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While authoritarian presidents prevail under heavily president-oriented constitutions throughout the post-Soviet region, democracy along parliamentary lines triumphs in Central Europe. This article discusses the constitutional pattern among the post-communist countries on the basis of two general questions: First, how can we explain why strong presidential constitutions dominate throughout the post-Soviet region whereas constrained presidencies and governments anchored in parliament have become the prevailing option in Central Europe? Second, and interlinked with the first question, why have so many post-communist countries (in the post-Soviet region as well as in Central Europe) chosen neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism, but instead semi-presidential arrangements whereby a directly elected president is provided with considerable powers and coexists with a prime minister? The analysis indicates that both historical-institutional and actor-oriented factors are relevant here. Key factors have been regime transition, pre-communist era constitutions and leaders, as well as short-term economic and political considerations. With differing strengths and in partly different ways, these factors seem to have affected the actors' preferences and final constitutional compromises.

This paper applies the replacement cost method for calculating the value of stochastic carbon sink in the EU climate policy for mitigating carbon dioxide emissions. Minimum costs with and without carbon sinks are then derived with a safety-first approach in a chance constrained framework for current system with an emission trading system and national allocation plans and a hypothetical system where all sectors trade. The theoretical results show that i) the value of carbon sink approaches zero for high enough risk discount, ii) relatively low abatement cost in the trading sector curbs supply of permits on the ETS market, and iii) large abatement costs in the trading sector create values from carbon sink for meeting national targets. The empirical application to the EU commitment of 20% reduction in carbon dioxides shows large variation in carbon sink value depending on risk discount and on institutional set up. Under no uncertainty, the value can correspond to approximately 0.45% of total GDP in EU under current policy system, but it is reduced to one third if all sectors are allowed to trade. The values are unevenly allocated among countries, but in different ways depending on EU policy; under current system countries make gains from reduced costs of meeting national targets, under a sector wide trading scheme buyers of permits gain from reductions in permit price and sellers make associated losses.