Focus is given to studies on Belgian politics which have been published in the US & Britain between 1965 & 1975. Special emphasis is on works by V. R. Lorwin, D. Urwin, A. Zolberg, & M. O. Heisler. These studies have added considerable insights, findings, & hypotheses to knowledge of political processes in Belgium. This is probably due to 3 characteristics which mark most of these studies: (1) a strong tendency toward comparative analysis, (2) the use of fruitful theoretical concepts, & (3) the use of sophisticated techniques for handling empirical data. Modified HA.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 9, Heft 4, S. 398-412
THE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR IS OFTEN BASED UPON RECALL DATA. THE NOTE OF RELIABILITY OF THIS TYPE OF DATA IS QUESTIONED. RECALL DATA UNDERESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF CHANGES IN PARTY CHOICE. NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THE USE OF RECALL DATA HAS ANY CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STABILITY OF PARTY CHOICE & SUCH VARIABLES AS POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, & EDUCATION. THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELIABILITY OF QUESTIONS ON TURN-OUT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE. THERE ARE VERY STRONG INDICATIONS THAT IN EACH ELECTION STUDY NONVOTERS GIVE LESS RELIABLE ANSWERS THAN VOTERS. THIS UNRELIABILITY IS ESPECIALLY HIGH WHEN RECALL DATA ARE USED. 11 TABLES. HA.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 22, Heft 4, S. 385-407
A theoretical analysis of the problem of conflict between states or alliances, founded on the Nash theory of bargaining & cooperative games (Nash, J. F., "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, 1950, 18, 155-162). Assumptions that must be met to make the use of this theory possible are elucidated. Given these assumptions, precise meanings can be given to such concepts as "dominance" & "strategic equilibrium." Such game-theoretical understanding provides an alternative to warfare as a means of gaining knowledge of relative military strength, thus making unnecessary the Clausewitzian process of repeated warfare. A two-step process -- a stage of strategic rivalry, & a cooperative phase -- leads to attainment of an ideal final agreement for both sides. An application to the global East/West matrix from 1970 to 1987 is presented, & means of applying game-theoretical methods realistically to international relations are proposed. 7 Tables, 3 Figures. Modified HA
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 4, Heft 3, S. 275-298
It is assumed that it is the purpose of a theory to explain something. An explanation is an answer to a question of the linguistic form 'why 7'; its logical structure is of the following form: L1,....Ln That is, on the basis of a certain set of postuC1 ....Cn lates, or 'laws,' (L1,....Ln), & a set of given, observed 'circumstances' (C1,....Cn), 'E', the conclusion is deduced. Accordingly, the character of an explanation & consequently, of J a theory, is deductive. II - As regards the structure of a theory several elements should be distinguished. (1) The logical mathematical, or probabilistic system in which the theory is formulated. (2) The calculus which may be conceived as the axiomatic nucleus of the theory & which consists of a set of primitive concepts & postulates governing the use of the primitives. On the basis of primitives & postulates new concepts & theorems are deduced. It is to be noted that the content of the primitives (their 'meaning') consists of the way they are used within the relational structure of the calculus; that is they are defined implicitly. (3) An interpretative system of rules connecting the 'abstract' calculus with other structures of knowledge. In this way the calculus can be given cliff interpretations, which constitute models of the initial calculus. In order to explain empirical reality, there should at least be an empirical model of the calculus, that is, the calculus has to be connected with observable reality. In this case the interpretation is given by a set of 'operational definitions' as they are commonly called. It is shown that these definitions can be conceived as 'quickly decidable sentences' by means of which the empirical model can be falsified. III - The role which theory construction plays with regard to the formation of reality is indicated. Making explicit its logical structure & its empirical interpretation, theory formation leads to 'intersubjectively transmissible knowledge.' It results in the construction of a reality which transcends individual & parochial idiosyncracies & which is accessible to everybody. Of the conditions a theory should fulfill, 2 stand out: (a) it should be consistent, & (b) it should be falsifiable. Finally, it is shown that there is some ground to assume theory formation to be possible-even in the soc sci's-difficult though it may be. IPSA.