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In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.

The author draws our attention to the European unfamiliarity with American political thought. He also talks about Jefferson's natural law theory that he took over from Locke & adapted to American circumstances. The features of American political thought are outlined by means of comparing common law & rule of law with the concept of Rechtstaat. The author suggests that natural law & common law are a powerful determinant of the concept of republicanism that deeply influences American political thought. Adapted from the source document.

There are prima facie reasons why political parties should be recognized as public law persons of the Croatian legal system: Political parties play a leading role in the creation & implementation of the state's will. Continental European legal systems distinguish between public & private law: the Croatian Constitution prescribes that political parties are associations with the features typical of public law persons. What requires analysis is the nature & consequences of the public law personality of political parties. Aristotle's theory of justice is still a useful starting point for distinguishing between public & private law, & between public & private law persons. The theory demonstrates that both the political community & the economic market presuppose standards of conduct that regulate interaction of their members. The standards include two essential types of legal acts, namely, statutes, which are fundamental acts of public law, & contracts, which are fundamental acts of private law. The dichotomy of legal acts implies virtually all the criteria that Roman & Continental lawyers have found important for distinguishing public & private law (source, bindingness, hierarchy, interest, subjects, etc). The division of a legal system into private & public law can be positivized in several ways. However, a liberal, democratic, & social legal system ought to meet the following principles, which guarantee the public law status of political parties: explicit recognition of the public law personality; justiciability; constitutionality; transparency; democracy; solidarity. The principles are followed by the Draft Bill on Political Parties, which was prepared by the Croatian Law Center in May 2002 & was adopted, with some changes, by the Committee on Constitution, Rules of Order, & Political System of the Croatian Parliament in July 2002. 90 References. Adapted from the source document.

The paper provides a detailed overview of the existing relationship between the just war theory & international law. It stresses the fact that the two concepts were historically incompatible. The just War theory falls within ethics & appeals to superior principles that were not in accordance with the positivist law theory & the concept of sovereignty upon which public international law was founded. That incompatibility may at first seem as a paradox since the two concepts should be derived from a common base: the idea of justice. Further development of international law has clearly proved that law cannot be separated from the idea of justice & that is, to some extent, closely linked to some elements of natural law. The author concludes that in the domain of the use of force contemporary international law provides a legal frame, which is in accordance with the precepts of the just war theory. References. Adapted from the source document.

Using the contemporary system theories, the author primarily points to the asymmetry of the constitutional law & the political processes it so rarely regulates. Then he goes on to analyze the historical process of separating the custom law, oral law & written law, of the court & the courtroom, the law & the constitution, the constitution & its interpretation, the constitution's interpretation, & the constitutional theory, & concludes his study with a description of the difference between constitution & democracy in the postmodern categorical optics. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the meaning of law in Kant's practical philosophy for the constitution of a political community. First, he defines the specific character of modern knowledge by referring to Heidegger & Fink & how this knowledge is reflected in Kant's philosophy of morality & law. Then he goes on to define the external legislation & list its applications. After the author has defined Kant's concept of law, he shows how freedom & its security -- not happiness, well-being, or interest -- are central to Kant's political philosophy. Freedom becomes the foundation of all activities & laws, & freedom can only be based on law & not morality. Thus, individual freedom is possible solely within a law-abiding community. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks at a book with the promising title Law and Revolution, particularly, promising to those prone to think about law strategically. Starting from the main points of the book & of some interpretations of legal history that qualify these points, the author then demonstrates how negligible appear to be the possibilities of strategic action in the renewal & development of Croatian law. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocks of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modem (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modem social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modem social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part) law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action-guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within the limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocs of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modern (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modern social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modern social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part), law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach, which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

In the second part of the text the author looks into the paradox of the concept of justice as discerned by Jacques Derrida, & analyzes the tradition of the European constitutional law. Since the constitution & politics are discordant & semantically irritating mediums, the author argues that the European Union is an open semantic relationship of legal acquisitions & political processes. The European Union should be explained by means of contemporary, postmodernist theories derived from the linguistic & deconstructivist reversals of the modern substantial rationalism, universalism & cosmopolitism. Consequently, the constitution & the law are not underpinned by the political or any other specific power; on the contrary, it is the unspecific power of the constitution & the law that enables the gradual development & strengthening of the European law & the constitution without the extra constitutional authorities as the disguised power that traditionally legitimizes law. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the position of the Constitutional Court in the light of the proposed Constitutional Law on amendments & modifications of the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court that would change some powers of the Constitutional Court. A short historical review shows that the Croatian people belong to the European civilizational setting, as evidenced by numerous documents & statutes that have regulated the rule of law in Croatia. According to the Croatian Constitution, the Constitutional Court is assigned a special place outside the system of the division of power into the legislative, the executive, & the judiciary; it is a special constitutional category that cannot be under the scrutiny of law since it scrutinizes laws. The author goes on to enumerate the changes in the jurisdiction & the operation of the Court envisaged in this new proposal of the Constitutional Law. The author concludes that constitutional courts are the very core of Western democracy & that they protect constitutions as a constantly developing living form. 59 References. Adapted from the source document.