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The growing awareness of educational options and the expansion of school choice have helped parents find and afford the learning environment that works best for their children, including Montessori and Catholic schools.

The dialogue between Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) and Jürgen Habermas:"Vorpolitische moralische Grundlagen eines freiheitlichen Staates" (2004)[Zur debatte, 1/2004, free access]Habermas: "I assume that the constitution of the liberal state can satisfy its need from legitimation in a modest way by drawing on the cognitive resources of a set of arguments that are independent of religious or metaphysical traditions." (....) "...the proceduralist conception of Kantian inspiration insists on an autonomous grounding of constitutional principles that claims to be rationally acceptable to all citizens."The liberal state is not incapable of "reproducing the motivations on which it depends from its own secular resources.""(....) the secular character of the constitutional state does not exhibit any internal weakness inherent in the political system as such that jeopardizes its ability to stabilize itself in a cognitive or motivational sense. This does not exclude external reasons. An uncontrolled modernization of society as a whole could certainly corrode democratic bonds and undermine the form of solidarity on which the democratic state depends even though it cannot enforce it. (....) Evidence of such a corrosion of civic solidarity can be found in the larger context of the politically uncontrolled dynamics of the global economy and global society."(English translation in Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Polity, 2008), pp. 101-113.

Teil I dieses Artikels findet ihr hier. Mit dieser und anderen diversen diskriminierenden Maßnahmen, die sich auch dezidiert gegen das polnische Vereinsweisen richteten, förderten die Behörden vielerorts das Nationalbewusstsein der Zugewanderten nur weiter. Dies war allerdings nur eine Seite der Medaille: Längst nicht alle Ruhrpol:innen schlossen sich dem polnischen Vereinswesen ... mehr
Der Beitrag Ruhrpol:innen im Vereinswesen II erschien zuerst auf Demokratiegeschichten.

Kurz rezensiert

Here on Political Economy, I sit down with Joe Antos to discuss the current state of Medicare and its systemic challenges. What follows is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.
The post The State of Medicare: My Long-Read Q&A with Joseph Antos appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

A flurry of investment bank newsletters (Wells Fargo, GS) impels me to look at what happened to the aggregate trade balance in the wake of Trump's tariff hikes: Source: Wells Fargo. The US trade-weighted tariff rate against world imports roughly doubled to nearly 3%. What happened to aggregate net exports and the current account, expressed […]

Yesterday, I posted a reply to John Cochrane's Sept 4 post on the national debt. John alerted me to his Sept 6 update, which I somehow missed. Given this update (together with some personal correspondence), let me offer my own update. John begins with an equation describing the flow of government revenue and expenditure. With a debt/GDP ratio of one, the sustainable (primary) deficit/GDP ratio is given by g - r, where g = growth rate of NGDP and r = nominal interest rate on government debt (I include Federal Reserve liabilities and currency in this measure). John assumed g - r = 1% (so about $200B). In a post I published last year, I assumed g - r = 3% (so about $600B); see here: Is the U.S. Budget Deficit Sustainable? Two things to take away from these calculations. First, this arithmetic suggests that the U.S. federal government can easily run persistent primary budget deficits in the range of 1-3% of GDP. Not only does the debt not need to be paid off, but it can grow forever. Second, primary budget deficits are presently far in excess of this range. What does this imply?Let's step back and think about John's equation. The arithmetic of the government "budget constraint" basically says this:Deficit/GDP = [1 - (1+r)/(1+g)] x Debt/GDPNote that a sustainable primary deficit is only possible if r < g. If r > g, then a primary surplus is needed to service the interest expense of the debt. Students of monetary theory may recognize the expression above as a Laffer curve for inflation finance. That is, in the case of currency we have r = 0. Let g represent the growth rate of the supply of currency and assume a constant RGDP (so that g also measures the growth rate of NGDP). Finally, replace debt with currency, so that Seigniorage revenue = [1 - 1/(1+g)] x Money/GDP Again, this is just arithmetic. Economic theory comes in through the assumption that the demand for money is decreasing in the rate of inflation, g. If this is true, then an increase in g has two opposing effects: it increases seigniorage revenue by increasing the inflation tax rate, but it lowers seigniorage revenue because it decreases the inflation tax base. There is a maximum amount of seigniorage revenue the government can collect by printing money. That is, there are limits to inflation finance. (See also my post here.)Now, I know John is fond of saying that Federal Reserve liabilities and U.S. Treasury securities are essentially the same thing (especially if the former exist mainly as interest-bearing reserve accounts). I happen to agree with this view. But then we can use exactly the same logic to characterize the limits to bond finance, recognizing that U.S. Treasury securities are essentially money. To this end, assume that the Debt/GDP ratio is an increasing function of (r - g). To make things a little simpler, let me continue to assume zero RGDP growth, so that g represents both inflation and NGDP growth. Finally, let me assume that r is a monetary policy choice (just as setting r = 0 for currency is a policy choice). Next, we need a theory of inflation. In the models I work with, the rate of inflation in a steady state is determined by the growth rate of the nominal debt, g, which I also treat as a policy parameter. So, the magnitude r - g is policy-determined, at least, within some limits. By lowering r and increasing g, the government is making its securities less attractive for people to hold. But this just tells us that the demand for debt is lower than it otherwise might be--it does not tell us how large this demand is in the first place, or how it is likely to evolve over time owing to factors unrelated to r or g (e.g., regulatory demand, foreign demand, etc.).So, with this apparatus in place, my interpretation of what worries John is the question of what happens if [1] the federal government finds itself near the top of the bond-seigniorage Laffer curve; and [2] a shock occurs that requires a large fiscal stimulus. Barring alternative forms of securing resources (e.g., through direct command/conscription), the government will not have the fiscal capacity to lay claim against the resources it needs. Printing more money/bonds here is not going to help even with zero interest rates. The ensuing inflation would simply put us on the right-hand-side of the Laffer curve -- the government's ability to secure resources would only diminish. Assuming I have captured at least a part of John's concern accurately, let me go on to critique it. To begin, there's nothing wrong with the logic I spelled out (I don't think). But I want to make a couple of points nevertheless.First, the demand for U.S. government securities (D/Y) seems to be growing very rapidly and for a very long time now. We know, anecdotally, that the UST is used widely as collateral in credit derivatives markets and repo, that foreign countries view it as a safe asset, that investors value its safety, and that recent changes to Dodd-Frank and Basel III have contributed to the regulatory demand for USTs. The global demand for the U.S. dollar is, if anything, growing more rapidly than ever (re: the recent "dollar shortages" that resulted in the Fed opening its central bank swap lines). We don't know where this limit is, but judging by how low U.S. inflation is (together with low UST yields), it seems fair to day that there's still plenty of fiscal capacity. (And I want to stress that this has nothing to do with the ability of a country to pay back its debt -- I'm not sure why John keeps mentioning this while at the same time understanding that this debt is money). I suspect that John is likely to agree with what I just said. Sure, there may be more room now, but how much more? With bipartisan concern for debt absent in Congress, with no sign of inflation in sight, with interest rates so low, how can we not hit this limit at some point?My own view is that we are bound to hit this limit (though, economists like Simon Wren-Lewis have warned me not to discount the forces of austerity). The question is what happens once we hit that limit? I say we get USD depreciation and some inflation (not hyperinflation). John seems to be worried about hyperinflation after all, which he likens to a debt rollover crisis. I just don't see it. (Of course, if John is simply suggesting that the fiscal authority will continue to run persistently large deficits in the face of high inflation, then I agree with him. While I don't see this happening, who can say for sure?)Finally, what happens if we're near the debt limit and there's a shock. Well, what type of shock exactly? The type of shock that hit us in 2008 is likely to increase the demand for debt, expanding fiscal capacity. So, here too, I'm not sure what form the debt crisis is supposed to take. It would be great to appeal to a model (but please, not one of Greece). 

Teil I dieses Beitrags ist hier zu finden. Die Unterstützung demokratischer Bewegung aus dem Ausland in diktatorischen oder autokratischen Staaten ist aktueller denn je. Schauen wir etwa auf die belarussische Bürgerrechtlerin Maryja Kalesnikawa. Bis 2020 lebte die Musikerin in Deutschland und schloss sich dann der belarussischen Demokratiebewegung an. Seit Herbst ... mehr
Der Beitrag Die Unterstützung der Opposition in der DDR aus DDR-Migranten II erschien zuerst auf Demokratiegeschichten.

Teil I dieses Beitrags ist hier zu finden. Erste Handgreiflichkeiten arten aus Zunächst halten Angehörige der USPD, der KPD und der Betriebsrätezentrale politische Reden, werben erneut für die Räterepublik und verdammen das geplante BRG. Doch als die Reden fertig sind, löst sich die Menge nicht auf – Kalkül der Veranstaltenden ... mehr
Der Beitrag Gewaltsamer Superlativ der Protestgeschichte – das Blutbad vor dem Reichstag (II) erschien zuerst auf Demokratiegeschichten.

Teil I dieses Beitrags ist hier zu finden. Rollenklärung – Wer macht was? Die US-Verfassung legt fest, dass das amerikanische Volk den Präsidenten (Exekutive) über sogenannte Wahlmänner wählt. Im Grund bekannt, aber stets wiederholungsbedürftig: Als die Verfassung Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Kraft trat, gehörten Frauen, Native Americans, Sklav:innen und ... mehr
Der Beitrag "Wir, das Volk …" – die Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika II erschien zuerst auf Demokratiegeschichten.

Despite intervening economic progress and medical advance, mortality rates in America were no better for the Class of 1990 by the time they reached their late 20s than in their parents' generation, 30 years earlier.
The post Who Won the Cold War? Part II appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

Rightso! Novels. My three runaway favourite novels this year, which I recommend to you wholeheartedly, are Rumaan Alam's Leave the World Behind, Vajra Chandrasekera's The Saint of Bright Doors and, friend of this parish, Francis Spufford's Cahokia Jazz. Cahokia Jazz I want to write something dedicated about, and imminently, so let me tell you about […]

Bing prompt: "Draw a businessman leaving China".Hot on the heels of the previous post about how Chinese are showing at the United States' southern border seeking asylum from increasingly dire economic conditions in the PRC, we get more news of this sort. Just as people are leaving China, so is capital: For the first time its records, the PRC has seen a net outflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). On balance, more FDI is leaving than entering China, once the world's most notable destination for investment. From the Nikkei Asia Review: Outflows of foreign direct investment in China have exceeded inflows
for the first time as tensions with the U.S. over semiconductor
technology and concerns about increased anti-spying activity heighten
risks. The shift was reflected in balance-of-payments data for the
July-September quarter released Friday by the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange.FDI came to minus $11.8 billion, with more
withdrawals and downsizing than new investments for factory construction
and other purposes. This marked the first negative figure in data going
back to 1998.To be sure, there are overseas precursors for this shift. The US is keen on banning cutting-edge knowledge on semiconductors and artificial intelligence from leaking to China:Escalating tensions with the U.S. are one reason for the decline in
foreign investment. In a survey taken last fall by the American Chamber
of Commerce in the People's Republic of China, 66% of member respondents
cited rising bilateral tensions as a business challenge in China. In August, the U.S. announced tighter restrictions on chip
and artificial intelligence investment in China. Washington is
coordinating with Beijing ahead of a summit meeting between Presidents
Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in November, but the U.S. remains committed to
technology restrictions in the name of economic security.Looking
at foreign investment in the semiconductor field by destination, China's
share has already shrunk from 48% in 2018 to 1% in 2022, according to
U.S. research firm Rhodium Group. In contrast, the U.S. share rose from zero to 37%. The combined share of India, Singapore and Malaysia grew from 10% to 38%.However, American chip and AI concerns obviously do not make up all potential sources of FDI to China. It is here where a decidedly unfriendly foreign investment policy climate factors in. You name it: from corporate espionage to various forms of harassment of overseas businesses under dubious pretenses... today's PRC leadership does not think much of how others perceive these actions meant to promote domestic industry at the expense of foreign concerns. Europeans, for instance, cite only cosmetic efforts to improve prospects for FDI:Beijing has been seeking to reverse capital outflows in the face of mounting economic challenges. But such efforts appear to have failed to assure investors. The China International Import Expo (CIIE), an annual event
launched by President Xi Jinping in 2018 to portray China as an open
market and improve its trade ties, kicked off on Sunday. But the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China criticized the event last week as a "showcase."



"European businesses are becoming disillusioned as symbolic
gestures take the place of tangible results needed to restore business
confidence," the chamber said in a Friday statement. "The CIIE was originally intended as a showcase of China's opening
up and reform agenda, but it has proven to be largely smoke and mirrors
so far," Carlo D'Andrea, vice president of the chamber, said in the
statement. Having done nearly everything possible to discourage FDI, is it any wonder it's leaving China?

Days away from the Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and United for Hungary, the opposition camps are fierce in their campaigns, particularly in the message they pass to the electorate via billboards. In this piece, I like to draw comparisons between the billboards used by Fidesz and the opposition political parties, highlight which […]
The post Billboard Politics in Hungary– Hungarian Parliamentary Elections (II) appeared first on Gulay Icoz.