Suchergebnisse

One of the main characteristics of the Brazilian labor market is its impressively high job and worker turnover rates. Although labor legislation in Brazil is very restrictive, dismissal costs are not high when compared with other Latin American countries. Moreover, many authors argue that the design of some job security programs creates perverse incentives that generate labor turnover. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we describe Brazilian labor legislation, with emphasis on job security provisions and their incentives on workers reallocation. Then, after reviewing the most recent evidence on labor turnover in Brazil, we investigate the effects of changes in job termination costs implemented in the 1988 Constitution and in a Labor Law of September 2001 on employment duration. Both legislation changes increased firing costs and should have, therefore, reduced turnover for formal workers affected by them. A simple differences-in-differences methodology is applied to monthly individual data from Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME, IBGE), which has information on previous employment spells for those currently unemployed. The results establish that both changes reduced turnover for formal workers affected by the legislation. A significant increase in average employment duration of affected workers relative to not affected workers was observed after both legislation changes. We also provided evidence that the 1988 Constitutional change reduced the probability of fake layoffs, although there are still a high number of such agreements being made between workers and their employers.

Child labor exists because it is the best response people can find in intolerable circumstances. Poverty and child labor are mutually reinforcing: because their parents are poor, children must work and not attend school, and then grow up poor. Child labor has two important special features. First, when financial markets are imperfect, the separation in time between the immediate benefits and longdelayed costs of sending children to work lead to too much child labor. Second, the costs and benefits of child labor are borne by different people. Targeted subsidies for school attendance are very effective in reducing child labor because they successfully address both of these problems.

Item 745 ; Updated ed. of: U.S. labor law and the future of labor-management cooperation. ; Prepared by Stephen I. Schlossberg and Steven M. Fetter. ; "BLMR 104." ; Shipping list no.: 88-422-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Item 745 ; "BLMR 104." ; Shipping list no.: 86-552-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper explores the political economy of unions, and the consequences this has for bargaining and strikes. We develop a very simple model to show that there are circumstances in which everyone, including striking workers, gains when some employees cross the picket line. We detail how strikes can emerge in equilibrium despite the absence of uncertainty, and how this strike outcome can Pareto dominate the outcome when scabbing is illegal, despite the fact that the strike destroys surplus. We also characterize when the firm might prefer to lock out those workers who would be strike breakers.

Item 745. ; "BLMR 134." ; "June 1989." ; Shipping list no.: 89-445-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The relationship between international trade and labor standards is one of several controversial issues facing the WTO. Proponents of a trade-labor link argue that labor is a human rights issue and that trade sanctions represent a critical tool in the effort to improve international working conditions. Opponents argue that a link between trade and labor would open the door to protectionist measures that would target low wage countries and harm the very workers the policy is intended to help. This paper argues that the merits of the trade-labor debate must be resolved through a political process. The alternative of a resolution through the WTO's Appellate Body (AB) is undesirable for a number of reasons, including the fact that the AB is undemocratic, unaccountable, poorly positioned to understand the trade-offs at stake, and has not been charged with resolving such fundamental policy issues. An attempt to resolve the issue at the AB will lack political legitimacy and ultimately undermine the stability of the WTO itself. Given that a political solution is required, the only sensible place to negotiate it is the WTO. If there is to be a trade-labor link it will be necessary to change the rules of international trade, which must be done at the WTO. At present, however, there is reason to fear that the institutional structure of the organization will cause trade concerns to trump labor concerns. This paper proposes a set of reforms to the WTO designed to place trade and labor on an even footing without undermining the significant benefits that the WTO delivers to the international system. The key to the proposed reforms is the creation of independent trade and labor departments within the WTO. The labor department would have considerable autonomy from the rest of the organization, would be staffed by labor specialists, and would have the authority to hold its own periodic rounds of negotiation, limited to labor issues. Such negotiations would result in binding obligations. In addition, from time to time the WTO would host negotiating rounds that include both the labor department and other WTO departments, including trade. These larger rounds would permit states to reach a negotiated agreement on the relationship between trade and labor. Because the agreement would be the product of consensus, a negotiated settlement would engender more legitimacy than an AB decision.

The various labor laws enacted in Japan in the Occupation era, and still in effect today without substantial amendment, legitimized unions, both as bargaining units on behalf of the employees of large companies and as political organizations, but prohibited strikes by public employees, and did not lead to the establishment of valuable labor monopolies. The effective bargaining units in wage negotiations in Japan are mostly enterprise unions, whose respective members are employees of a given company. This does not preclude their having succeeded in raising members' wages. Japan's infrequency and short duration of strikes is a poor indication of the effectiveness of its labor unions at obtaining higher wages for their members. The smallness of losses due to strikes in Japan means only that there is little discrepancy between the unions' and employers' information regarding the employers' maximum willingness to pay a premium for union members' services. It does not necessarily mean that the premium itself is small. Enterprise union members in Japan mostly include the regular employees of large firms, trained in company-specific skills and expectant of long ultimate tenures of service. Compared to members of a typical industry-wide union in the U.S. or elsewhere, the members of a Japanese enterprise union are relatively homogeneous and have had a longer time in which to observe the behavior of their employer. For both these reasons, it is quite natural to suppose that union members in Japan should be relatively well-informed regarding their employers' willingness to pay a premium for their services.

This paper estimates the macroeconomic effect of labor market programs on labor force participation. Labor market programs could counteract business-cycle variation in the participation rate that is due to the discouraged-worker effect, and they could prevent labor force outflow. An equation that determines the participation rate is estimated with GMM, using panel data (1986-1998) for Sweden's municipalities. The results indicate that labor market programs have relatively large and positive effects on labor force participation. If the number of participants in labor market programs increases temporarily by 100, the labor force increases immediately by around 63 persons. The effect is temporary so the number of participants in the labor force returns to the old level in the next period. If the number of participants in programs is permanently increased, the labor force increases by about 70 persons in the long run.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Labor negotiations in the airline industry fall under the Railway Labor Act. Under this act, airline labor contracts do not expire, but instead, become amendable. To help labor and management reach agreement before a strike occurs, the act also provides a process--including possible intervention by the President--that is designed to reduce the incidence of strikes. Despite these provisions, negotiations between airlines and their unions have sometimes been contentious, and strikes have occurred. Because air transportation is such a vital link in the nation's economic infrastructure, a strike at a major U.S. airline may exert a significant economic impact on affected communities. Additionally, if an airline's labor and management were to engage in contentious and prolonged negotiations, the airline's operations--and customer service--could suffer. GAO was asked to examine trends in airline labor negotiations in the 25 years since the industry was deregulated in 1978, the impact of airline strikes on communities, and the impact of lengthy contract negotiations and nonstrike work actions (such as "sickouts") on passengers."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, focusing on: (1) the Department of Labor's organizational structure and use of fiscal year (FY) 1999 resources to implement LMRDA; and (2) how the Department of Labor administers and enforces each title of the act for which it is responsible."

Emanuel Professor Series study aid. Covers development of labor legislation, procedures and remedies, right of self-organization, selection of the bargaining representative, negotiating the collective bargaining agreement, concerted activity strikes, collective bargaining agreement administration and federal preemption, the union and individual employee relationship, public sector bargaining, and other laws governing labor relations. ; https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/facw_books/1044/thumbnail.jpg

Includes bibliographical references. ; The Latinos in Missouri occasional paper series grew out of the writing experiences of graduate students in Rural Sociology 406: The Sociology of Globalization. ; This paper presents labor advocates' accounts of the common problems faced by Latino/a workers employed in the Missouri meatpacking industry and the potential strategies they identify for addressing them. Information is drawn from participatory observation, document analysis and qualitative interviews. Placed in the context of globalization of the agrifood system and the increasingly problematic position of wage laborers, these accounts are discussed using a theoretical framework based on Karl Polanyi's concept of fictitious commodities. In this study we investigate what labor advocates have to say about the situation faced by Latino workers employed in Missouri meatpacking plants. In the next section, we present an overview of the global agri-food system with specific attention to the meatpacking industry. This is followed by a discussion of Karl Polanyi's (1944) concept of "fictitious commodities," which we use here as a theoretical framework to provide insight into the situation faced by Latino workers in meatpacking. We then examine, in two sections, the problems expressed by labor advocates in Missouri and the proposals for changes they suggest. To conclude, we return to Polanyi's fictitious commodity framework as a way of understanding these issues more fully. Specifically, this theoretical framework supports the argument we make that Latino labor must be able to organize and unionize to correct unfair labor practices that currently exist in the state and the industry as a whole. ; Occasional Paper Series Developed with Support from the Cambio Center.

This paper estimates the macroeconomic effect of labor market programs on labor force participation. Labor market programs could counteract business-cycle variation in the participation rate that is due to the discouraged-worker effect, and they could prevent labor force outflow. An equation that determines the participation rate is estimated with GMM, using panel data (1986-1998) for Sweden's municipalities. The results indicate that labor market programs have relatively large and positive effects on labor force participation. If the number of participants in labor market programs increases temporarily by 100, the labor force increases immediately by around 63 persons. The effect is temporary so the number of participants in the labor force returns to the old level in the next period. If the number of participants in programs is permanently increased, the labor force increases by about 70 persons in the long run.

"September 1993"--Pt. 3. ; "August 1999"--Binder, pt. 2. ; Shipping list no.: 2000-0006-S (pt. 2), 93-0703-P (pt. 3). ; Description based on pt. 3. ; Includes bibliographical references and index. ; Pt. 1. Unfair labor practice proceedings -- pt. 2. Representation proceedings -- pt. 3. Compliance proceedings. ; Mode of access: Internet.