LIBERALISM, POPULISM, AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 127-142
ISSN: 1065-9129
THE AUTHOR STUDIES HOW THE PROBLEM OF CYCLICAL MAJORITIES AFFECTS THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE LIBERAL MODEL OF DEMOCRACY. HE ARGUES THAT RIKER'S DEFENSE OF LIBERALISM IS UNSATISFYING IN THAT IT ULTIMATELY DEPENDS UPON THE HOPE THAT CYCLES ARE NOT COMMON EVENTS. AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION, HE PROPOSES THAT THE ASSUMPTIONS OF A PROPERLY-CONSTRUED LIBERAL MODEL IMPLY CONDITIONS THAT PROHIBIT THE OCCURRENCE OF THE VOTER'S PARADOX. HE CONCLUDES THAT LIBERALISM CONTINUES TO SURVIVE DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS INTERNAL STRUCTURE DEPENDS UPON THE TRANSITIVITY OF COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES AND THAT THIS FACT, IN TURN, PROVIDES A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR PURSUING MORE ROBUST OR POPULISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY.