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Laurence H. Tribe questions Mark Tushnet's (2005) recommendation of passing a Constitutional amendment that would remove judicial review from US courts. After acknowledging that some liberals & progressives have advocated the removal of judicial review authority from US courts, it is asserted that these individuals have not adequately contemplated the potential ramifications of removing this check against the executive branch. In response to Tushnet's article, Jeremy Waldron expresses guarded support for Tribe's proposed End Judicial Review Amendment. It is stated that dismissing judicial review would augment the political authority of the general population by superseding the opinions of non-elected officials & would made legislators more publicly accountable; nevertheless, it is suggested that weak judicial review be maintained to allow courts the opportunity to present unconstitutional or incompatible aspects of legislation into public purview. In response, Mark Tushnet considers the practicality of Waldron's call for maintaining weak judicial review & critiques Tribe's delineation of US politics as driven by interests & ultimately rejects his argument for keeping judicial review. J. W. Parker

New works by five young political scientists are establishing a new paradigm for studying judicial review. In different ways, Terri Peretti, Ran Hirschl, George Lovell, Kevin McMahon, & Thomas Keck point out that judicial review is established & maintained by elected officials. Adjudication is one of many means that politicians & political movements employ when seeking to make their constitutional visions the law of the land. Elected officials provide vital political foundations for judicial power by creating constitutional courts, vesting those courts with jurisdiction over constitutional questions, staffing those courts with judges prone to exercising judicial power, assisting or initiating litigation aimed at having those courts declare laws unconstitutional, & passing legislation that encourages justices to make public policy in the guise of statutory or constitutional interpretation. Judicial review does not serve to thwart or legitimate popular majorities; rather, it is a practice that alters the balance of power between the numerous political movements that struggle for power in a pluralist democracy. 1 Appendix, 47 References. Adapted from the source document.

Judicial review in Palestine is a record under which executive and legislative actions are subject to review by the judiciary. Judicial review in Palestine is one of the checks and balances in the separation of powers: the power of the judiciary to supervise the legislative and executive branches when the latter exceed their authority. The doctrine varies between jurisdictions, so the procedure and scope of judicial review may differ between and within countries.

Introduction : reconstructing judicial review -- The dual nature of law and the methodoogy of this study : constructive interpretation -- Judicial review and values -- An operative interpretation of judicial review : social practice and the Administrative Court's caseload -- An operative interpretation of judicial review : community justice -- An operative taxonomy of grounds of review : Part one -- An operative taxonomy of grounds of review : Part two -- A target interpretation of judicial review and judicial rationality -- Judicial review for the advancement of justice and good governance