The author explores the legitimating roots of the constitutional state. In his opinion, they can be found in moral universalism and national democracy. Both principles undoubtedly belong with the fundamental tenets of the constitution of modern constitutional state. While the former implies the universality of its postulates which are accepted by every constitutional state, the latter represents the restrictive principle of this universalness. The author links these two principles and defines a people as a group of individuals who, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, and religious station may, in line with the principles of freedom and equality of individuals create a successful political community. By the universality of its legality, the defence of human rights and power-sharing, constitutional state is a necessary prerequisite for the prospect of fashioning a people as a group of responsible individuals in establishing universal will. (SOI : PM: S. 16)
The Croatian Constitutional Court by its decision of June 24, 1992 partly rejected a reqest to start proceedings, and partly terminated already started proceedings, to determine the constitutionality of some thirty emergency decrees passed by the President of the Croatian Republic during the undeclared war with Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army in the second half of 1991. The Court backed its decision inter alia by the following arguments: the President has the power to pass emergency decrees without declaring first the state of emergency; presidential emergency decrees can be retroactive since Croatian Constitution does not forbid specifically their retroactivity. The Court's reasoning which endorses a permanent coup d'etat, is very probably a corollary of the idea, which is taken for granted by some Croatian constitutional lawyers, that the Croatian Constitution has been modelled on the Constitution of the French 5th Republic so that the sweeping powers of the French President belong also to his Croatian counterpart. The paper challenges the idea and discusses the relevance of comparative constitutional theory for Croatian constitutional practice. The first three sections demonstrate that, despite political similarities between the early years of the French 5th Republic and the Croatian Republic the two semi-presidential systems differ in several important constitutional and legal respects so that the powers - especially emergency powers - of the French President cannot be used as a persuasive authority to interpret powers of the Croatian President. Section four indicates that if anything in French law is authoritative in interpreting Croatian constitutional provisions on the state of emergency it is the effort of the French Conseil d'etat to control, even though in a very limited way, the legality of presidential emergency decrees. The last section points out that assumptions with which Croatian Constitutional Court interprets presidential powers are more in accord with the Weimar Constitution than with the Constitution of the 5th French Republic. The paper ends with the warning that the unrestrained exercise of presidential powers in Croatia may lead, as it did in Mussolinni's Italy and in the Weimar Republic, to a dictatorship. (SOI : PM: S. 165)