Leakage
In: Climate Change Policy and Global Trade; ZEW Economic Studies, S. 205-230
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In: Climate Change Policy and Global Trade; ZEW Economic Studies, S. 205-230
In: CESifo working paper series 3379
In: Energy and climate economics
We build a simple analytical general equilibrium model and linearize it, to find a closed-from expression for the effect of a small change in carbon tax on leakage - the increase in emissions elsewhere. The model has two goods produced in two sectors or regions. Many identical consumers buy both goods using income from a fixed stock of capital that is mobile between sectors. An increase in one sector's carbon tax raises the price of its output, so consumption shifts to the other good, causing positive carbon leakage. However, the taxed sector substitutes away from carbon into capital. It thus absorbs capital, which shrinks the other sector, causing negative leakage. This latter effect could swamp the former, reducing carbon emissions in both sectors.
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In: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 15/2023
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Working paper
In: Energy, Technology, and the Environment, S. 147-154
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Proceedings 25th International Symposium, DISC 2011, Rome, Italy, September 20-22, 2011. ; The ability to collectively toss a common coin among n parties in the presence of faults is an important primitive in the arsenal of randomized distributed protocols. In the case of dishonest majority, it was shown to be impossible to achieve less than 1 r bias in O(r) rounds (Cleve STOC '86). In the case of honest majority, in contrast, unconditionally secure O(1)-round protocols for generating common unbiased coins follow from general completeness theorems on multi-party secure protocols in the secure channels model (e.g., BGW, CCD STOC '88). However, in the O(1)-round protocols with honest majority, parties generate and hold secret values which are assumed to be perfectly hidden from malicious parties: an assumption which is crucial to proving the resulting common coin is unbiased. This assumption unfortunately does not seem to hold in practice, as attackers can launch side-channel attacks on the local state of honest parties and leak information on their secrets. In this work, we present an O(1)-round protocol for collectively generating an unbiased common coin, in the presence of leakage on the local state of the honest parties. We tolerate t ≤ ( 1 3 − )n computationallyunbounded Byzantine faults and in addition a Ω(1)-fraction leakage on each (honest) party's secret state. Our results hold in the memory leakage model (of Akavia, Goldwasser, Vaikuntanathan '08) adapted to the distributed setting. Additional contributions of our work are the tools we introduce to achieve the collective coin toss: a procedure for disjoint committee election, and leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing. ; National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship ; National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-1018064)
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Ein Kritikpunkt am Kyoto-Protokoll lautet, dass Emissionen durch Spezialisierung und internationalen Handel ins Nicht-Kyoto-Ausland verlagert werden könnten (»Carbon Leakage«). Die Analyse sektoraler Importströme und die damit einhergehenden CO2-Importe zeigen, dass Kyoto-Länder ihr Importvolumen aus Nicht-Kyoto-Ländern erhöhen und die CO2-Importe im Schnitt um 8% ansteigen, wobei energieintensive Sektoren, wie Metallerzeugung und Papierwaren, besonders stark betroffen sind. Folglich sollte sich die internationale Politikgemeinschaft verstärkt mit Möglichkeiten auseinandersetzen, wie CO2-Grenzausgleichssteuern WTO-konform implementiert werden können.
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