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Focusing on the critical role of the judiciary in the transition to democracy in Latin America, this book examines the significance of the independence of the judiciary, which ensures institutional integrity and freedom from political pressure.

Affirmative Principle (AP) is the substratum for a just society. In the backdrop of its immense importance, countries across the globe have inculcated and sustained with AP by providing constitutional as well as legislative status. Judiciary as the roadmap of AP is crystal clear from the decisions of the various Courts. However, it is evident from the judicial verdicts that instability in the judicial approach resulted in the fluctuation of the sense of social justice in India. This paper conceptualizes those approaches under Making Approach (MA), Breaking Approach (BA), and Shaking Approach (SA). This threefold approach symbolizes the fact that on the one hand many of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of India (SCI) provoked way for AP by adopting MA and an equal number of the instances wherein SCI has scaled down the sanctity of the AP by invoking BA and SA. This changing nature of the judicial approach heightened the sense of insecurity amongst marginalized sections of the society. A substantial number of the decisions including the decision given Supreme Court of India on 25th August 2020 emphasizing the need for inner reservations, structurize the concept of social justice. There are an equal number of cases including the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of India on 22nd April 2020 invalidating 100% reservation provided for Scheduled Tribes in Scheduled Area in the State of Andra Pradesh is an added crisis to AP. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the landmarking decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of India wherein social justice is interpreted in a sustained and intermittent manner. The researcher, based on the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, of the firm opinion, that understanding and interpreting AP in its loose sense would seriously dilute the sacred goals encapsulated under the Constitution. The purpose of the paper is to trace out the rationale of assessment of AP by the judiciary and to counter such rationale in the backdrop of the veracity of the AP.

This Article contends that while the Vietnamese judiciary and court system have been the subject of not insignificant reforms over the last two years, they remain political institutions. More particularly, our analysis of the manner and criteria for the appointment and dismissal of judicial officers characterizes these officers as having to act within the auspices of the Communist Party of Vietnam, despite reforms having been introduced that cast the courts as more independent.

This paper enumerates the efforts made by the Supreme Court of India and proposes a road map of how the existing Information and Communication Tech- nology (ICT) can help Indian judiciary to evolve as more technology driven with increased transparency. The main drive behind the efforts made by the Supreme Court is through e-Courts project. The Government of India has unleashed huge amount of funds to enhance the rate of justice and reduce the piling up of huge number of cases in the courts in India. Various steps have been taken to utilize the power of the Internet to ease the life of the litigant and all the other stakeholders in the process. The efforts are specially targeted to help the poor. The e-Courts project has led to scanning, digitization and digital preservation of case records, enabling video-conferencing for courts and jails, etc. A major outcome of the e- Courts project is the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG). It provides an online, real time information on around 25 million pending cases in Indian courts are various levels. This paper also provides insights in the potential of ICT to be able to go far beyond than what is proposed in the e-Courts project. The e-Courts project has mainly provided a platform for the consolidation of the ICT infrastructure in the courts. In order to be able to use all this computing machinery efficiently, more services, beyond as envisaged in the e-Courts project have to be developed.

The aim of the first section is to examine the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in the area of foreign affairs as manifested in Supreme Court rulings regarding executive agreements, travel abroad, the war power, and treaty termination. In the second section of this article, I provide a brief explanation of the policy underlying the Constitutional Convention's allocation of foreign affairs powers and argue that those values are as relevant and compelling today as they were two centuries ago. In the third section, I contend that a wide gulf has developed in the past fifty years between constitutional theory and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign policy. The Court has greatly facilitated the growth of presidential power in foreign affairs in three interconnected but somewhat different ways by: (1) adhering to the sole-organ doctrine as propounded in the 1036 case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (2) invoking the political question doctrine and other nonjusticiable grounds, and (3) inferring congressional approval of presidential action by virtue of congressional inaction or silence. I then offer an explanation of the Court's willingness to increase presidential foreign affairs powers well beyond constitutional boundaries. For a variety of reasons, the Court views its role in this area as a support function for policies already established. In this regard the judiciary has become an arm of the executive branch. Finally, I conclude with the argument that to maintain the integrity of the Constitution, the Court must police constitutional boundaries to ensure that fundamental alterations in our governmental system will occur only through the process of constitutional amendment. The judicial branch may not abdicate its function "to say what the law is. "

The aim of the first section is to examine the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in the area of foreign affairs as manifested in Supreme Court rulings regarding executive agreements, travel abroad, the war power, and treaty termination. In the second section of this article, I provide a brief explanation of the policy underlying the Constitutional Convention's allocation of foreign affairs powers and argue that those values are as relevant and compelling today as they were two centuries ago. In the third section, I contend that a wide gulf has developed in the past fifty years between constitutional theory and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign policy. The Court has greatly facilitated the growth of presidential power in foreign affairs in three interconnected but somewhat different ways by: (1) adhering to the sole-organ doctrine as propounded in the 1036 case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (2) invoking the political question doctrine and other nonjusticiable grounds, and (3) inferring congressional approval of presidential action by virtue of congressional inaction or silence. I then offer an explanation of the Court's willingness to increase presidential foreign affairs powers well beyond constitutional boundaries. For a variety of reasons, the Court views its role in this area as a support function for policies already established. In this regard the judiciary has become an arm of the executive branch. Finally, I conclude with the argument that to maintain the integrity of the Constitution, the Court must police constitutional boundaries to ensure that fundamental alterations in our governmental system will occur only through the process of constitutional amendment. The judicial branch may not abdicate its function "to say what the law is. "

[eng] South America has a lack of confidence in almost all its public institutions, and judiciaries are not the exception. This article starts with general aspects of judicial independence, impartiality and accountability, and then shows an overview of regional judicial reforms in the last decades. Based on a widely accepted conception of bureaucratic judiciary, this article aims to analyze how its elements work on South American democracies; which will be useful to identify critical issues and emerging challenges on Judicial Councils, recruitment process of judges and magistrates, technical qualification, and disciplinary liability. ; [spa] En Sudamérica existe una desconfianza en casi todas sus instituciones públicas, y sus judicaturas no son la excepción. Este artículo comienza con aspectos generales sobre independencia judicial, imparcialidad y responsabilidad, para luego mostrar un panorama general de las reformas judiciales hechas en la Región las últimas décadas. A base de una concepción ampliamente aceptada de magistratura burocrática, este artículo procura analizar cómo sus elementos funcionan en las democracias sudamericanas; lo que será de utilidad para identificar aspectos críticos y retos emergentes relacionados a los Consejos de la Magistratura, procesos de selección de jueces y magistrados, formación especializada y responsabilidad disciplinaria. ; [cat] A Sud-amèrica existeix una desconfiança en gairebé totes les seves institucions públiques i les seves judicatures no són l'excepció. Aquest article comença amb aspectes generals sobre independència judicial, imparcialitat i responsabilitat, per després mostrar un panorama general de les reformes judicials realitzades a la Regió les últimes dècades. A força d'una concepció àmpliament acceptada de magistratura burocràtica, aquest article procura analitzar com els seus elements funcionen en les democràcies sud-americanes; que serà d'utilitat per identificar aspectes crítics i reptes emergents relacionats als Consells de la Magistratura, processos de selecció de jutges i magistrats, formació especialitzada i responsabilitat disciplinària.

Over the past two decades, the United States has seen an intense debate about the composition of the federal judiciary. Are judges "activists"? Should they stop "legislating from the bench"? Are they abusing their authority? Or are they protecting fundamental rights, in a way that is indispensable in a free society? Are Judges Political? cuts through the noise by looking at what judges actually do. Drawing on a unique data set consisting of thousands of judicial votes, Cass Sunstein and his colleagues analyze the influence of ideology on judicial voting, principally in the courts of appeal.

The Department of Islamic law was established In Baluchistan absent during the reign of the rightly guided caliphs. After the disintegration of abased, it remained under the control of the Islamic caliphate. Baluchistan become an independent of state but Mehmood Ghaznavi included it in his empire during the reign. The Baloch government was established in Kalat in 1530 A.D. As Muslim they turned to shariah for solution their problems. First, in 1866 Khan Ahmed Yar Khan officially introduced the judiciary in Baluchistan which proved to be beacon for all latter Baloch rulers. In the meantime, due to the intervention of the British, although this chain was slightly weakened, but until 1933. Khan Ahmed Yar Khan ii tried to implement a complete sharia system In Baluchistan. The book "Moheen ul Qazat wal Muftiyyan" compiled by Allama Shams ul Haq Afghani is a happy line of this series.

Indonesia as a democratic country that implemented the electoral system since 1955. Caused the world of politics in Indonesia to become more mature. Democratic practices developed from the reform era to the present. The general election which is a means of democracy is not far from political deviations, one of which is the black campaign. Special election judiciary exists with the aim of protecting the constitutional rights of citizens in elections, provide legal space for those who have been harmed in the implementation of elections, get legal certainty in the life of a democratic country, and as an effort to accelerate the settlement of disputes or cases during the general election process. Democracy in Indonesia can now be said to be comparatively well established but actually has a fairly shaky foundation, where the power of the people who should be united from below is taken from above (Top-Down democracy consolidation). For this reason, a special election court exists to examine, hear and decide on certain cases which can only be established in one of the judicial bodies under the Supreme Court regulated in the law. Special election court is important to maintain stability in politics. The idea of a Special Election Court is actually one of the most important components in the principles of election administration, namely "legal certainty".

The ombudsman institution is one of the most rapidly developing institutions in modern democratic states. In general, ombudsmen can be characterised as impartial investigators of the conduct of administration. They often act as dispute resolution mechanisms between the state and individuals and sometimes also act as solvers of problems of individuals connected with the state power. In order to assess the quality of administrative conduct they use certain normative standards against which they assess this conduct. However, ombudsmen are not the only state institutions dealing with these issues. The problems of individuals discontent with the work of administration are primarily in the hands of the judiciary. The judiciary, notably administrative courts, is the most important dispute resolution mechanism in modern states which also assess the administrative conduct against certain normative standards. Ombudsmen and the judiciary are often seen as institutions having relatively similar competences in a relatively similar area. Ombudsmen and the judiciary work in similar conditions. They are approached by individuals and they provide their opinion about the justice. This potential similarity raises questions on a possible coordination of their relations. They are the institutions of the same state. But are there any checks and balances in their approaches? They both should also provide the dispute resolution between individuals and the state. But do their decisions lead to the same or similar results? How do ombudsmen approach the judgments of the courts and how do the courts approach the reports of ombudsmen? And where is the individual? Last but not least, normative standards applied by these institutions represent another interesting matter. The normative standards of ombudsmen and the judiciary are not necessarily similar. They should not be the same, as the concepts of control of ombudsmen and the judiciary are only rarely identical. Nonetheless, these normative standards must also have some similarities as ...

This study is an examination of a changing judiciary in an emerging democracy. As part of the conditions mandated for European Union (EU) accession, Romania has been urged to demonstrate movement toward greater rule of law (Romania, 2008). One way in which Romania has responded to this objective is through the creation of the Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSM), a judicial body separate from the executive branch. Additionally, changes are occurring to the Romanian judiciary as a result of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) power to remand cases that are inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights (Janis, 2000). This qualitative research involved an attitudinal study based on semi-structured interviews of members of the Romanian judiciary. This research is unique because, although many studies of the population's perception of corruption are available, this study involves the suggestions of members of the Romanian judiciary themselves.

The success of the legal transitions occurring in the 1990s was quite dubious. Although, as a result of enlargement of the EU, much of the "other Europe" became part of the European Union, it would be too simplistic to assume that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the region became part of Western European political and legal landscape. While the books of the old era were discarded, legislation repealed and new institutions created, one should not underestimate the continuing strength of the old values, principles and legal thought in general. After all, the authors of those discarded books remained in the academia, even if they seemingly started to produce – virtually overnight – new works, while defending new values and principles. Alongside with the academics, the entire legal personnel of the old era survived the systemic change, and this contributed to the persisting spirit of old legal culture. That is why the philosophies of the old socialist legal system were able, not only to survive, but to govern a substantial portion of the post-socialist legal and judicial discourse. The deepest layers of the old legal culture are resistant to sudden changes by their very nature. They seldom have a direct connection to the former official political ideology, and they are often clothed in the new legal vocabulary. Furthermore, the most persistent features of socialist legal culture are often those linked to the region's illiberal pre-socialist past, although substantively modified during the era of socialism. I will show some examples of old socialist concepts which seem to be alive and well in the new legal system. First, I am going to deal with the authoritarian model of judicial process, which appears to prevail in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The socialist conception of a judicial process continues to haunt the region even several decades after the fall of "existing socialism." The parties continue to be viewed as passive objects in the post-communist litigation. Second, I am going to explain a specific socialist novelty, the concept of supreme courts' interpretative statements, legislating from the bench without any real-life case pending before those courts. Last but not least, I will show the gradual decline of the activist role of constitutional courts in the region and the return to the tradition of self-restrained judiciary influenced by politics and politicians.

Government transparency is understood to be a bedrock principle of American democracy, yet the judiciary branch is often exempted from this ideal. Secrecy exists in all branches of government, but in the judiciary it's often viewed as essential for proper ethics rather than as a threat to them. The judiciary has some important transparency traditions such as published opinions and open trials. However, the judiciary has held back from many modern transparency practices. This dissertation explores how the federal judiciary has been partially exempted from the modern expectation of transparency. The current understanding is that more information is always better for democracy, but the ambivalent relationship between this formulation and the judiciary suggests the story is more complicated. Katrina Hoch addresses this puzzle by looking at the history of government transparency, both as a concept and as a set of policies and practices, and by analyzing three judicial realms: Supreme Court confirmation battles, the debate over cameras in the courtroom, and the Supreme Court Justices' public image. This research includes hearing transcripts, case law, legislation, news reports, historical records from the American Bar Association and the Judicial Conference, field visits to the Supreme Court and Supreme Court press office, popular books about the Court, entertainment media and secondary sources. While government transparency and the federal judiciary were always structured around different principles, contemporary transparency practices have sharpened the tension between them. New developments in journalism, media economics, technology, political culture and political institutions have reshaped the meaning and practice of transparency, and the resulting new forms include the "personalization of politics" and the "performance of transparency." The judiciary has been resistant to these changes because courts operate differently from other government institutions and judges have a unique role. However, several recent developments have contributed to the personalization of the judiciary. This personalization is linked to a new mode of legitimation, one based on engagement with the public. This shift has characterized the way all public officials seek legitimation, but it is a much bigger change for the judiciary, because judges have traditionally cultivated distance rather than familiarity

This article examines the changing practices of the Dutch highest courts, the Hoge Raad and the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, under the influence of globalisation, and the constitutional implications of this development. The increasing intertwinement of legal systems and the increasing possibilities for judges to interact with courts in foreign jurisdictions have stimulated the consideration of foreign legislation and case law in judicial decision-making in individual cases. An empirical study clarifies how the Dutch judges perceive the usefulness of legal comparisons in this context and how foreign law is used in deliberations and judgments. The constitutional implications of the changing practices of the courts are analysed in light of three aspects of the constitutional normative framework for judicial decision-making: the democratic justification of judicial decisions; legal tradition and the nature of cases; and the effectiveness and efficiency of judicial decision-making.