Suchergebnisse

ch. 1. Introduction -- ch. 2. The foreign trade regime and trade liberalization in Turkey -- ch. 3. Standards, conformity assessment and technical barriers to trade -- ch. 4. Liberalization of telecommunications services -- ch. 5. Electricity sector policy reform -- ch. 6. Policy reform in the natural gas sector -- ch. 7. Liberalization of banking services -- ch. 8. Maritime freight transport sector policy reform -- ch. 9. Policy reform in the road freight transport sector -- ch. 10. Impact of economic liberalization.

Chapter 1. Processing Trade, Trade Liberalisation, and Opening Up: China's Miracle of International Trade -- Chapter 2. Import, Firm Productivity, and Product Complexity -- Chapter 3. Trade Liberalization, Product Complexity, and Productivity Improvement: Evidence from Chinese Firms. - Chapter 4. Processing Trade, Export Intensity, and Input Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Chinese Firms -- Chapter 5. Processing Trade, Tariff Reductions, and Firm Productivity: Evidence from Chinese Firms -- Chapter 6. Firm R&D, Processing Trade and Input Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from Chinese Firms -- Chapter 7. Input Trade Liberalization and Import Switching -- Chapter 8. Trade Liberalisation and Chinese Exports: Sourcing from the South -- Chapter 9. Measured Skill Premia and Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Chinese Firms -- Chapter 10. All-Around Trade Liberalization and Firm-Level Employment: Theory and Evidence from China.

According to a 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Americans have the lowest opinion of free trade than the populations of the other 47 countries surveyed. The author feels this is cause for concern & argues that continuing to liberalize trade will be beneficial in restoring feelings of international good will towards America & strengthen multilateral foreign policy efforts. A movement towards greater trade liberalization in America will require a continued commitment to World Trade Organization (WTO) & its policies, which would bolster the international credibility of the United States. C. Goger

Agricultural markets have entered a long-term process of liberalization, with the aim of reducing imposed market imperfections such as monopolistic public trade, entry barriers and subsidies. The experience of more than a decade of agriculture liberalization offers a good opportunity to review and analyze the outcome of this process and to draw lessons for the future. The central topic in Agricultural Markets Beyond Liberalization is the relationship between market structure and how markets perform in a dynamic context during a liberalization process. The topic is studied from both a micro and macro viewpoint and refers to different types of agricultural markets. This volume brings together the dynamics of agricultural markets in several parts of the world, with a special focus on transition economics and Africa. The different studies cover geographical areas as wide as a district as well as a group of countries, and institutions from individual contracts to multi-national organizations. The analysis of liberalization under different circumstances, and the different methods of analysis used by the authors provide a valuable foundation for the assessment of liberalization

A Negative Binomial Regression Model is used to investigate the sustainability of China–Mexico trade liberalization by testing the tariff lines underpinning Mexico's successful antidumping (AD) measures against Chinese imports from 1991 to 2011. Evidence shows import tariff cutting and consumption growth have a positive impact on consumer goods but a negative impact on intermediaries. This result implies that while the Mexican government has expended considerable energy on the trade liberalization of intermediate and capital goods, the domestic consumer goods market has been protected from Chinese imports. The empirical results indicate that Mexico's AD use for consumer goods helps to sustain trade liberalization of intermediate and capital goods under the domestic political pressures for trade opening.

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the government's temptation to expropriate. Political liberalization can relax this constraint, increasing the government's revenue, but also increasing the ruler's political risks. We analyze the ruler's optimal liberalization, where our measure of political liberalization is the probability of the ruler being replaced if he tried to expropriate private investments. Poorer endowments can support reputational equilibria with more investment, even without liberalization. So we find a resources curse, where larger resource endowments can decrease investment and reduce the ruler's revenue. The ruler's incentive to liberalize can be greatest with intermediate resource endowments. Strong liberalization becomes optimal in cases where capital investment yields approximately constant returns to scale. Adding independent revenue decreases optimal liberalization and investment. Mobility of productive factors that complement capital can increase incentives to liberalize, but equilibrium prices may adjust so that liberal and authoritarian regimes co-exist.

We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the government's temptation to expropriate. Political liberalization can relax this constraint, increasing the government's revenue, but also increasing the ruler's political risks. We analyze the ruler's optimal liberalization, where our measure of political liberalization is the probability of the ruler being replaced if he tried to expropriate private investments. Poorer endowments can support reputational equilibria with more investment, even without liberalization. So we find a resources curse, where larger resource endowments can decrease investment and reduce the ruler's revenue. The ruler's incentive to liberalize can be greatest with intermediate resource endowments. Strong liberalization becomes optimal in cases where capital investment yields approximately constant returns to scale. Adding independent revenue decreases optimal liberalization and investment. Mobility of productive factors that complement capital can increase incentives to liberalize, but equilibrium prices may adjust so that liberal and authoritarian regimes co-exist.

This paper empirically analyzes the effects of de jure financial openness on institutional quality as captured by indicators on investment risk, corruption level, impartiality of judiciary system as well as the effectiveness of bureaucratic authorities. Using a panel data set of more than 110 countries and a time span from 1984 to 2005, we show that a higher degree of financial openness improves institutional quality in particular by reducing investment risks. We also study the effect of a single liberalization reform on the development of institutional quality. Again, we find evidence for the beneficial impact of financial liberalization with the exception of the level of corruption. We additionally show that if financial liberalization is supported by simultaneous political liberalization, the benign consequences of financial opening for the institutional performance are even larger, while financial deregulation in former socialist countries tends to worsen institutional quality.

The paired notions of 'revolution' & 'liberalization' are explored in regard to their social roots & complications. The notion of the 'revolution' arises in part from the conditions prevalent during the transition from agrarian to industrial civilization, during which the social order of the previous age loses all legitimacy; & partly through the adaptation, in these circumstances, of certain messianic & scriptualist ideas pervasive in the ideologies of some of th old order. The appeal of this expectation, ie, of a total social fulfillment following a political cataclysm, is no longer so strong, & is, in present circumstances, being replaced by a new notion--liberalization. An attempt is made to explore the preconditions of this idea & a more systematic & sustained study of the social & political phenomena falling under it is urged. AA.

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the 1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the functioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE countries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers. The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between trade and institutions, and the pro-trade effect of institutional similarity.