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"Corporate Lobbying in Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Ethnic Lobbying in Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries & loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries & beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

What explains policy outcomes? Using a data set containing the actions and assessments of 776 lobbyists working closely on 77 policy proposals, combined with newly collected data on each proposal, I show that the intensity of lobbying against a proposal is a powerful predictor of the likelihood that the proposal is adopted in Congress or a federal agency. This negative lobbying is more effective than positive lobbying: it takes 3.5 lobbyists working for a new proposal to counteract the effect of just one lobbyist against it. Negative lobbying is a more important predictor of the policy outcome than the level of conflict, the preference of the majority of lobbyists, and differences in interest group resources. Several institutional factors—presidential support for the measure, congressional polarization, and whether the proposal was initiated by a federal agency—are found to affect policy outcomes, but only presidential support matters more than negative lobbying.

What explains policy outcomes? Using a data set containing the actions and assessments of 776 lobbyists working closely on 77 policy proposals, combined with newly collected data on each proposal, I show that the intensity of lobbying against a proposal is a powerful predictor of the likelihood that the proposal is adopted in Congress or a federal agency. This negative lobbying is more effective than positive lobbying: it takes 3.5 lobbyists working for a new proposal to counteract the effect of just one lobbyist against it. Negative lobbying is a more important predictor of the policy outcome than the level of conflict, the preference of the majority of lobbyists, and differences in interest group resources. Several institutional factors-presidential support for the measure, congressional polarization, and whether the proposal was initiated by a federal agency-are found to affect policy outcomes, but only presidential support matters more than negative lobbying. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

In the EU, a new discussion on temporary labour migration is underway, set in motion by a German-French initiative of Ministers of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble and Nicholas Sarkozy. Their proposal: that the EU states work more closely both to combat illegal migration and to control legal migration, especially by fostering 'circular migration'. The latter idea in particular has been met with criticism. Yet this critical perspective overlooks the fact that the initiative has injected new momentum into the halting development of a European migration policy. At the same time, key aspects must still be clarified to provide a foundation for a sustainable immigration policy. The debate on the open questions should be pushed further, both within the Council and in the other EU institutions.(SWP Comments / SWP)

Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coincide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest. References. Adapted from the source document.

In this article, we examine the regulation of pollution in open economies when the regulator is influenced by special interest groups. In a setting with free trade, we identify conditions under which a country may unilaterally adopt the stricter regulatory standards of its competitors. In our model, two lobby groups - representing industrial and environmental special interests - influence their government's policy decision. Their lobbying efforts not only depend on the domestic policy, but also on environmental regulation abroad. We find that both market structure and the characteristics of the pollutant are crucial determinants of the political equilibrium: given a local pollutant, the probability of convergence of environmental policies is increasing in the stringency of regulation abroad when product supply is relatively inelastic. This effect is reversed in the case of transboundary pollution. We also extend our framework to cases of imperfect competition.