Suchergebnisse

The problem this article seeks to deal with is that legal standards are insufficient to support the needs of judicial governance in Europe (i.e. in terms of efficiency, public accountability and modernisation (in terms of technology) in interfacing with and meeting public needs. Given this problem, I will look at what approach should be taken instead. This article posits that an inter-disciplinary approach, taking in law, politics, economics and management, should be taken: i.e. a discipline of judicial governance.I am going to reintroduce the principle of accountability from a different perspective than the traditional constitutional and legal perspective that focuses mainly upon judicial independence, procedural law and human rights. My theory is that there should be an inter-disciplinary approach to judicial governance. Legal standards are insufficient by themselves to hold the judicial office to account, given the requirements for increased accountability by politicians (for the functioning of courts); the public (for unpopular and seemingly unjust outcomes of judgments); and internally to their peers, both judicial and administrative (for the functioning of individual organisations and judges).

The problem this article seeks to deal with is that legal standards are insufficient to support the needs of judicial governance in Europe (i.e. in terms of efficiency, public accountability and modernisation (in terms of technology) in interfacing with and meeting public needs. Given this problem, I will look at what approach should be taken instead. This article posits that an inter-disciplinary approach, taking in law, politics, economics and management, should be taken: i.e. a discipline of judicial governance.I am going to reintroduce the principle of accountability from a different perspective than the traditional constitutional and legal perspective that focuses mainly upon judicial independence, procedural law and human rights. My theory is that there should be an inter-disciplinary approach to judicial governance. Legal standards are insufficient by themselves to hold the judicial office to account, given the requirements for increased accountability by politicians (for the functioning of courts); the public (for unpopular and seemingly unjust outcomes of judgments); and internally to their peers, both judicial and administrative (for the functioning of individual organisations and judges).

Chapter 1: Introduction. Democracy and judicial governance in Europe -- Chapter 2: The trade-offs of judicial governance -- Chapter 3: Modernization, democracy and judicial governance -- Chapter 4: Independent judicial councils and democratic quality: a set-theoretical approach -- Chapter 5: Conclusions and some policy reflections -- Appendix 1. Classification and justification of models of judicial governance -- Appendix 2. Database for replication of statistical analyses -- Appendix 3. QCA data matrix for replication of analyses.

Law and governance need to be justified vis-à-vis citizens in order to be accepted as legitimate and supported by civil society. This contribution argues that the legal and judicial methodologies of multilevel governance for international public goods need to be changed in order to protect basic needs and human rights of citizens more effectively. I define legal methodology in terms of the conceptions of the sources and 'rules of recognition' of law, the methods of interpretation, the functions and systemic nature of multilevel legal systems like IEL, and of the relationships between rules, principles, political and legal institutions and related practices. Section I recalls the historical evolution from 'good governance' to third-party adjudication and individual rights of access to justice. Section II discusses eight models of multilevel judicial governance in Europe. Section III uses constitutional and 'public goods' theories in order to explain the multiple functions of courts of justice and the increasing importance of judicial cooperation (comity) in protecting transnational rule of law in European and international economic law (IEL). Section IV argues that the diverse 'constitutional methods' applied by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) offer important lessons for multilevel judicial governance in IEL beyond Europe. Section V concludes by emphasizing the judicial task of administering justice in IEL and the need for limiting the existing 'legal' and 'doctrinal fragmentation' through multilevel judicial protection of transnational rule of law for the benefit not only of governments, but also of citizens as legal subjects and 'democratic owners' of IEL.

Während der Wandel der Staatlichkeit im Kontext von Europäisierung und Globalisierung vielfach diskutiert wird, bleibt der Wandel des Rechts unter diesen Bedingungen bisher unterbelichtet. In dieser Arbeit werden Begriffe aus dem politikwissenschaftlichen Governance-Diskurs auf die Entwicklung des Rechts bezogen und gesellschaftstheoretisch ausgedeutet. Mit dem Judicial-Governance-Konzept wird das Spannungsfeld zwischen nationaler Politik, europäisiertem Recht und globalisierter Wirtschaft verdeutlicht, in dem die Verfassung der Gesellschaft ausgehandelt wird - und auch zum Streitgegenstand vor Gericht gerät. In systemtheoretischer, diskurstheoretischer, strukturfunktionalistischer und politökonomischer Perspektive wird die konstitutive Bedeutung des Rechts für die Entwicklung einer europäischen Gesellschaft (und perspektivisch einer Weltgesellschaft) erschlossen, die nicht von Staaten, sondern von Bürgern getragen wird. Auf diese Weise entsteht ein facettenreiches Bild der Integration durch Recht jenseits des Staates. Die Rechtsprechung in der europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft - insbesondere die richterrechtliche Prägung der Wirtschaftsverfassung - erscheint so in einem neuen Licht

Judicial Governance in Indonesia Judicial independence under The One Roof System Summary The one roof system, a judicial governance model in Indonesia, where the Supreme Court holds the technical judicial authority and court administration authority, is considered rare among prevailing systems around the world. The idea of distancing courts from managerial issues by establishing a judicial council has been accepted as the solution in many countries around the world. However, it is clearly just the opposite in the Indonesian system, which has chosen to give the managerial function to the Supreme Court. Progress has been made since its implementation, but significant problems remain. This research aims to understand whether the one roof system has achieved its goal and what are the effects to the judiciary. It also presents the dilemmas around judicial governance to balance the principle of management and judicial independence. Historical overview to trace back the idea of the one roof system since 1958, and interviews have been conducted to justices, judges, and high-ranking managers in Indonesia. The findings suggest that threats to the institutional independence of the judiciary by the government have been significantly reduced. However the centralization of power may eventually lead to possible infringements of the internal and core independence of judges from within the judiciary itself. Further, this system changes the landscape of the relationships between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The institutional alienation as a result of greater autonomy of the judiciary from the government and parliament has resulted in a disconnect in the legislative and policymaking process concerning judicial organization. The evaluation also reveals that the quality management approach can be used to solve the problems of internal accountability of the one roof system, however, the application of quality management is limited by the quality of the legal framework in the arrangements for the fundamentals of the organization. In a large organization like the Indonesian judiciary, with its diverse geographical, unstable political condition and contextual challenges, the application of quality management to promote change can be difficult to control.

Through the acknowledgment and balancing of the conflicting fundamental rights at stake in a private litigation, the courts 'govern' societal relationships. This judicial governance complements and adjusts the governance of the concerned societal relationships that takes place at the legislative level. This paper discusses a number of societal governance policies pursued, consciously or inconsciously, by national courts while deciding on private relationships through the application of fundamental rights. Thereby it considers casesdecided by courts in Germany, England, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,Sweden and Spain. One may observe six major policy trends underlying these decisions: (1)the fight against discrimination, (2) the protection of weaker parties in contract cases, (3) the increasing valorisation of non-economic interests in tort cases, (4) the protection of privacy from intrusions by media, (5) the protection of political rights in privately owned public spaces, and (6) environmental protection in property cases.