparativne političke i socijalne filozofije na temelju interakcije s empirijskim i teorijskim istraživanjima u društvenim znanostima i humanistici. Sastoji se od četiri dijela: 1. Kratke prezentacije izvora »komparativnog zaokreta« i četvrtog vala kritike eurocentrizma; 2. Razmišljanja o problemu »višestrukih moderna« (»nove moderne«) kao posljedice »komparativnog zaokreta« i izazova za ideju društva i politike temeljene na konceptu sekularnog javnog uma; 3. Reference na izazov klasičnoj postavci javne sfere (ukorijenjene u idealu javnog uma) razvijene od strane Nilüfer Göle koja je istraživala novu »islamsku javnu vidljivost kao kritiku sekularne verzije javne sfere« u Zapadnoj Europi. ; The paper is an effort to reflect on the prospects of comparative political and social philosophy based on interaction with empirical and theoretical research in the social sciences and humanities. It consists of the following components: 1. Short presentation of the sources of the "comparative turn" and the fourth wave of the critique of Eurocentrism. 2. Reflection on the problem of "multiple modernities" ("new modernities") as the consequence of the "comparative turn", and a challenge for the idea of society and politics based on the concept of secular public reason. 3. Reference to a challenge to the classical notion of the public sphere (rooted in the ideal of public reason) which was developed by Nilüfer Göle while studying new "Islamic public visibility as a critique of a secular version of the public sphere" in Western Europe. ; Cet article, constituant une tentative pour penser les perspectives d'avenir de la politique comparée et de la philosophie sociale, se base sur l'interaction entre les recherches empiriques et théoriques dans les sciences sociales et humaines. Il est composé des trois parties suivantes : 1. d'une brève présentation de la source du « tournant comparé » et de la quatrième vague de la critique de l'eurocentrisme ; 2. d'une réflexion sur le problème des « multiples modernités » (« nouvelles modernités ») comme conséquence du « tournant comparé » et sur le défi se rapportant à l'idée d'une société basée sur la raison publique séculaire ; 3. d'une référence concernant la récusation de la notion classique de sphère publique (incarnée dans l'idéal de la raison publique) développée par Nilüfer Göle dans sa recherche sur la nouvelle « visibilité publique islamique en tant que critique d'une version séculaire de la sphère publique » dans l'Europe de l'ouest. ; Der Artikel ist bestrebt, über die Perspektiven der komparativen politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie zu reflektieren, basiert auf der Interaktion mit der empirischen und theoretischen Forschung in den Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften. Er besteht aus folgenden Komponenten: 1. Kurze Darstellung der Quelle der "komparativen Wende" und die vierte Welle der Kritik des Eurozentrismus; 2. Nachdenken über das Problem der "multiplen modernitäten" ("neue modernitäten") als Folge der "komparativen Wende" und der Herausforderung an die sich auf das Konzept der säkularen öffentlichen Vernunft stützende Idee der Gesellschaft und Politik; 3. Bezugnahme auf die Herausforderung für die klassische Vorstellung von der öffentlichen Sphäre (verwurzelt im Ideal der öffentlichen Vernunft), entwickelt von Nilüfer Göle, die die neue "islamische öffentliche Sichtbarkeit als Kritik der säkularen Version der öffentlichen Sphäre" in Westeuropa erforscht hat.

At present, when we are once again faced with the question: quo vadis Bosnia and Herzegovina, towards new integration or towards further disintegration? -- it is undoubtedly useful to show how and when the process was initiated of its administrative-territorial division and its connecting with the neighbour states in the 20th century; in this case, with Dalmatia in 1929 within the Littoral Banovina, and with the Banovina of Croatia ten years later. This paper provides a detailed account of the size of territory and population with regard to various denominations on the level of 8, i.e. 13 districts which comprised 38, i.e. 70 municipalities of BiH. The population data based on the 1931 census, the last carried out in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, are the starting point of an attempt to establish the ratio between the Catholic majority and the Islam and Orthodox minorities. In the period of the Littoral Banovina, the Catholic population in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian districts had the absolute majority of 63%, and in the Banovina of Croatia -- 53%. Beside the Catholics, the same counties were inhabited by minorities of Islam and Orthodox denominations, which were in the majority in some municipalities and districts. In Dalmatian districts of the Littoral Banovina, 84% of the population were Catholics, while the percentage in BiH districts was 63%, which means that the percentage on the level of the Banovina as a whole was 75%. Consequently, many were right to perceive and proclaim that the Littoral Banovina was Catholic by denomination, and Croatian by ethnicity, although this became a fact only when it joined the Banovina of Croatia together with the Sava Banovina. Adapted from the source document.