Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points
In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-56
ISSN: 1047-1987
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In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-56
ISSN: 1047-1987
In: Spectrum: The Journal of State Government, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 28
In: Annual review of political science, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 349-366
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: Cato policy report: publ. bimonthly by the Cato Institute, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 2
ISSN: 0743-605X
In: Polity: the journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 430-448
ISSN: 0032-3497
Partisan polarization in legislators' roll call voting is well established. In this article, we examine whether partisan and ideological differentiation extends to legislators' agendas (i.e., the issue content of the bills and resolutions they introduce and cosponsor). Our analyses, focusing on the 101st-110th Congresses, reveal that differentiation occurs both across and within parties (e.g., Democrats and Republicans tend to pursue different issues in their legislative activity, as do moderate and more ideologically extreme copartisans), but that these differences are not typically large in magnitude and did not increase between the late 1980s and late 2000s. These findings suggest that the dynamics of polarization differ for roll call voting and agenda activities in ways that have important implications for our assessments of its consequences. In particular, they highlight that the polarization that has occurred is less a result of differing priorities between Democrats and Republicans and more a function of different preferences on those priority issues. This differentiation may bubble up in part from the true preferences of the rank-and-file, but it is also likely a function of the polarized choices that are presented to them on roll call votes. . Adapted from the source document.
In: The Parliamentarian: journal of the parliaments of the Commonwealth, Band 71, Heft 2, S. 119-120
ISSN: 0031-2282
THE LEGISLATURE HAS BEEN ACCORDED A SPECIAL POSITION AND ROLE IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. LEGISLATORS CLAIM THE RIGHT TO VOICE BOTH THE CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSENSUS OF SOCIETY. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT POSSIBLY INTERACT DIRECTLY WITH THE WHOLE OF SOCIETY, LEGISLATORS MUST USE INTERMEDIARIES--THE MAJOR ONE BEING THE MASS MEDIA. THIS HAS BROUGHT THE LEGISLATORS AND THE MEDIA TO A POINT WHERE THEY ARE INDISPENSABLE TO ONE ANOTHER. INDEED, THEIR ROLES ARE COMPLEMENTARY.
In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 30, Heft Jul/Aug 87
ISSN: 0002-7642
In: Executive intelligence review: EIR, Band 40, Heft 33, S. 17-19
ISSN: 0273-6314, 0146-9614
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 46, Heft 6, S. 18013A
ISSN: 0001-9844
In: STATE LEGISLATURES, Band 14, Heft 8, S. 9
In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 264-270
ISSN: 0190-292X
The concept of the marginal man appears to be applicable to women in politics. This assumption is used to generate hypotheses about women state legislators. A questionnaire mailed Feb 1978 to 703 women legislators obtained a 42% response which is used to test the model. Characteristics found reveal both objective marginality, marked by incomplete integration into legislative functioning, & experiential marginality, reflected in high level of self-motivation & importance attached to family attitudes about political involvement. 1 Table. W. H. Stoddard.