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Abstract:In the last ten or fifteen years, realism has emerged as a distinct approach in political theory. Realists are skeptical about the merits of abstract theories of justice. They regard peace, order, and stability as the primary goals of politics. One of the more concrete aims of realists is to develop a realist perspective on legitimacy. I argue that realist accounts of legitimacy are unconvincing, because they do not solve what I call the "puzzle of legitimacy": the puzzle of how some persons can have the right to rule over others, given that all persons are equals. I focus on the realist accounts of legitimacy developed by Bernard Williams and John Horton.

This paper examines the theory of political legitimacy through the framework of psychological learning theory and the theory of cognitive dissonance. The concepts of primary and secondary reinforcement in cases of learning permit a general understanding of the growth of positive affect toward a political system. Cognitive dissonance theory allows us to understand how this general positive affect built up by a regime's actions produces the sub-set of attitudes called political legitimacy. In order to build a theory of political legitimacy on these foundations, it is necessary to conceive of government policy-making as a case of producing successful learning throughout a population.The diffuse, largely irrational nature of political legitimacy has made it difficult for political scientists to handle the concept systematically. That systems are or are not "legitimate" has been asserted numerous times, though often the precise definition of legitimacy employed has been at best vague and the indices of legitimacy unclearly stated. This paper attempts to meet the problem by setting forth a theory and a set of implicit indices of political legitimacy. After the general model has been explicated, I will specify several problems in the manipulation of political legitimacy. Finally, I will look at the relationship of governmental structure to these problems.Before consideration of the model two preliminary tasks must be performed: a definition of legitimacy and justification for discussing it. We may define political legitimacy as the quality of "oughtness" that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime.

The legitimacy of the domestic institutional system is a significant factor of political stability and an important condition of solving current socio-economic development problems. Several new factors negatively influence legitimacy. An explanatory scheme is needed of the conditions for developing effective measures to strengthen legitimacy. First, it is important to highlight institutions of institutional legitimization. Historical and transformational analysis shows that in a secular society the nation is the institution of such legitimation. At the same time, the "Nation" as a social institution functions to integrate values and social interests, which are significant factors in the effectiveness of the institutional system.

Political realists reject the view that politics is applied morality. But they also usually claim that judgements about political legitimacy are normative. Where, then, does this normativity come from? So far, realists have given two answers: 'concessive realism', which identifies legitimacy as a norm internal to political practice while delegating to morality the task of explaining why this practice is valuable; and 'naturalist realism', which holds that alternatives to legitimate politics are not 'real options' for anyone. I argue that concessive realism should be rejected because it neglects the importance of the realist critique of morality. I also argue that naturalist realism should be rejected because alternatives to legitimate politics remain 'real options' for some people. I conclude with some thoughts on how a plausible account of the normative force of realist legitimacy should proceed.

Political legitimacy is a key concept in both macro and micro theories. Pioneers in survey-based research on alienation and system support envisioned addressing macro questions about legitimacy with the sophisticated empiricism of individual-level methodology but failed; and a succession of innovations in item wording and questionnaire construction only led to an excessive concern with measurement issues at the individual level. I return to an enumeration of the informational requirements for assessing legitimacy in hopes of finding a conceptualization that better utilizes available survey indicators to tap relevant macro dimensions. I specify formal measurement models for both conventional and revised conceptualizations of legitimacy orientations and compare the fit of the two models systematically on data from the U.S. electorate. The revised model appears preferable on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

AbstractAn often overlooked tension in liberal theory turns on its commitment to procedural accounts of legitimacy on the one hand, and to the robust protection of the right of citizens to dissent on the other. To the extent that one evaluates legitimate decision-making on the basis of the procedures that bear on it, determining how extra-procedural expressions of dissent fit into the picture becomes a complex undertaking. This is especially true if one accepts that protecting extra-procedural expressions of dissent is itself foundational to the overall legitimacy of the state. My aim in this paper is to explore some of the implications that follow from this tension. The paper proceeds in two parts. In the first part, I review the political grounds that support a protection on dissent. By drawing on its republican foundations, I argue that the functional role that the right to dissent serves in complex political communities is intimately connected to concerns over legitimacy. I claim that for the right to perform its function successfully, protections must be placed on both procedural and extra-procedural forms of dissent. The second part of the paper issues a direct challenge to procedural accounts of legitimacy. If a protection on citizen dissent is vital to legitimating government action, and if that protection necessarily extends to both procedural and extra-procedural forms of dissent, it follows that legitimacy cannot be captured by procedure alone—even procedures that secure the fair and equal participation by all affected parties.

Planners are centrally concerned with the legitimacy of planning institutions and practices. In a democratic society, governments depend on the voluntary compliance of external actors for the implementation of their policies. Planning theorists have largely focused on the inclusiveness and quality of deliberation in goal-setting. This article expands this focus using Scharpf's and Schmidt's distinction between three domains of legitimation—input, throughput, and output—each of which affords a distinct pathway to legitimacy. These legitimation processes are examined through a comparison of the postwar development of American regional planning institutions in Minneapolis–St Paul, Minnesota, and Portland, Oregon. The input-throughput-output distinction can be used to interpret the operation and impacts of historical planning activities, or prospectively to evaluate the potential impacts of institutional reforms.

AbstractWhat is international legitimacy and whence does it stem? What entities seek it and why, and who grants or withholds it? How might the different meanings of the concept be reconciled? This article argues that Family Resemblance Concept (FRC) methods are particularly well-suited to explicating the complex meanings associated with this multidimensional concept. We start with a basic level definition based on subjective perceptions and beliefs, the normative quality of oughtness, and the idea of consent. We then expand this definition by developing several secondary-level dimensions: shared values, constitutionalism (consisting of two forms of process legitimacy), and outcome legitimacy. At the indicator level, we examine 14 different survey questions asked in international public opinion polls to provide a tentative empirical glimpse of how our FRC version of legitimacy could be operationalised and tested. The paper concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of the FRC scheme in imposing some order on the legitimacy concept and in illuminating the recent legitimacy problems afflicting the United States.

This article makes three points. First, the police need public support and cooperation to be effective in their order-maintenance role, and they particularly benefit when they have the voluntary support and cooperation of most members of the public, most of the time. Second, such voluntary support and cooperation is linked to judgments about the legitimacy of the police. A central reason people cooperate with the police is that they view them as legitimate legal authorities, entitled to be obeyed. Third, a key antecedent of public judgments about the legitimacy of the police and of policing activities involves public assessments of the manner in which the police exercise their authority. Such procedural-justice judgments are central to public evaluations of the police and influence such evaluations separately from assessments of police effectiveness in fighting crime. These findings suggest the importance of enhancing public views about the legitimacy of the police and suggest process-based strategies for achieving that objective.