Suchergebnisse

Summary This dataset describes the Council Tax Requirement calculated for every Lower Tier Local Authority in England for each financial year since 2002/2003. The council tax requirement is the amount of revenue a local authority needs to raise through council tax and calculated by deducting from its planned spending any funding from reserves, income it expects to raise, and funding it will receive from the Government. Technical description The Council Tax Requirement indicator was compiled from annual revenue outturn estimates of Local Authority (LA) revenue expenditure and financing. Council Tax requirement is used to balance the net service expenditure, and many types of authorities receive income as council tax. Figures for Council Tax thus include values for both Upper Tier (UTLA) and Lower Tier (LTLA) Local Authorities. Other types of LAs that receive council tax include special/other authorities, such as Police and Fire and Rescue authorities. More recently, some Combined Authorities have also received income as Council Tax Requirement, e.g. the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. Note that from April 2013 onwards, council tax benefit, which provided help for low-income households with their council tax, was abolished and replaced with localised council tax support schemes. Until 2013, Council Tax Requirement was reported inclusive of any amount of council tax foregone due to benefits, and as such figures until 2012/13 are not comparable to those after 2013/14. Figures have been calculated for Lower Tier LAs (FIN_07_58L) and Upper Tier LAs (FIN_07_58U). Values are expressed in thousands (£) and presented on the basis of financial years, i.e. from April 1st to March 31st. Figures from historic LA geography have been referenced to the 2018 LA geography. This includes changes in name/codes, merges, or splits of old LAs to new LAs based on population ratios for that year. The Council Tax Requirement is expressed as the total amount as well as per capita, for direct comparisons. However, annual figures were not adjusted for inflation.

A broad outline of the main elements of the Norwegian local tax system is first given. This is followed by a discussion of some of the changes that have taken place in the relative distribution of various sources of local revenue since the mid-seventies. It is shown that although local government's share of total national income tax revenues has increased over recent years, such taxes have decreased as a proportion of total local revenues. This relative decline in the importance of local income taxes has been compensated, in particular, by increases in state grants. Thus, whereas in 1977 taxes accounted for 53% of total local current revenues, by 1982 this proportion had dropped to 47%. Over the same period, central government grants increased from 31% to 35% of current revenues. It is also shown that fees and charges are becoming increasingly important as sources of local revenues. These relative changes in the composition of local revenues have not been uniform across all municipalities. Whereas the larger cities were subject to real cutbacks in tax revenues, taxes continued to increase in the smallest and most peripheral municipalities, despite a government decision in 1978 to lower the maximum local tax rate. Overall, it is suggested that the long-term effect of the policy of central government, as regards local revenues, has been to bring about a rather massive redistribution of revenues, solely benefitting the smallest and already the most well-off municipalities.

A wide range of criticisms apply to the present local business tax in Germany: It is incompatible with a rational tax system; the definition of the tax base is inequitable; it is unstable through the economic cycle; it is very unequal between areas; it leaves local finance vulnerable to economic declines; it is not perceptible; and it has been subject to reforms at federal level which have taken no account of local needs. However, from the point of view of local government the tax has many advantages: particularly, that it is a large source of revenue, it is fairly autonomous, and it links businesses to local authorities. Reform is nevertheless required, but it is argued that this should be based on revitalisation of the present business tax, primarily by widening its tax base or by the institution of a new tax on the local value-added.

Local authorities in England have been set spending targets. If they exceed these targets, their central government grant is reduced, thus sharply increasing the local tax rate. The resulting spending decisions of local authorities have been analysed, in an attempt to explain their behaviour in terms of a model of rational spending behaviour in line with neoclassical consumer theory. Various families of indifference curves indicating preferences between expenditure and local tax rate increases have been tested for consistency with the actual spending decisions of the authorities, and evidence found to support such a model. Empirical results are presented. But there is evidence that other variables, such as past spending decisions and expectations about the future, also have a significant impact on spending decisions.

The local Consortium and its consideration as Local Authority has been a topic under constant discusion since Law, of 1985, regulating Local Regimen Bases came into forced. This discussion has increased even more when the Law of rationalization and sustainability of the Local Administration came into force. In addition to that, the taxing rights of the Consortium, is another issue that generates constant debate. This work prenteds to point out, althogh with some controversy, that the Cosortium is not a local Authority —because the basic central govenment legislator wanted to be this way— and, therefore, it cannot have any tax rights. ; La figura del consorcio local y su consideración como Entidad local, ha sido un tema sujeto a constante discusión, tras la entrada en vigor de la Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local, de 1985. Esta discusión se ha acrecentado aún más, si cabe, desde la entrada en vigor de la Ley de racionalización y sostenibilidad de la Administración Local. Junto a lo anterior, la potestad tributaria del consorcio, es otro asunto que genera una constante discusión. Este trabajo pretende poner de manifiesto, no sin cierta controversia, que el consorcio no es una Entidad local —porque el legislador básico estatal así lo quiso— y por tanto no puede gozar de potestad tributaria alguna.

In this article we present the research of local agricultural tax policy in Poland. It is a specific kind of tax as its volume depends on an artificial measure, i.e. the price of rye. The article aims to find out if with this construction of tax the local tax policy may be efficient. Our research proves that the lower the share of agricultural tax in property taxes, the more efficient is the tax policy. The reduction in the agricultural tax correlates positively with the growth in agricultural tax in the current year, and also to a lesser extent in the next year. Higher rye prices result in an increased reduction in agricultural tax rates as well as in tax revenues, and the tendency is reversed in the following year.