The article analyzes perspectives for democracy in the Islamic socio-cultural and political region. In Islamic world the democratization project meets strong Islamism opposition, which uses Islamic rhetoric and tries to convince the world community that democracy does not conform to the norms of Islam. It has been claimed that by virtue democracy and Islam are just incompatible, implying that fundamental values and principles protected by constitutional democracy are impossible in Islamic nations. However, the conducted analysis proves otherwise. Islam and democracy are not adversaries. On the contrary, they are united by the same fundamental values and principles, which are cherished by Islam and protected by constitutional democracy. Islamic nations have everything in order to build democracy and go toward the rule of law state. Yet it will require extremely radical actions – re-interpretation of contemporary concept of justice as well as the entire Shari'ah reverting to justice as a virtue. And only in this way it will become possible by the idea walk toward God.
The article analyzes perspectives for democracy in the Islamic socio-cultural and political region. In Islamic world the democratization project meets strong Islamism opposition, which uses Islamic rhetoric and tries to convince the world community that democracy does not conform to the norms of Islam. It has been claimed that by virtue democracy and Islam are just incompatible, implying that fundamental values and principles protected by constitutional democracy are impossible in Islamic nations. However, the conducted analysis proves otherwise. Islam and democracy are not adversaries. On the contrary, they are united by the same fundamental values and principles, which are cherished by Islam and protected by constitutional democracy. Islamic nations have everything in order to build democracy and go toward the rule of law state. Yet it will require extremely radical actions – re-interpretation of contemporary concept of justice as well as the entire Shari'ah reverting to justice as a virtue. And only in this way it will become possible by the idea walk toward God.
Today exclusive attention focuses on Muslims, their religion Islam, exclusive and distinctive lifestyle and the ever growing threat – terrorism. Now is obviously, a time in which Islam to Muslims is not only religion, it is law and morality, culture and mind rule of life. this is Muslims political ideology. The power of religion has always been strong in the Muslim world, but in these last decades, Islam as political ideology has become very strong and in some places has become radical. Strong processes of globalization, Israel's rise and western culture expansion within the Muslim world, has been resisted by its people, this resistance is still growing and growing. In this place Islam is already not only the religion, but political ideology, which exists to represent and to protect Muslims, as strong players in world religions and region maps. We can't forget that every fifth person in the world is Muslim: in fifty seven countries they are the majority. The main purpose of the paper was to detect "islam threat" in television (CNN television), so the main attention is to detect how "Islam threat" images are made in television. To detect why Islam is represented as a threat, when Muslims say, that Islam is a religion of peace. To detect these dimensions (aspects) the main object of the paper is to measure "Islam threat" in television. Paper tasks are: to characterize Islam and its functions in Islamic cultures and to present the modern Islam; To rate and to understand how television broadcasts images; To evaluate the connection between Islam and terrorism; And to analyze Islam, as a threat, through images on television. The work forms three parts. In the first part we discuss Islam and Muslims, modern Islam, Islam fundamentalists and western expansion in Muslim countries. In the second part we concentrate on television, how television broadcasts images and who is influencing television programs. Also in this part we discuss the Islam threat of terrorism. How Koran is connected with terror and about the very new term "Islam phobia". In the third (analysis) part we analyze Islam as a threat on CNN television news programs and try to look over reportage connected with Islam, Muslim and terrorism on a time perspective, after this we look at reportage content and syntax and eventually we try to prove or to deny in public settled opinions by analyzing CNN reportages. The main method of analysis was CNN televisions news reportages analysis, which was connected to Islam, Muslim and Terrorism. Analysis involved reportages which CNN had broadcast between the beginning of May 2005 till the end of April 2007. After analysis the findings are: Islam is a powerful religion and can not be analyzed looking through "western eyes". Muslims immigrants living in western countries do not want to accept "western country" rules and formalities; Television is the only one media which can propagate information to all age groups and influence large audiences, affording to create all kinds of images about Islam, Muslims and terrorism. Now the main threat is terrorism, television is using images to created a wrong image of Islam and Koran. After analyzing CNN reportages connected with Islam, Muslims and terrorism the finding are, that not only television, but different people, specially countries or different organizations leaders, are trying to create different images of Islam, Muslims and their connection with terrorism to reach certain goals. CNN is using very forceful pictures and lexis to create the perceived threat of Islam, to the countries which are connected with war in Iraq and countries which have influence over Muslims and Muslim countries. After the survey of all CNN reportages about Islam, Muslims and terror, we can confirm that CNN represents only USA interest regions and directions.
Today exclusive attention focuses on Muslims, their religion Islam, exclusive and distinctive lifestyle and the ever growing threat – terrorism. Now is obviously, a time in which Islam to Muslims is not only religion, it is law and morality, culture and mind rule of life. this is Muslims political ideology. The power of religion has always been strong in the Muslim world, but in these last decades, Islam as political ideology has become very strong and in some places has become radical. Strong processes of globalization, Israel's rise and western culture expansion within the Muslim world, has been resisted by its people, this resistance is still growing and growing. In this place Islam is already not only the religion, but political ideology, which exists to represent and to protect Muslims, as strong players in world religions and region maps. We can't forget that every fifth person in the world is Muslim: in fifty seven countries they are the majority. The main purpose of the paper was to detect "islam threat" in television (CNN television), so the main attention is to detect how "Islam threat" images are made in television. To detect why Islam is represented as a threat, when Muslims say, that Islam is a religion of peace. To detect these dimensions (aspects) the main object of the paper is to measure "Islam threat" in television. Paper tasks are: to characterize Islam and its functions in Islamic cultures and to present the modern Islam; To rate and to understand how television broadcasts images; To evaluate the connection between Islam and terrorism; And to analyze Islam, as a threat, through images on television. The work forms three parts. In the first part we discuss Islam and Muslims, modern Islam, Islam fundamentalists and western expansion in Muslim countries. In the second part we concentrate on television, how television broadcasts images and who is influencing television programs. Also in this part we discuss the Islam threat of terrorism. How Koran is connected with terror and about the very new term "Islam phobia". In the third (analysis) part we analyze Islam as a threat on CNN television news programs and try to look over reportage connected with Islam, Muslim and terrorism on a time perspective, after this we look at reportage content and syntax and eventually we try to prove or to deny in public settled opinions by analyzing CNN reportages. The main method of analysis was CNN televisions news reportages analysis, which was connected to Islam, Muslim and Terrorism. Analysis involved reportages which CNN had broadcast between the beginning of May 2005 till the end of April 2007. After analysis the findings are: Islam is a powerful religion and can not be analyzed looking through "western eyes". Muslims immigrants living in western countries do not want to accept "western country" rules and formalities; Television is the only one media which can propagate information to all age groups and influence large audiences, affording to create all kinds of images about Islam, Muslims and terrorism. Now the main threat is terrorism, television is using images to created a wrong image of Islam and Koran. After analyzing CNN reportages connected with Islam, Muslims and terrorism the finding are, that not only television, but different people, specially countries or different organizations leaders, are trying to create different images of Islam, Muslims and their connection with terrorism to reach certain goals. CNN is using very forceful pictures and lexis to create the perceived threat of Islam, to the countries which are connected with war in Iraq and countries which have influence over Muslims and Muslim countries. After the survey of all CNN reportages about Islam, Muslims and terror, we can confirm that CNN represents only USA interest regions and directions.
Today exclusive attention focuses on Muslims, their religion Islam, exclusive and distinctive lifestyle and the ever growing threat – terrorism. Now is obviously, a time in which Islam to Muslims is not only religion, it is law and morality, culture and mind rule of life. this is Muslims political ideology. The power of religion has always been strong in the Muslim world, but in these last decades, Islam as political ideology has become very strong and in some places has become radical. Strong processes of globalization, Israel's rise and western culture expansion within the Muslim world, has been resisted by its people, this resistance is still growing and growing. In this place Islam is already not only the religion, but political ideology, which exists to represent and to protect Muslims, as strong players in world religions and region maps. We can't forget that every fifth person in the world is Muslim: in fifty seven countries they are the majority. The main purpose of the paper was to detect "islam threat" in television (CNN television), so the main attention is to detect how "Islam threat" images are made in television. To detect why Islam is represented as a threat, when Muslims say, that Islam is a religion of peace. To detect these dimensions (aspects) the main object of the paper is to measure "Islam threat" in television. Paper tasks are: to characterize Islam and its functions in Islamic cultures and to present the modern Islam; To rate and to understand how television broadcasts images; To evaluate the connection between Islam and terrorism; And to analyze Islam, as a threat, through images on television. The work forms three parts. In the first part we discuss Islam and Muslims, modern Islam, Islam fundamentalists and western expansion in Muslim countries. In the second part we concentrate on television, how television broadcasts images and who is influencing television programs. Also in this part we discuss the Islam threat of terrorism. How Koran is connected with terror and about the very new term "Islam phobia". In the third (analysis) part we analyze Islam as a threat on CNN television news programs and try to look over reportage connected with Islam, Muslim and terrorism on a time perspective, after this we look at reportage content and syntax and eventually we try to prove or to deny in public settled opinions by analyzing CNN reportages. The main method of analysis was CNN televisions news reportages analysis, which was connected to Islam, Muslim and Terrorism. Analysis involved reportages which CNN had broadcast between the beginning of May 2005 till the end of April 2007. After analysis the findings are: Islam is a powerful religion and can not be analyzed looking through "western eyes". Muslims immigrants living in western countries do not want to accept "western country" rules and formalities; Television is the only one media which can propagate information to all age groups and influence large audiences, affording to create all kinds of images about Islam, Muslims and terrorism. Now the main threat is terrorism, television is using images to created a wrong image of Islam and Koran. After analyzing CNN reportages connected with Islam, Muslims and terrorism the finding are, that not only television, but different people, specially countries or different organizations leaders, are trying to create different images of Islam, Muslims and their connection with terrorism to reach certain goals. CNN is using very forceful pictures and lexis to create the perceived threat of Islam, to the countries which are connected with war in Iraq and countries which have influence over Muslims and Muslim countries. After the survey of all CNN reportages about Islam, Muslims and terror, we can confirm that CNN represents only USA interest regions and directions.
Today exclusive attention focuses on Muslims, their religion Islam, exclusive and distinctive lifestyle and the ever growing threat – terrorism. Now is obviously, a time in which Islam to Muslims is not only religion, it is law and morality, culture and mind rule of life. this is Muslims political ideology. The power of religion has always been strong in the Muslim world, but in these last decades, Islam as political ideology has become very strong and in some places has become radical. Strong processes of globalization, Israel's rise and western culture expansion within the Muslim world, has been resisted by its people, this resistance is still growing and growing. In this place Islam is already not only the religion, but political ideology, which exists to represent and to protect Muslims, as strong players in world religions and region maps. We can't forget that every fifth person in the world is Muslim: in fifty seven countries they are the majority. The main purpose of the paper was to detect "islam threat" in television (CNN television), so the main attention is to detect how "Islam threat" images are made in television. To detect why Islam is represented as a threat, when Muslims say, that Islam is a religion of peace. To detect these dimensions (aspects) the main object of the paper is to measure "Islam threat" in television. Paper tasks are: to characterize Islam and its functions in Islamic cultures and to present the modern Islam; To rate and to understand how television broadcasts images; To evaluate the connection between Islam and terrorism; And to analyze Islam, as a threat, through images on television. The work forms three parts. In the first part we discuss Islam and Muslims, modern Islam, Islam fundamentalists and western expansion in Muslim countries. In the second part we concentrate on television, how television broadcasts images and who is influencing television programs. Also in this part we discuss the Islam threat of terrorism. How Koran is connected with terror and about the very new term "Islam phobia". In the third (analysis) part we analyze Islam as a threat on CNN television news programs and try to look over reportage connected with Islam, Muslim and terrorism on a time perspective, after this we look at reportage content and syntax and eventually we try to prove or to deny in public settled opinions by analyzing CNN reportages. The main method of analysis was CNN televisions news reportages analysis, which was connected to Islam, Muslim and Terrorism. Analysis involved reportages which CNN had broadcast between the beginning of May 2005 till the end of April 2007. After analysis the findings are: Islam is a powerful religion and can not be analyzed looking through "western eyes". Muslims immigrants living in western countries do not want to accept "western country" rules and formalities; Television is the only one media which can propagate information to all age groups and influence large audiences, affording to create all kinds of images about Islam, Muslims and terrorism. Now the main threat is terrorism, television is using images to created a wrong image of Islam and Koran. After analyzing CNN reportages connected with Islam, Muslims and terrorism the finding are, that not only television, but different people, specially countries or different organizations leaders, are trying to create different images of Islam, Muslims and their connection with terrorism to reach certain goals. CNN is using very forceful pictures and lexis to create the perceived threat of Islam, to the countries which are connected with war in Iraq and countries which have influence over Muslims and Muslim countries. After the survey of all CNN reportages about Islam, Muslims and terror, we can confirm that CNN represents only USA interest regions and directions.
Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.
Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.
Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.
Muslims have known and used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe and North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities'. Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity', for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities – during and after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian and Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it and indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power – the fact that attests to its political nature.
Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.
Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.
Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.
Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the political discourse of one among the most influential thinkers of Islamic resurgence movement, Hasan al-Banna, who is frequently considered the father of contemporary radical movements advocating the must for the Islamic state what is due to extra-legal activities of his created Islamic organization "The Muslim Brotherhood" which was often taken as an organizational model by subsequent Islamic groups. The theoretical analysis, however, of the major principles that Hasan al-Banna employs in constructing foundations of the legitimate Islamic state reveals that his political theory is compromising and open to the basic values of Western democracy. This article seeks to shown how Hasan al-Banna reconstructs Islamic political theory by reworking the meanings of its basic foundations.
