Suchergebnisse

Ideologija liberalizma obilježena je protuslovljima. U ime slobode nametano je ropstvo jednih drugima. Odnos liberalizma prema državi obilježen je protuslovljem između negativne i pozitivne slobode. Državu blagostanja razvijenu na Zapadu u drugoj polovini 20. stoljeća, zasnovanu na konceptu pozitivne slobode, zamijenio je neoliberalizam zasnovan na konceptu negativne slobode. Rezultat je povećanje ekonomskih razlika između bogatih i siromašnih. Na međunarodnom planu liberalizam je obećavao svijet bez rata uređen na načelima razuma. Nakon prestanka Hladnoga rata, kad su stvorene pretpostavke za ostvarivanje liberalnih obećanja, bogate zemlje Zapada odlučile su ostatku svijeta nametnuti neoliberalne modele funkcioniranja ekonomije i društva. Umjesto win-win situacije svijet je suočen sa sukobima i krizama. Liberalizam može opstati kao kredibilna ideologija ako se na unutrašnjem i na međunarodnom planu budu primjenjivale sve njegove sastavnice. ; The ideology of liberalism is marked by contradictions. Slavery has been imposed to some in the name of liberty for others. The relationship of liberalism toward the state is determined by the contradiction between negative and positive liberty. Welfare state was developed in the West in the latter half of the 20th century and based on the concept of positive liberty, but it has since been replaced by neoliberalism based on the concept of negative liberty. The result was the exacerbation of the economic gap between the wealthy and the poor. On the international level, liberalism promised a world with no wars and arranged according to reason. Following the end of the Cold War and the realization of the preconditions for the fulfillment of liberal promises, the rich countries of the West decided to impose the neoliberal model of society and economy on the rest of the world. Instead of a win-win situation, the world is faced with conflicts and crises. Liberalism can survive as a credible ideology only if all of its components are implemented both on the domestic and international levels.

Članak obrazlaže potrebu eksplicitnoga uključivanja civilnoga društva u Rawlsov sustav političkog liberalizma. Članak identificira tri problema u Rawlsovu sustavu i tada kroz definicije civilnoga društva Keanea, Taylora, Gellnera i Rosenblum izlaže mogućnosti njihova rješavanja. Prvi je problem onaj stabilnosti demokratskih sustava, koji je Rawls riješio uvođenjem preklapajućeg konsenszusa. Rawls, ipak nije dostatno objasnio dinamiku interakcije između razložnih doktrina, čime je ostavio prostor za gubitak potpore trenutnoj političkoj koncepciji pravde u slučajevima u kojima politički predstavnici previše često ignoriraju stavove razložnih doktrina. Drugi je problem onaj nerazložnih doktrina: Rawls planira da ih se riješi uobičajenim pravnim mehanizmima, ali ne elaborira kako se mogu nadzirati njihove aktivnosti. Posljednji je problem onaj stvaranja i mijenjanja javnoga uma, u kojem Rawls ne daje dostatne načine na koji javnost može utjecati na odluke zakonodavaca, sudstva i državnih dužnosnika. Esej identificira elemente definicija civilnoga društva koji rješavaju ova tri problema i zaključuje da bi Rawlsov sustav bio ojačan uključivanjem civilnoga društva. ; The essay argues for explicit inclusion of civil society into Rawls's system of political liberalism. It identifies three problems in Rawls's system and then using the definitions of civil society by Keane, Taylor, Gellner and Rosenblum presents the opportunities for their solution. The first problem is the one of stability of democratic systems, which Rawls solved by introducing overlapping consensus. The essay argues that Rawls does not sufficiently account for the dynamics of the interaction between reasonable doctrines, which can conceivably result in the withdrawal of support for the current political conception of justice if the citizens' representatives too often ignore the views of too many reasonable doctrines. The second problem is the one of unreasonable doctrines: Rawls plans that they be kept under check by legal mechanisms, but does not elaborate on how their activities can be supervised. The final problem is the one of the (re)creation of public reason, in which Rawls offers insufficient means through which the public can influence the actions of law-makers, the judiciary and state officials. The essay identifies the elements of the definitions of civil society that address the three problems and concludes that Rawls's system would be made stronger by the introduction of civil society.

U članku se tvrdi da John Rawls u svojoj kritici perfekcionizma sa stajališta liberalističke neutralnosti razmatra koncepcije dobra bez demarkacije između njih, odnosno bez njihova razlikovanja. Naime, Rawls ne razrješava pitanje o tome je li tu riječ o sveobuhvatnoj religijskoj odnosno filozofsko-etičkoj koncepciji ili je riječ o parcijalnom poimanju lokalnih vrijednosti, dobara i ciljeva. Bez obzira na spornu upotrebu pojma sveobuhvatnosti, neophodno je zadržati koncept razložnosti jer poimanja dobra, da bi bila relevantna u političkoj raspravi, trebaju biti relativno dobro zasnovana, konzistentna i koherentna. Kada se pođe od danih razlikovanja, može se tvrditi da u pojedinim slučajevima uvođenje razmatranja određenih dobara u rasprave o osnovnim principima političkog ustrojstva može biti dobro potkrepljeno i, sa stajališta razložnog pluralizma, moralno opravdano. Ipak, umjereni liberalistički perfekcionizam treba precizirati odnose li se političke odluke na stvaranje opcija, na promociju vrijednih ili na odvraćanje od bezvrijednih dobara i u skladu s tim treba odrediti doseg perfekcionističkih mjera. ; The paper argues that Rawls' critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral liberalism scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly.

Until the first half of the 19th century, two major contending families were predominant in political theory, namely republicanism and liberalism. The early 19th century unambiguously resolved this theoretical contestation in favor of liberalism. In the last two centuries, liberalism has been the leading political theory. The paper analyzes the revival of republican political theory within the framework of the "historical school" and puts forward the theoretical views of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting assumption is the domination of two undemocratic ideological orientations: liberalism & republicanism. The author sees republicanism & liberalism as the ideas proximate to the political or the democratic. These ideas operate semantically but cannot be identified with the political or the democratic. This is not possible as they are not commensurable structures. By providing a theoretical account of various historical traditions the author shows that European republicanism ignored democracy & considered it to be the worst form of government. This is partly true of the liberal political doctrine that evolved later. The author argues it is possible to convert republicanism to democratic pluralism i.e. that this is the biggest common good today. In this way republicanism may be spared its controversies. References. Adapted from the source document.

Is Rousseau unquestionably an enemy of political liberalism, as per the famous irrevocable judgment of I. Berlin? In other words, is he a representative of radical (even "totalitarian") democracy, an apologist of popular sovereignty and a vicious plebeian "friend of the people" (of so-called "positive freedom"), who overlooks the importance of negative freedom of individuums and the separation of powers? Are Rousseau as republican political theorist on the one hand and political liberalism on the other advocates not only of different, but opposite perceptions of political freedom? The first part of the paper recalls the fact that Rousseau's political theory is shaped in a deliberate and complete opposition with regard to the physiocratic economic liberalism, which reduces freedom to its economic and legal aspects, and the modern man to a bourgeois. In this Rousseau is very close to Tocqueville, who questions the physiocratic doctrine from the standpoint of political liberalism. The second part provides a concise presentation and evaluation of the critique of Rousseau's political doctrine (of political freedom and popular sovereignty) from the standpoint of B. Constant's classic political liberalism. In the third, final and most important part, the author shows that an adequate comparison of Rousseau's doctrine with the liberal political doctrine must carefully distinguish between the conceptual clusters reflecting affinity (the people and the separation of powers) and the ones reflecting opposition (the people, the law, the general will and the citoyen). On the basis of this distinction, Rousseau turns out to be both frere and ennemi -- i.e. frere ennemi -- of political liberalism, but not of economic liberism as well. Adapted from the source document.

In this article, the author analyzes the International Relations (IR) liberal theory and its "interdependence" paradigm. The first part presents the liberal "interdependence" paradigm by defining the state and power as the key elements of every political science analysis, including the IR theory. The second part overviews the academic critique of the IR liberalism, as a methodologically outdated and historically disputed theory. Finally, the third part focuses on the contemporary "interdependence" paradigm as crucial for understanding the current international processes in the global society. The goal of this article is to present the reevaluation of the contemporary IR liberal theory in the "real world politics", and indicate the possible directions of its ongoing theoretic development. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the usefulness of the theoretical concepts that have popped up in the riveting perennial debate between liberals & multiculturalists that revolves around the states of the developed liberal democracy. The question is: how enlightening the theoretical categories of the Anglo-Saxon tradition are for us, & can the solutions from that tradition serve as a guideline in a transitional country such as Croatia. The argument unravels in three steps. In the first two parts the author presents some of the key theoretical concepts by outlining the discussions by Iris M. Young & Brian Barry, & in the third he challenges their usability. The author points out the theoretical as well as the practical-political problems stemming from the politicization of culture. References. Adapted from the source document.

Od Teorije pravednosti do Prava narodâ liberalizam Johna Rawlsa razvija se od individualizma do jednog specifičnog oblika tzv. »komunitarističkog liberalizma«. U Teoriji Rawls će govoriti o pojedincu i njegovoj dužnosti izbjegavanja rata (građanskom neposlušnošću) dok će u Pravu narodâ govoriti o društvu i dužnosti dobro uređenih naroda na pokretanje rata ako su ugrožena ljudska prava. Prva je perspektiva individualna i miroljubiva, dok je druga društvena i ne čini se baš pacifističkom. Prva kao da je protumačena iz perspektive običnog građanina liberalne ustavne demokracije, dok je druga više nalik tumačenju nekoga tko ima moć. U tom razvoju Rawlsova liberalizma intrigira potencijalni sukob između pojedinca i društva što je osobito uočljivo u njegovu shvaćanju odbijanja sudjelovanja ili opravdanja sudjelovanja u ratu. ; From the Theory of Justice to the Law of Peoples liberalism of John Rawls develops from individualism to one specific form of the so¬called "Communitarian liberalism". In the Theory Rawls discussed the individual and his duty to avoid war (civil disobedience), while in the Law of Peoples he discussed society and the duties of well¬organized Nations to launch war if human rights are endangered. The first perspective is individualistic and peaceful, while the other is more social and does not seem too pacifist. The first seems interpreted from the perspective of an ordinary citizen of liberal constitutional democracy, while the other is more like an interpretation from someone who holds the power. In that development of Rawls' liberalism, what is intriguing is the potential conflict between individuals and society, which is particularly evident in his understanding of refusal to participate or justification to participate in war.

This paper deals with Bhikhu Parekh's theory of intercultural evaluation. Parekh's approach to multiculturalism is based on an open dialogue between minorities & the majority on cultural practices that should be tolerated. In the first part, author criticizes Parekh's concept of operative public values, which Parekh uses as a starting point for intercultural debate. In the second part, author deals with the problem of consistency between Parekh's theoretical arguments & their application to particular cases. In the conclusion, author argues that Parekh's aspiration to avoid both claims of liberal universalism & cultural relativism is unsuccessful because he fails to provide a convincing theoretical argument on how to resolve disputes on cultural values & practices. References. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, the author focuses on the work of Bernard Mandeville as predecessor of Scottish Enlightenment and liberal tradition of thought. Starting from the social, political and economic context of the all-embracing crisis of the society in transition of his time, special attention is devoted to his moral, social and economic views based on methodological individualism. The author argues that Mandeville's controversial thought resists one-sided labeling and unambiguous fitting into mutually opposed camps of mercantilism and market liberalism, i.e. constructivism and evolutionism. This is the reason behind the variety of interpretations, and sometimes even completely opposite readings of his work. He was a satirist, social critic, physician, philosopher and economist, who effectuated a shift and a turn with regard to the habitual perceptions of the age in all those segments of his reflection and activity, and he launched a sort of "revolution in thought", which will be given its definitive formulation and elaboration in the second half of the 18th century by the Scottish moral philosophers. The author concludes that Mandeville was, first and foremost, a man of his time and responded to the acute problems of his age. It would thus be inappropriate and wrong to apply his ideas from the beginning of the 18th century to the present time with a clearer precising of intellectual and political projects, and declare him either a mercantilist or an interventionist, or else an advocate of laissez-faire. Nonetheless, Mandeville came up with answers that would later be incorporated in the liberal tradition. One may therefore say that he greatly influenced the Scottish Enlightenment and contributed to the birth of liberalism, although he was not a consistent economic liberal himself, of the type that was familiar to the late 18th century. Adapted from the source document.

Polazište ovog rada nedavni je prijepor suvremenih realista oko aktualne dvojbe je li vanjskopolitička doktrina američkog predsjednika Donalda Trumpa realistička. Autor ukazuje da je navedena polemika posljedicom zastarjelog, tautološkog, ali još uvijek i neprevladanog dualističkog diskursa u teorijama međunarodnih odnosa, koji dijeli teoriju i vanjskopolitičku praksu na dva dominantna pravca: realizam i liberalizam. Na temelju dosadašnje teorijske kritike novog realizma, ili neorealizma, članak potvrđuje da ovaj suvremeni realistički pravac epistemološki ne pripada tradiciji realizma na koju se poziva, nego se svojim predodžbama o moći, državi i međunarodnom sustavu utemeljuje u političkom idealizmu: pravcu mišljenja koji se redovno pripisuje liberalima I kojemu je tradicionalni, ili "klasični" realizam bitno suprotstavljen. Analizirajući glavne podudarnosti između pretpostavki neorealizma i načela Trumpove doktrine, ovaj rad navodi na zaključak da Trump nije realist nego protuliberalni idealist. Pojam "protuliberalni idealizam" prikladniji je za razmatranje aktualne američke vanjske politike u kontekstu njene hegemonijske pozicije u liberalnom međunarodnom poretku. ; The article's initial motive is the recent controversy among contemporary realists, who questioned the supposed realism of US president Donald Trump's foreign policy doctrine. The author argues that the polemic is a consequential outgrowth of outdated, tautological, and yet still actual binary discourse, that divides international theory and foreign policy practice on Realism and Liberalism. Referring to the established critique of Neorealism, the article argues that Neorealism does not in epistemic terms belong to the tradition of Realism, to which it is a self-proclaimed successor. On the contrary, with its notions of power, state and international system it is established in political idealism: the tradition of thought that is conventionally attributed to Liberalism, and to which "classical" Realism was fundamentally opposed. By analyzing evident congruence between principles of Neorealism and Trump's America First doctrine, the article concludes that Trump is not a realist, but illiberal idealist. His idealistic nationalist world-view, when translated into foreign policy objectives, is in stark contrast to the professed principles of Realism. Furthermore, the concept of illiberal idealism offers an analytical framework for further analysis of present US foreign policy in the context of its hegemonic position in the Liberal International Order.

The author sees Schmitt's understanding of the political as a division into adversary groups that implies the possibility of physical liquidations of people, based on the conditioning of the political by the taxonomy of liberal thought, whose most consistent manifestation is the age of technology of the 20th century. According to Schmitt, contemporary liberalism understood as the age of technology represents an attempt at eliminating all the contentious issues of human survival through the faith in unlimited technological progress i.e. enabling communication by avoiding the issue of correctness at all cost. Based on Strauss' criticism of Schmitt, the author argues that Schmitt's concept of the political can be understood as the first step in the renunciation of such communication by revealing its disguised politicalness i.e. as a warning that avoiding the issue of correctness is the most dangerous response to it. In that case, however, the political as understood by Schmitt, by its logic aims to be eventually overcome, since its rationale beyond the age of technology lies exclusively in opening the space for asking the pertinent questions on the conditions & the goals of the survival of the human race. In the second part of the paper the author looks into the possibility that Schmitt's concept of the political, with Derrida's help, can be analyzed by using the concept of amity as its starting point. The enemy would be a figure of laying oneself open to death in the other, by which a friendly relationship is freed from its natural foundations & fraternization, retaining in amity a moment of a thoughtful decision for the other & preventing its degradation into a mere technique of cultivating friendship. References. Adapted from the source document.