Suchergebnisse

Der Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit den demokratietheoretischen Konzepten von Huntington, Diamond, Przeworski und Di Palma auseinander. Besonderer Wert wird dabei auf die Unterscheidung zwischen einem Demokratiebegriff, der als zentrales Kriterium auf wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung setzt, und einem anderen, der sich in erster Linie an politischen Rechten und Freiheiten orientiert. Eine zu starke Betonung des Aspektes der wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung, wie sie von Wissenschaftlern aus dem Westen oft vertreten wird, verweist auf imperialistische Interessen und trägt neokoloniale Züge. (DÜI-Spl)

THIS ARTICLE ANALYSES TWO HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT CASES OF TRANSITION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA; EACH SEEMS TO EPITOMIZE THE "POLITICAL SCIENCE" APPROACH, YET TO CONTAIN THE LONGER TERM POSSIBILITY OF "POPULAR DEMOCRACY." THUS IN SOUTH AFRICA THE LEFT ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY OF A CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED TRANSITION TO OBVIATE THE RISK OF CIVIL WAR. HOWEVER, THE ANC, TO RETAIN THE "CONFIDENCE" OF LOCAL AND EXTERNAL CAPITAL AND OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, HAS HAD TO DEMOBILIZE ITS (NON-ELECTORAL) POPULAR SUPPORT, AND TO ABANDON A SOCIAL REDISTRIBUTIVE STRATEGY IN FAVOR OF A ONE DOMINATED BY NEO-LIBERAL "MARKET SOLUTIONS." WHAT KEEPS A PROGRESSIVE AGENDA ALIVE IN THESE CONDITIONS ARE THE PRESSURES FROM TRADE UNIONS, CIVICS, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS ETC. WHERE THERE ARE GROWING SIGNS, AT LEAST AT GRASSROOTS LEVEL, OF RESISTANCE TO THE ANC'S NEW PROJECT. IN MOZAMBIQUE, THE TRANSITION HAS BEEN LESS EUPHORIC, MORE PERHAPS A MATTER OF TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE AND FROM WAR THAN TO A DEMOCRATIC REGIME. AS IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE TRANSITION WOULD SEEM TO DISEMPOWER POPULAR FORCES - BUT OUTSIDE THE ELECTORAL ARENA, THERE ARE INSTANCES OF RESISTANCE AND STRUGGLE WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY, WHICH MAY CARRY WITH THEM THE LONGER-TERM POTENTIAL FOR THE GROWTH OF POPULAR DEMOCRACY.

This article accompanies an essay reviewing recent literature on 'transitions to democracy', which we publish in our next issue. There Saul contrasts two approaches to the understanding of democratisation. Both see transition as part of a larger political and economic process; for one this limits the possible scope and sustainability of democratisation, while for the other it threatens but also enhances its scope and strength. The latter approach, older and currently less fashionable, sees democratisation (and its analysis) as rooted in processes of imperialism, class struggle and state‐society relations. This 'political economy of democratisation' approach, characteristic of the work of Shivji and Saul, contrasts with a larger, more pessimistic body of work, which Saul labels the 'political science of democratisation'. While sometimes used in suggestive ways, it can narrow debate disastrously when detached from any self‐conscious mooring in the critical traditions of political economy. This literature stresses the necessity of democratic institutions and values, but argues that only highly attenuated versions are currently feasible: 'if reform is to be adopted without provoking a crisis', then it must be reform consistent with the demands of capital and the neo‐liberalism of the IFIs.
This companion article analyses two highly significant cases of transition in southern Africa; each seems to epitomise the 'political science' approach, yet to contain the longer term possibility of 'popular democracy'. Thus in South Africa the left accepted the necessity of a carefully negotiated transition to obviate the risk of civil war. However, the ANC, to retain the 'confidence' of local and external capital and of foreign governments, has had to demobilise its (non‐electoral) popular support, and to abandon a social redistributive strategy in favour of a one dominated by neo‐liberal 'market solutions'. What keeps a progressive agenda alive in these conditions are the pressures from trade unions, civics, women's organisations etc, where there are growing signs, at least at grassroots level, of resistance to the ANC's new project. In Mozambique, the transition has been less euphoric, more perhaps a matter of transition from authoritarian rule and from war than to a democratic regime. As in South Africa, the transition would seem to disempower popular forces ‐ but outside the electoral arena, there are instances of resistance and struggle within civil society, which may carry with them the longer‐term potential for the growth of popular democracy.

Examines democratization as part of economic and political transition; South Africa and Mozambique.

Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht die Transitionsprozesse in Südafrika und Mosambik in die analytischen Kategorien konkurrierender Demokratietheorien einzuordnen. Eine zentrale Frage ist dabei, ob die Wurzeln der Demokratisierungsprozesse in erster Linie im Kampf gegen die autoritäre und diskriminierende Herrschaftsform oder in der wirtschaftspolitischen Notwendigkeit (bzw. dem internationalen Druck) zur Durchführung von Liberalisierungsprozessen gelegen haben. Die Bestimmung der Wurzeln der Prozesse in die eine oder andere Richtung stellt einzelne Etappen ihrer Entwicklung in ein jeweils anderes Licht und führt zu unterschiedlichen Bewertungen der Verhandlungsstrategien und Ergebnisse. (DÜI-Spl)

<p>W powszechnej opinii demokracja liberalna przechodzi bardzo poważny kryzys. Poszukując jego źródeł wyróżnić można trzy płaszczyzny: ekonomiczną, polityczną i kulturową. Przy czym w debacie publicznej dość rzadko, poza postawieniem diagnozy o kryzysie demokracji liberalnej, prezentuje się możliwe metody jego przezwyciężenia. Tym samym zapomina się, że podstawą dla właściwego funkcjonowania demokracji liberalnej jest obywatel posiadający polityczne kompetencje. Bowiem tylko zaangażowany obywatel jest w stanie przezwyciężyć kryzysy występujące w demokracji liberalnej poprzez wykorzystanie wiedzy politycznej, działając w oparciu o wartości polityczne i rozwijając kulturę zaufania społecznego, przy zachowaniu zasady nieufności w rozumieniu liberalnym i demokratycznym. Polityczne kompetencje obywatelskie, jako podstawa postaw obywatelskich wspierających demokrację i respektujących jej zasady stanowią jeden z trzech filarów jej konsolidacji, a przez to także mogą się stać instrumentem przezwyciężania kryzysu demokracji liberalnej. Przy czym uznając równoważność komponentów politycznych kompetencji obywatelskich szczególną uwagę należy zwrócić na poziom wiedzy politycznej obywateli, bowiem to on determinuje ich kolejne elementy.</p>

Yascha Mounk talks with Kate & Luigi about his new book "The People Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It." Recorded in front of a live audience, the conversation touches on recent populist uprisings and the extent to which they threaten liberal democracy.

A theoretical companion piece to an earlier article (1997 [see abstract 9814845]) contrasts two discourses on African democratization: the political science of democratization, which favors liberal democracy; & the political economy of democratization, which supports a truly anticolonialist popular democracy. The work of Tanzanian theorist Issa Shivji (eg, 1991) & observations on the 1994 national elections in Mozambique & South Africa are drawn on to advocate a political economy analysis -- often accused of being outmoded -- that understands how democratization & its Western analysis are linked wth imperialism, class struggle, & state-society relations. It is argued that such an analysis -- in contrast with the political science/liberal democracy approach, which pursues only a thin democracy not threatening to the interests of national elites & international capital -- can result in a broad, strong, egalitarian democracy in which society is not subservient to neoliberal economics. It is conceded that this form of democracy if more difficult to achieve. 31 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWe analyse conflicts over norms and institutions in internet governance. In this emerging field, dispute settlement is less institutionalised and conflicts take place at a foundational level. Internet governance features two competing spheres of authority characterised by fundamentally diverging social purposes: A more consolidated liberal sphere emphasises a limited role of the state, private and multistakeholder governance and freedom of speech. A sovereigntist challenger sphere emphasises state control, intergovernmentalism and push against the preponderance of Western institutions and private actors. We trace the activation and evolution of conflict between these spheres with regard to norms and institutions in four instances: the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12), the fifth session of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and the Budapest Convention of the Council of Europe. We observe intense norm collisions, and strategic attempts at competitive regime creation and regime shifting towards intergovernmental structures by the sovereigntist sphere. Despite these aggressive attempts at creating new institutions and norms, the existing internet governance order is still in place. Hence, authority conflicts in global internet governance do not necessarily lead to fragmentation.