Suchergebnisse

El presente texto está basado en el Trabajo Fin de Grado en Trabajo Social de la Universidad de Granada (España), titulado "Minorías étnicas, Islamofobia y Garantía de las Libertades Religiosas: el caso de Granada" realizado por José Luis Martínez Ruiz y dirigido por Mourad Aboussi durante el curso académico 2015-2016. ; ______ ; This text is based on the Final Degree Project of the Degree on Social Work -University of Granada (Spain)-, entitled "Ethnic Minorities, Islamophobia and the Guarantee of Religious Freedoms: the case of Granada". It was developed by José Luis Martínez Ruiz and directed by Mourad Aboussi during the academic year 2015-2016. ; La globalización ha cambiado los movimientos migratorios convirtiéndolos en globales, transnacionales, circulares y heterogéneos desde países pobres a países llamados desarrollados. De igual forma, las políticas migratorias han cambiado, apuestan por una mayor seguridad y un mayor control. Los sentimientos de racismo, xenofobia e islamofobia están más presentes en las sociedades occidentales desde los atentados cometidos por el islamismo radical en diferentes ciudades. La sociedad, los partidos políticos y los medios de comunicación no suelen diferenciar el Islam del Islamismo Radical. Estos factores, entre otros, dificultan la integración y la convivencia de las personas inmigrantes. El Estado Español responde con leyes y normas que recogen los derechos de este colectivo, pero a veces la garantía de estos derechos muestra ciertas deficiencias. Tampoco los planes, programas y proyectos de integración se adaptan suficientemente a las nuevas circunstancias. En el presente artículo, nos centraremos en la comunidad musulmana en España, la práctica de su libertad religiosa y si se promueve su integración y convivencia con la población autóctona. ; Globalization has changed the migratory movements, which are now global, transnational, circular and heterogeneous between poor and developed countries. In the same way, migration policies have also changed, going for better security and more control. Feelings of racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia are even more present in western societies after the attacks by radical islamic have happened in different cities, making harder the integration and coexistence of people from different countries. Society, political parties and media do not tend to differentiate Islam from the Radical Islamism. The Spanish State try to alleviate making new laws with the rights of this group, but sometimes the guarantee of these rights are totally inaccurate when are carried them out. In addition, the State, along with the local councils and areas of Spain, create integration plans which are adapted to the new circumstances, but they do not provide most needs of that group. In this article, we will focus on the Muslim Community in Spain, the practice of her religious freedom and if her integration and coexistence with native population is promoted.

В статье рассматривается генезис ислама в дореволюционной России и его особенности на Северном Кавказе. Одной из особенностей принятия ислама явилось то, что этот процесс затянулся более чем на тысячелетие. Другой особенностью принятия и функционирования ислама на Северном Кавказе является еще и то, что шариат здесь, объединившись с местными правовыми обычаями (адатами) и затем - с законодательством России, создав уникальную систему регулирования общественных отношений. Освещается процесс вхождения Северного Кавказа в правовое пространство России. Отмечается роль шариата и адата в правовом регулировании общественных отношений на Северном Кавказе в Российской империи, в Советском государстве и постсоветской России. С учетом исторического опыта можно предположить, что включение отдельных норм и принципов мусульманского права и адата в российскую правовую систему - вполне вероятная перспектива развития законодательства ряда республик в составе Российской Федерации, в частности на Северном Кавказе. Отмечается, что ислам в целом стоит на стороне законопослушания и лояльности по отношению к власти, готовой уважать разделяемые им ценности. Поэтому внедрение в сознание российских мусульман истинных ценности ислама будет способствовать борьбе с международным терроризмом. Пацифистская направленность религиозных мусульманских организаций, развенчание исламистских мифов, делает их союзником государства в борьбе с терроризмом и представляет значительный интерес, так как является мирной альтернативой воинствующего исламизма ; The article discusses the Genesis of Islam in pre-revolutionary Russia and its features in the North Caucasus. One of the features of the adoption of Islam was that this process was delayed by more than a Millennium. Another feature of the adoption and functioning of Islam in the North Caucasus is also the fact that Sharia here, teaming up with local legal customs (ADAT) and then with Russian legislation, creating a unique system of regulating social relations. It covers the process of entering the North Caucasus in the legal space of Russia, it also notes the role of Sharia and ADAT in the legal regulation of social relations in the North Caucasus in the Russian Empire, the Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Taking into account historical experience, it can be assumed that the inclusion of certain provisions and principles of Islamic law and ADAT in the Russian legal system the likely future development of legislation of a number of republics of the Russian Federation, in particular in the North Caucasus. It is noted that Islam in general is on the side of law-obedience and loyalty to authority, willing to respect share his or her values. Therefore, the introduction into the consciousness of the Russian Muslims the true values of Islam will contribute to the fight against international terrorism. Pacifist orientation of Muslim religious organizations, debunking Islamist myths, makes them an ally of the state in the fight against terrorism is of considerable interest because it is the peaceful alternative to militant Islamism

This paper seeks to analyze how the program of deradicalization in Indonesia is approached, understood and treated by radical Islamists. This paper argues that the deradicalization program in this country has invited controversies, criticisms and even backlash from radical Islamists on the grounds that it goes against the principles of human rights because of state's intervention into religious life of its citizens. In addition, it is carried out by violent method which mostly ends with killing the accused terrorists along with the arrest and ambush by security officers. In order to analyze the focus of the study, this paper employs socio-political approach. This paper finds that more thorough approach needs to be employed by the state within the framework of human rights. Therefore, the ideology of radical Islamism and terrorism must be dealt with from two sides; at the upstream and the downstream levels. At the upstream level, the program of deradicalization must be carried out within the framework of interdepartmental and ministerial partnership. This program should invite as many institutions as possible to be involved and reach as wide audience as possible. At the downstream level, the program of deradicalization must abide to human rights principles. The security approach taken by the government should not end with killing or dehumanizing terrorists. By doing so, the national program of deradicalization can appeal as wide sympathy possible and will not harvest backlash from the Islamists.[Artikel ini mendiskusikan bagaimana program deradikalisasi di Indonesia dipahami, dimengerti, dan disikapi oleh kalangan Islamis. Tulisan ini berasumsi bahwa program deradikalisasi yang dilakukan memincu kontroversi, kritik, bahkan memicu juga aksi balasan yang dilancarkan kalangan Islamis radikal. Beberapa kalangan menilai program tersebut melanggar prinsip hak asasi manusia karena merepresentasikan bentuk intervensi negara terhadap kehidupan beragama masyarakatnya. Lebih dari itu, beberapa program dilaksanakan dengan melakukan tindak kekerasan dan kerap berakhir dengan penangkapan, penganiayaan, bahkan pembunuhan tersangka teroris. Dalam menganalisis tema tulisan, pendekatan sosialpolitik digunakan. Artikel ini kemudian menemukan bahwa pendekatan yang berangkat dari nilai-nilai hak asasi manusia perlu dipertegas. Karena itu, ideologi islamis-radikal and terorisme harus dilihat melalui dua sisi secara bersama. Pada level atas, program deradikalisasi dilakukan dengan kerjasama antar lembaga dan kementerian terkait. Dengan begitu, program deradikalisasi diwujudkan dengan mengajak sebanyak-banyaknya lembaga untuk terlibat serta memperluas target audien. Pada level bawah, program deradikalisasi harus mematuhi prinsip hak asasi manusia. Pendekatan keamanan yang dominan dilakukan tidak harus berakhir dengan membunuh atau dengan melanggar hak asasi manusia yang juga melekat pada diri Islamis dan teroris. Dengan model seperti ini, program nasional deradikalisasi mampu memperoleh dukungan dan simpati masyarakat luas dan dapat meredam aksi balasan kalangan Islamis.]

The paper is devoted to analyze European Union and Turkey debates on human rights. Here the debates are perceived as the scene where both sides put their arguments, positions, values, express intensions. This helps to find out the main reason, why discussion on human rights between European Union and Turkey isn't as fluent as it could be. Debates are analyzed in so called "language games" perspective, which means, that all argumentation here is equated to the move making in the game theory. Going along game theory lines, here we make a presumption, that states as international actors are rational, but their identity and interests are not static. Taking into account ideas of Alexander Wendt, identity and interests are presupposed to be a product of mutual states interaction. Interaction in the paper by itself is supposed to be a game, where the biggest stress is put on rules – knowing the rules of the game, it's possible to understand state intentions and identity elements. In the paper main theme of human rights is parted into two sections that deal with freedom of speech and religious minorities rights. It is supposed that the first topic is debated between European Union and Turkey's Kemalist establishment, and the second – between Union and proislamic movements in Turkey. Such move is made because of the ambivalent Turkish identity. After the First World War established Turkish state, soon it turned into a radical modernization and westernization. This led to the partitioned state identity. Kemalist establishment stresses threat of radical Islamism and Kurdish separatism, and Islamists demand the same rights for Muslims as for all other religious minorities. For this reason Kemalist identity is based on four main principles: nationalism, secularism, state hegemony and modernization. Meanwhile, Islamists stress muslimhood as the core of their identity. In the first debate European Union criticizes Turkey because of sanctions for citizens while they are expressing non-violent opinion on such topics as Armenian genocide, Kurdish question and the legacy of Atatürk. Turkey (Kemalist establishment) gives it's own arguments referring to the aforementioned threats to the state, but these arguments are not taken into account by European Union. For this reason Kemalists assume, that European Union seeks to rebuild Kemalist identity of Turkey. The second debate deals with religious minorities' situation in Turkey. On the one hand, Europe always stresses problems, which face non-Muslim and non-Sunni religious minorities. One the other – Turkey's Islamists, while agreeing with such statements, seek to show problems of Sunni Muslim majority. This part of debate reveals how Muslim identity is excluded out of European human rights concept.

The paper is devoted to analyze European Union and Turkey debates on human rights. Here the debates are perceived as the scene where both sides put their arguments, positions, values, express intensions. This helps to find out the main reason, why discussion on human rights between European Union and Turkey isn't as fluent as it could be. Debates are analyzed in so called "language games" perspective, which means, that all argumentation here is equated to the move making in the game theory. Going along game theory lines, here we make a presumption, that states as international actors are rational, but their identity and interests are not static. Taking into account ideas of Alexander Wendt, identity and interests are presupposed to be a product of mutual states interaction. Interaction in the paper by itself is supposed to be a game, where the biggest stress is put on rules – knowing the rules of the game, it's possible to understand state intentions and identity elements. In the paper main theme of human rights is parted into two sections that deal with freedom of speech and religious minorities rights. It is supposed that the first topic is debated between European Union and Turkey's Kemalist establishment, and the second – between Union and proislamic movements in Turkey. Such move is made because of the ambivalent Turkish identity. After the First World War established Turkish state, soon it turned into a radical modernization and westernization. This led to the partitioned state identity. Kemalist establishment stresses threat of radical Islamism and Kurdish separatism, and Islamists demand the same rights for Muslims as for all other religious minorities. For this reason Kemalist identity is based on four main principles: nationalism, secularism, state hegemony and modernization. Meanwhile, Islamists stress muslimhood as the core of their identity. In the first debate European Union criticizes Turkey because of sanctions for citizens while they are expressing non-violent opinion on such topics as Armenian genocide, Kurdish question and the legacy of Atatürk. Turkey (Kemalist establishment) gives it's own arguments referring to the aforementioned threats to the state, but these arguments are not taken into account by European Union. For this reason Kemalists assume, that European Union seeks to rebuild Kemalist identity of Turkey. The second debate deals with religious minorities' situation in Turkey. On the one hand, Europe always stresses problems, which face non-Muslim and non-Sunni religious minorities. One the other – Turkey's Islamists, while agreeing with such statements, seek to show problems of Sunni Muslim majority. This part of debate reveals how Muslim identity is excluded out of European human rights concept.

L'empereur Charles V était détesté par Paul IV pas seulement parce qu'il hésitait à réprimer l'hérésie en Allemagne, mais surtout parce qu'il protégeait en Espagne des personnages qui professaient une religion fortement influencée par des instances ascétiques et mystiques, qui recueillait l'héritage d'un très dangereux (suivant l'opinion de Paul IV) syncrétisme entre judaïsme, islamisme et christianisme, une religion sensible aux messages d'Erasme et de Luther adapté à un contexte typiquement espagnol: une religion interiorisée qui impliquait une devalorisation des pratiques exterieures et qui opponait à l'Eglise institutionelle, une Eglise de "parfaits", des saints, union mystique des croyants en Jésus-Christ. Contre cette Espagne qui avait généré le théologien Juan de Valdés, accusé d'avoir « infectato [.] tutta Italia de eresia » (infecté toute l'Italie d'hérésie) Paul IV voulut courir aux armes, en menaçant une véritable « crociata di scudi cristiani » (croisade d'écus chrétiens). Si Charles V ne voulut jamais chosir entre l'Espagne de l'Inquisition et l'Espagne des alumbrados, des moriscos et des luthériens, et si pendant son règne les adversaires de l'Inquisition purent à plusieurs fois gagner du terrain, la politique de Philippe II, après quelques incertitudes au début, fut orienté finalement avec décision vers une répression extrêmement dure. L'engagement de Paul IV aux côtés du nouveau souverain peut être considéré comme un prélude du « virage » de la politique de Philippe II aux années suivantes, lorsque le fils de « l'empereur hérétique » Charles V (« imperatore eretico » suivant la définition de Paul IV) devint le champion et le défenseur des intérêts du catholicisme romain contre les hérétiques et les infidèles, le champion de la Contre-Reforme et de la lutte contre l'« internationale protestante ». ; Carlo V era detestato da papa Paolo IV non solamente perché esitava a reprimere l'eresia nei territori tedeschi, ma soprattutto perché proteggeva in Spagna dei personaggi che professavano una religiosità profondamente influenzata da istanze ascetiche e mistiche, che raccoglieva l'eredità di un pericolosissimo (secondo papa Carafa) sincretismo tra giudaismo, islamismo e cristianesimo, una religiosità sensibile ai messaggi di Erasmo e Lutero rielaborati in un contesto tipicamente spagnolo. Contro questa Spagna "spirituale" che aveva generato il teologo Juan de Valdés, Paolo IV volle correre alle armi, minacciando una vera e propria "crociata di scudi cristiani". Ma se Carlo V non volle mai scegliere tra la Spagna dell'Inquisizione e la Spagna "spirituale", la politica di Filippo II, dopo alcune incertezze iniziali, si orientò infine verso una durissima repressione. L'impegno di Paolo IV al fianco del nuovo sovrano può essere considerato un preludio della "svolta" di Filippo II negli anni successivi, allorché il figlio dell'"imperatore eretico" (secondo la definizione dello stesso papa Carafa) divenne il campione e difensore degli interessi del cattolicesimo romano contro eretici e infedeli, il campione della Controriforma e della lotta contro l'"internazionale protestante".

L'empereur Charles V était détesté par Paul IV pas seulement parce qu'il hésitait à réprimer l'hérésie en Allemagne, mais surtout parce qu'il protégeait en Espagne des personnages qui professaient une religion fortement influencée par des instances ascétiques et mystiques, qui recueillait l'héritage d'un très dangereux (suivant l'opinion de Paul IV) syncrétisme entre judaïsme, islamisme et christianisme, une religion sensible aux messages d'Erasme et de Luther adapté à un contexte typiquement espagnol: une religion interiorisée qui impliquait une devalorisation des pratiques exterieures et qui opponait à l'Eglise institutionelle, une Eglise de "parfaits", des saints, union mystique des croyants en Jésus-Christ. Contre cette Espagne qui avait généré le théologien Juan de Valdés, accusé d'avoir « infectato [.] tutta Italia de eresia » (infecté toute l'Italie d'hérésie) Paul IV voulut courir aux armes, en menaçant une véritable « crociata di scudi cristiani » (croisade d'écus chrétiens). Si Charles V ne voulut jamais chosir entre l'Espagne de l'Inquisition et l'Espagne des alumbrados, des moriscos et des luthériens, et si pendant son règne les adversaires de l'Inquisition purent à plusieurs fois gagner du terrain, la politique de Philippe II, après quelques incertitudes au début, fut orienté finalement avec décision vers une répression extrêmement dure. L'engagement de Paul IV aux côtés du nouveau souverain peut être considéré comme un prélude du « virage » de la politique de Philippe II aux années suivantes, lorsque le fils de « l'empereur hérétique » Charles V (« imperatore eretico » suivant la définition de Paul IV) devint le champion et le défenseur des intérêts du catholicisme romain contre les hérétiques et les infidèles, le champion de la Contre-Reforme et de la lutte contre l'« internationale protestante ». ; Carlo V era detestato da papa Paolo IV non solamente perché esitava a reprimere l'eresia nei territori tedeschi, ma soprattutto perché proteggeva in Spagna dei personaggi che professavano una religiosità profondamente influenzata da istanze ascetiche e mistiche, che raccoglieva l'eredità di un pericolosissimo (secondo papa Carafa) sincretismo tra giudaismo, islamismo e cristianesimo, una religiosità sensibile ai messaggi di Erasmo e Lutero rielaborati in un contesto tipicamente spagnolo. Contro questa Spagna "spirituale" che aveva generato il teologo Juan de Valdés, Paolo IV volle correre alle armi, minacciando una vera e propria "crociata di scudi cristiani". Ma se Carlo V non volle mai scegliere tra la Spagna dell'Inquisizione e la Spagna "spirituale", la politica di Filippo II, dopo alcune incertezze iniziali, si orientò infine verso una durissima repressione. L'impegno di Paolo IV al fianco del nuovo sovrano può essere considerato un preludio della "svolta" di Filippo II negli anni successivi, allorché il figlio dell'"imperatore eretico" (secondo la definizione dello stesso papa Carafa) divenne il campione e difensore degli interessi del cattolicesimo romano contro eretici e infedeli, il campione della Controriforma e della lotta contro l'"internazionale protestante".

L'empereur Charles V était détesté par Paul IV pas seulement parce qu'il hésitait à réprimer l'hérésie en Allemagne, mais surtout parce qu'il protégeait en Espagne des personnages qui professaient une religion fortement influencée par des instances ascétiques et mystiques, qui recueillait l'héritage d'un très dangereux (suivant l'opinion de Paul IV) syncrétisme entre judaïsme, islamisme et christianisme, une religion sensible aux messages d'Erasme et de Luther adapté à un contexte typiquement espagnol: une religion interiorisée qui impliquait une devalorisation des pratiques exterieures et qui opponait à l'Eglise institutionelle, une Eglise de "parfaits", des saints, union mystique des croyants en Jésus-Christ. Contre cette Espagne qui avait généré le théologien Juan de Valdés, accusé d'avoir « infectato [.] tutta Italia de eresia » (infecté toute l'Italie d'hérésie) Paul IV voulut courir aux armes, en menaçant une véritable « crociata di scudi cristiani » (croisade d'écus chrétiens). Si Charles V ne voulut jamais chosir entre l'Espagne de l'Inquisition et l'Espagne des alumbrados, des moriscos et des luthériens, et si pendant son règne les adversaires de l'Inquisition purent à plusieurs fois gagner du terrain, la politique de Philippe II, après quelques incertitudes au début, fut orienté finalement avec décision vers une répression extrêmement dure. L'engagement de Paul IV aux côtés du nouveau souverain peut être considéré comme un prélude du « virage » de la politique de Philippe II aux années suivantes, lorsque le fils de « l'empereur hérétique » Charles V (« imperatore eretico » suivant la définition de Paul IV) devint le champion et le défenseur des intérêts du catholicisme romain contre les hérétiques et les infidèles, le champion de la Contre-Reforme et de la lutte contre l'« internationale protestante ». ; Carlo V era detestato da papa Paolo IV non solamente perché esitava a reprimere l'eresia nei territori tedeschi, ma soprattutto perché proteggeva in Spagna dei personaggi che professavano una religiosità profondamente influenzata da istanze ascetiche e mistiche, che raccoglieva l'eredità di un pericolosissimo (secondo papa Carafa) sincretismo tra giudaismo, islamismo e cristianesimo, una religiosità sensibile ai messaggi di Erasmo e Lutero rielaborati in un contesto tipicamente spagnolo. Contro questa Spagna "spirituale" che aveva generato il teologo Juan de Valdés, Paolo IV volle correre alle armi, minacciando una vera e propria "crociata di scudi cristiani". Ma se Carlo V non volle mai scegliere tra la Spagna dell'Inquisizione e la Spagna "spirituale", la politica di Filippo II, dopo alcune incertezze iniziali, si orientò infine verso una durissima repressione. L'impegno di Paolo IV al fianco del nuovo sovrano può essere considerato un preludio della "svolta" di Filippo II negli anni successivi, allorché il figlio dell'"imperatore eretico" (secondo la definizione dello stesso papa Carafa) divenne il campione e difensore degli interessi del cattolicesimo romano contro eretici e infedeli, il campione della Controriforma e della lotta contro l'"internazionale protestante".

L'empereur Charles V était détesté par Paul IV pas seulement parce qu'il hésitait à réprimer l'hérésie en Allemagne, mais surtout parce qu'il protégeait en Espagne des personnages qui professaient une religion fortement influencée par des instances ascétiques et mystiques, qui recueillait l'héritage d'un très dangereux (suivant l'opinion de Paul IV) syncrétisme entre judaïsme, islamisme et christianisme, une religion sensible aux messages d'Erasme et de Luther adapté à un contexte typiquement espagnol: une religion interiorisée qui impliquait une devalorisation des pratiques exterieures et qui opponait à l'Eglise institutionelle, une Eglise de "parfaits", des saints, union mystique des croyants en Jésus-Christ. Contre cette Espagne qui avait généré le théologien Juan de Valdés, accusé d'avoir « infectato [.] tutta Italia de eresia » (infecté toute l'Italie d'hérésie) Paul IV voulut courir aux armes, en menaçant une véritable « crociata di scudi cristiani » (croisade d'écus chrétiens). Si Charles V ne voulut jamais chosir entre l'Espagne de l'Inquisition et l'Espagne des alumbrados, des moriscos et des luthériens, et si pendant son règne les adversaires de l'Inquisition purent à plusieurs fois gagner du terrain, la politique de Philippe II, après quelques incertitudes au début, fut orienté finalement avec décision vers une répression extrêmement dure. L'engagement de Paul IV aux côtés du nouveau souverain peut être considéré comme un prélude du « virage » de la politique de Philippe II aux années suivantes, lorsque le fils de « l'empereur hérétique » Charles V (« imperatore eretico » suivant la définition de Paul IV) devint le champion et le défenseur des intérêts du catholicisme romain contre les hérétiques et les infidèles, le champion de la Contre-Reforme et de la lutte contre l'« internationale protestante ». ; Carlo V era detestato da papa Paolo IV non solamente perché esitava a reprimere l'eresia nei territori tedeschi, ma soprattutto perché proteggeva in Spagna dei personaggi che professavano una religiosità profondamente influenzata da istanze ascetiche e mistiche, che raccoglieva l'eredità di un pericolosissimo (secondo papa Carafa) sincretismo tra giudaismo, islamismo e cristianesimo, una religiosità sensibile ai messaggi di Erasmo e Lutero rielaborati in un contesto tipicamente spagnolo. Contro questa Spagna "spirituale" che aveva generato il teologo Juan de Valdés, Paolo IV volle correre alle armi, minacciando una vera e propria "crociata di scudi cristiani". Ma se Carlo V non volle mai scegliere tra la Spagna dell'Inquisizione e la Spagna "spirituale", la politica di Filippo II, dopo alcune incertezze iniziali, si orientò infine verso una durissima repressione. L'impegno di Paolo IV al fianco del nuovo sovrano può essere considerato un preludio della "svolta" di Filippo II negli anni successivi, allorché il figlio dell'"imperatore eretico" (secondo la definizione dello stesso papa Carafa) divenne il campione e difensore degli interessi del cattolicesimo romano contro eretici e infedeli, il campione della Controriforma e della lotta contro l'"internazionale protestante".

Understanding al-Qaeda: History, Ideology, and Infrastructure is a critical analysis of the formation and evolution of the global terrorist organization commonly referred to as al-Qaeda. The work provides a foundation for understanding al-Qaeda's operations and organizational strategies by detailing its historical origins, ideological framework, and infrastructural installations. The thesis is divided into three segments, each containing two chapters. The first segment is devoted to a discussion of al-Qaeda's historical formation. The initial chapter relies on the investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the hunt for terrorist Ramzi Yousef as a point of departure in understanding al-Qaeda. This chapter sheds light on missed opportunities to weaken the terrorist network and reveals that the 1993 bombers were connected to one another through their embrace of radical Sunni Islam and violent political objectives. The next chapter traces the major events in the life of Osama bin Laden, explaining the connection between the Soviet-Afghan War and the rise of al-Qaeda, as well as illustrating how al-Qaeda has evolved since its beginnings as Maktab al-Khadimat, the "Services Office." The second segment represents an analytical reflection on al-Qaeda's ideology. Its first chapter explains the discourses of al-Qaeda's key ideologues, analyzes cornerstone al-Qaeda statements, and depicts how bin Laden's ideology fits into the larger spectrum of Islamic radicalism. "Tracking the Appeal of Islamism" examines how al-Qaeda's ideology has resonated in the Middle East, addressing such issues as political and economic instability in the Arab world, the popularity of bin Laden as a symbol of resistance, and al-Qaeda's exploitation of media and Internet resources. The final segment of the thesis discusses al-Qaeda's infrastructure, thereby providing a glimpse of what goes on "inside al-Qaeda." Its first chapter focuses on the recruitment and training of jihadists, answering the question, "Who joins the jihad and why?" The concluding chapter of the thesis tackles the debate on al-Qaeda's structure, arguing that the terror group should be understood as a social network, rather than as an organization. This final chapter also provides commentary on counter-terrorism techniques, demonstrating the importance of cooperation within the international intelligence community and the need for policymakers to engage in a critical assessment of al-Qaeda's history and US foreign policy. The sources cited in the thesis are relevant to today's discussion of al-Qaeda; most have been published or updated after September 11, 2001. Please note that Arabic names and terms have been transliterated in a manner that preserves accuracy as much as possible. A glossary is provided in the appendix to clarify the usage of these terms.

1. Terrorism, democracy and Islamist terrorism -- 2. Transnational Islamist terrorism : Al Qaeda -- 3. Islamist terrorism and national liberation : Hamas and Hizbullah -- 4. Islamist terrorism in domestic conflicts : the armed Islamist group in Algeria and the Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt -- 5. Moderation and Islamist movements in opposition : the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Nahda -- 6. Islamist moderation and the experience of government : Turkey's welfare and justice and development parties and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Die militärische Terrorismusbekämpfung der letzten eineinhalb Jahrzehnte gilt heute als kontraproduktiv. Hat der "War on Terror" die dschihadistischen Bewegungen tatsächlich gestärkt und ist er der Grund für ihre wachsende Anhängerzahl? Die kommunikations- und organisationstheoretischen Analysen gehen den Eskalationsmechanismen im Verhältnis von transnationalem Terrorismus und staatlicher Terrorismusbekämpfung nach. Die Studie zeigt: Der Identitätskonflikt zwischen modernen Gesellschaften und fundamentalistischer Weltanschauung lässt sich nur dann entschärfen, wenn sicherheitspolitische Überreaktionen vermieden werden.