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This text to be published in a handbook of political science offers a political sociology of the judiciary. ; Ce texte à paraître dans un Manuel de science politique propose une sociologie politique du pouvoir judiciaire.

The article analyzes judicial activism, based on a pretext that is to comment on Lambert's work, which will exercise a powerful influence in France in terms of judicial review of the law, and which allows some "lessons from a classic" to be drawn; in the contemporary perspective, in light of the old dogma of the "separation of powers" and the fundamental decisions about the rule of law and democracy. ; El artículo analiza el activismo judicial, a partir de un pretexto que es comentar la obra de Lambert, que ejercerá en Francia una poderosa influencia en materia de revisión judicial de la ley, y que permite extraer algunas "lecciones de un clásico";, situadas en la perspectiva contemporánea, a la luz del viejo dogma de la "separación de poderes" y de las decisiones fundamentales acerca del Estado de Derecho y la democracia.

The modern principles of judiciary, being an integrative constitutional-theoretical category, are the object of scientific research from the point of view of a meaningful interpretation, as well as the specific nature of formalization, including its the comparative legal aspect. In this regard, the research subject of this article is represented by the norms of the constitutions of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The article presents the analysis results, which allowed us identifying the non-standard approaches to consolidate the constitutional principles of the judiciary in the focus group of acts. We associate these approaches with the compositional specific nature of principle reflection, as well as with the variably-substantive aspect, which quantitatively and qualitatively supplements the standard list of required fundamental ideas.

Uno de los ma?s dan?inos flagelos que azotan nuestras sociedades es la corrupcio?n vista desde diversos a?ngulos y acciones. Vargas solo ve al Poder Judicial como objeto de la corrupcio?n, como ente corruptible, mas no como una institucio?n encargada precisamente de controlar la corrupcio?n. La u?nica forma eficaz de superar los problemas ende?micos de corrupcio?n en nuestros sistemas judiciales es afrontar derechamente las profundas disfunciones que estos manifiestan que constituyen las reales causas de los serios problemas de corrupcio?n que los aquejan. Klitgaard formaliza el feno?meno de la corrupcio?n de la siguiente manera: Corrupcio?n = poder monopo?lico + arbitrio – responsabilidad. Villoria manifiesta que hay casos en que la judicatura no es un obsta?culo contra la corrupcio?n, sino un elemento esencial en su reproduccio?n y desarrollo, siendo un ejemplo de corrupcio?n que contribuye a la deslegitimacio?n del sistema poli?tico y corroe los cimientos de la gobernabilidad. Si se analizan, entonces, los problemas de los sistemas judiciales, con el objetivo de buscar soluciones a sus altos niveles de corrupcio?n administrativa, nos encontrari?amos con: una organizacio?n ineficaz, la precariedad del empleo, desprecio de la ley, amiguismo, delegaciones, abogados corruptores, silencio y jerarqui?a judicial cooptada. Palabras clave: Corrupcio?n, Rama Judicial, Monopolio, Amiguismo. One of the most damaging scourges afflicting our societies corruption is viewed from different angles and actions. Vargas only sees the judiciary as an object of corruption as a corruptible body, not as an institution to precisely control corruption. The only effective way to overcome the endemic problems of corruption in our judicial system is straight addressing the root dysfunctions they say they are the real causes of serious corruption problems that afflict them. Klitgaard formalizes the phenomenon of corruption as follows: Corruption = monopoly power + discretion - accountability. Villoria states that there are cases where the judiciary is not a barrier against corruption, but an essential element in its reproduction and development, an example of corruption that contributes to the legitimization of the political system and undermines the very foundations of governance. If analyzed, then, the problems of judicial systems, with the goal of finding solutions to their high levels of administrative corruption, we would find an ineffective organization, job insecurity, lawlessness, cronyism, offices, lawyers corrupters, silence and coopted judicial hierarchy. Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Monopoly, Cronyism. ; Uno de los ma?s dan?inos flagelos que azotan nuestras sociedades es la corrupcio?n vista desde diversos a?ngulos y acciones. Vargas solo ve al Poder Judicial como objeto de la corrupcio?n, como ente corruptible, mas no como una institucio?n encargada precisamente de controlar la corrupcio?n. La u?nica forma eficaz de superar los problemas ende?micos de corrupcio?n en nuestros sistemas judiciales es afrontar derechamente las profundas disfunciones que estos manifiestan que constituyen las reales causas de los serios problemas de corrupcio?n que los aquejan. Klitgaard formaliza el feno?meno de la corrupcio?n de la siguiente manera: Corrupcio?n = poder monopo?lico + arbitrio – responsabilidad. Villoria manifiesta que hay casos en que la judicatura no es un obsta?culo contra la corrupcio?n, sino un elemento esencial en su reproduccio?n y desarrollo, siendo un ejemplo de corrupcio?n que contribuye a la deslegitimacio?n del sistema poli?tico y corroe los cimientos de la gobernabilidad. Si se analizan, entonces, los problemas de los sistemas judiciales, con el objetivo de buscar soluciones a sus altos niveles de corrupcio?n administrativa, nos encontrari?amos con: una organizacio?n ineficaz, la precariedad del empleo, desprecio de la ley, amiguismo, delegaciones, abogados corruptores, silencio y jerarqui?a judicial cooptada. Palabras clave: Corrupcio?n, Rama Judicial, Monopolio, Amiguismo. One of the most damaging scourges afflicting our societies corruption is viewed from different angles and actions. Vargas only sees the judiciary as an object of corruption as a corruptible body, not as an institution to precisely control corruption. The only effective way to overcome the endemic problems of corruption in our judicial system is straight addressing the root dysfunctions they say they are the real causes of serious corruption problems that afflict them. Klitgaard formalizes the phenomenon of corruption as follows: Corruption = monopoly power + discretion - accountability. Villoria states that there are cases where the judiciary is not a barrier against corruption, but an essential element in its reproduction and development, an example of corruption that contributes to the legitimization of the political system and undermines the very foundations of governance. If analyzed, then, the problems of judicial systems, with the goal of finding solutions to their high levels of administrative corruption, we would find an ineffective organization, job insecurity, lawlessness, cronyism, offices, lawyers corrupters, silence and coopted judicial hierarchy. Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Monopoly, Cronyism.

The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president's powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform. ; El Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha sido ineficaz en su misión constitucional de ayudar a defender la independencia de jueces y tribunales frente a presiones de los demás poderes, dignificados o eficientes. La forma en que se designa a sus integrantes y el modo en que éstos eligen luego a los principales cargos judiciales ha puesto de manifiesto su dependencia de los partidos políticos. Pero la reforma de 2013 no resuelve estos problemas, incumple previsiones constitucionales de pluralismo en su composición y de colegialidad y añade otros nuevos como consecuencia de su presidencialismo y transfiere una parte sustancial de sus poderes al Ejecutivo. Supone un retroceso deliberado hacia el sistema de gobierno preconstitucional: una genuina Contrarreforma.The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as ...

The perception of the Judicial Council is, throughout its existence, too often associated to partisan or corporative interests. This has caused the image of the judiciary to suffer as a whole. One way to avoid dependence on outside interests is the procedure to appoint its members. Until now, three systems were tested, but none proved to be effective for the intended aims. This essay formulates a new appointment system proposal for the Council's members, involving the direct participation of judges and the legislature. It pursues the following objectives: to observe the democratic principle, and to facilitate and promote the participation of all judges and magistrates in the election of its governing body —thus ensuring a plural and inclusive body—. Additionally, other measures are formulated in order to limit outside influences and pressure on the Council, to promote the election of its members based primarily on merit and ability, and to steer the Council back to its strict mandate of defending judicial independence and Justice interests. ; La imagen del Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha estado vinculada en demasiadas ocasiones a intereses partidistas o asociativos a lo largo de su existencia, dañándose con ello la propia imagen del Poder Judicial en su conjunto. Uno de los mecanismos para evitar esa dependencia de intereses externos lo constituye el modo en que se eligen sus vocales. Hasta la fecha se han ensayado tres modelos, pero ninguno ha resultado eficaz a los efectos señalados. Este trabajo propone un nuevo mecanismo de elección de los miembros del Consejo, con participación directa de jueces y de nuestros representantes en el Parlamento, que persigue los siguientes objetivos: respetar el principio democrático, y facilitar y promover la participación de todos los jueces y magistrados en la elección de su órgano de gobierno —asegurando un órgano plural e integrador—. Igualmente, se proponen medidas para limitar las influencias y presiones externas sobre el Consejo, para propiciar que la elección de ...

Abstract:The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the General Council of the Judiciary, as an organ for the Judiciary government. Since of its creaction on 1980,this organ has been objet of a constant process of reforming that shows how the Conuncil hasn't achieved to find its place in institutional system and how this organ couldn't consolidate itself under a stable model. The last most important reform, the Organic Law 4/2013, reforming the CGPJ, has introduced in a reformulation of the structure and functions of the Council, and a new way of election of its members, thus constituting. This paper presents the evolution and the changes about of Council in forty years of constitutional vigence and analyzes the reform, the new position and place of Council and its organs, the doubts on the functioning of the Council, and the questions that today remain open. ; Resumen:La Constitución española de 1978 consagró el Consejo General del Poder Judicial, como órgano de gobierno del Poder Judicial. Desde su creación en 1980, este órgano ha estado sometido a constantes reformas, en un proceso de continuas modificaciones que han derivado en un órgano que no parece haber encontrado su lugar en el sistema institucional, y no ha podido consolidarse. La última reforma más importante, la Ley Orgánica 4/2013, de reforma del CGPJ, ha introducido una nueva reformulación del modo de elección, la estructura y las funciones del CGPJ. El presente trabajo expone la evolución y los cambios habidos en el Consejo en estos cuarenta años de vigencia constitucional, y analiza el régimen establecido por la reforma de 2013, la nueva posición del Consejo y de sus órganos de funcionamiento, la dudas sobre el funcionamiento que plantea y las cuestiones que aún siguen abiertas.Abstract:The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the General Council of the Judiciary, as an organ for the Judiciary government. Since of its creaction on 1980,this organ has been objet of a constant process of reforming that shows how the Conuncil hasn't achieved to find its place in institutional system and how this organ couldn't consolidate itself under a stable model. The last most important reform, the Organic Law 4/2013, reforming the CGPJ, has introduced in a reformulation of the structure and functions of the Council, and a new way of election of its members, thus constituting. This paper presents the evolution and the changes about of Council in forty years of constitutional vigence and analyzes the reform, the new position and place of Council and its organs, the doubts on the functioning of the Council, and the questions that today remain open. Summary:I. The reception of the Judiciary government in the Spanish Constitution: forty years about the General Council of the Judiciary.II. Regulation present and open questions. 1. About the Organic Law 4/2013, for reforming the CGPJ. 2. Elections system, status of its members and restaffinf of the organ.3. Organic Structure of the General Council of the Judiciary and questions about the functioning of its organs.4. Powers of the General Council of the Judiciary. 5. Relationship between the General Council of the Judiciary and the Spanish Parlament: the Appearance of the President anf the members of Council before the House of Representatives.III. Ultimate considerations.

El Consejo General del Poder Judicial en España se reconoce en el art. 122 de la CE como el órgano de gobierno de la judicatura, y se inscribe en la tendencia del constitucionalismo moderno dirigida a introducir una garantía institucional de la independencia judicial corporeizada en consejos de la magistratura que, a la vez que garantizan en sí mismos la independencia judicial, garantizan tendencialmente mejor la independencia judicial de los jueces individuales al detraer la gestión del estatuto judicial de las manos del Poder Ejecutivo. En este trabajo se desarrolla de manera crítica la configuración del mismo en nuestra Constitución. ; The General Council of the Judiciary in Spain is being recognized in the art. 122 of the CE as the organ of government of the judiciary, and may be included in the tendency of the modern constitutionalism headed to enter an institutional guarantee of the judicial independence embodied in councils of Magistrates that, at the same time that they guarantee the judicial independence, they ensure the independence of the individual judges eliminating the management of the judicial statute of the hands of the Executive Power. In this work we develops, critical way, the configuration of the General Council of the Judiciary in our Constitution.

El presente artículo participa de la discusión en torno al lawfare en América Latina, situación que es centro de intensos debates que exceden lo normativo, posicionándose como un tema complejo que atraviesa principalmente la geopolítica en la región. El trabajo toma el caso de Argentina en los últimos cinco años, para verificar la existencia del lawfare como una herramienta real en la disputa política en el país. Se analizan particularmente los cruces entre el poder judicial, los medios de comunicación y la política, en Argentina, que es en definitiva un eslabón de una situación histórica continental. Por último, se reflexiona sobre un posible momento refundacional en cuanto a la organización y construcción del Estado a partir de la pandemia del COVID - 19. Palabras clave: lawfare, Poder Judicial, comunicación, Estado, política Argentina. Abstract This article aims to participate in the discussion around lawfare in Latin America, a situation that is the center of intense debates that go beyond the normative, positioning itself as a complex issue that mainly crosses geopolitics in our region. The work takes the case of Argentina in the last five years, to verify the existence of lawfare as a real tool in the political dispute in the country. The intersections between the judiciary, the media and politics in Argentina, which is ultimately a link in a continental historical situation, are particularly analyzed. Finally, it is reflected whether or not we are in a refundational moment regarding the organization and construction of the State from the COVID - 19 pandemia. Keywords: lawfare, Judiciary, communication, State, Argentina politics.

The paper departs from the analytical premise that the current regulation of the judiciary in Chile establishes conditions that subject judges to the commanding power of the Supreme Court and to lesser extent of the appeal courts. Particularly important at the time of appointments and promotions, this affects the independence of judges in their judicial work. It is suggested that the government on the judiciary must be modified. It is proposed to incorporate into the Constitution a body with the characteristics of a Council of the Judiciary to administer the basic issues of the courts. With this purpose it is critically discussed how this kind of body has worked in different countries, namely Italy, Spain and Colombia. ; En el trabajo se establecen como premisas de análisis entre otras el que en Chile la regulación orgánica de la judicatura crea las condiciones para que en la designación o en la carrera judicial los jueces se vean sometidos a un poder de mando de la Corte Suprema y en menor medida de las Cortes de Apelaciones y del Ejecutivo. Esta situación afecta la independencia de los jueces en su trabajo jurisdiccional. Se postula de esta manera que el gobierno sobre la judicatura debe ser modificado. Se propone incorporar a la Constitución un órgano del tipo Consejo de la Judicatura para que administre las cuestiones básicas de los tribunales de justicia. Para ello se analiza críticamente cómo ha funcionado este órgano en distintos países: Italia, España y Colombia.

Brazil has embarked on many of the judicial reforms taking place in other Latin American countries. Since 1985 there have been ovo waves of reform. The first centred on the issue of judicial independence, leaving aside other aspects such as duration of cases, access to justice, or resources which lead to an overloading of the system of justice administration. The second wave of reforms was aimed at addressing these other problems. The article seeks to assess the problems of the justice system in Brazil, paying particular attention to structural constraints, levels of politicization and uneven application of the law, as well as to the successes and failures of the reform processes. ; Brasil se introduce en la dinámica de las reformas judiciales que se producen en América Latina. Desde 1985 se pueden percibir dos olas de reformas. La primera de ellas centrada en conseguir la independencia judicial, olvidándose de aspectos como la celeridad del proceso, el acceso a la justicia o los recursos, lo cual provocó el congestionamiento del sistema de justicia brasileño. Es por ello que la segunda ola de reformas se centrará en intentar corregir estos problemas. El objetivo del artículo es analizar la situación de la Administración de justicia brasileña, prestando una atención especial a las limitaciones, la politización y el trato desigual que presenta el Poder Judicial, así como a los resultados y consecuencias de los intentos de reforma.