Search results

NEXT TO THE PARTY ELITE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THERE ARE SEVERAL POLICY ELITES IN THE USSR. THEY CONSIST OF OFFICIALS IN EVERY FIELD OF POLICY & HAVE THEIR BASIS OF POWER IN THE RESOURCES THAT ARE ALLOCATED IN THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET. MOST RESOURCES FLOW TO THE ECONOMY, THE SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL SECTOR, THE MILITARY, & THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS. ELITES IN THESE SECTORS CAN BE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. THE PARTY ELITE MAKES ALL LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS, IT CAN REGULATE THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THESE POLICY ELITES & IT CAN CALL THE ELITES TO ACCOUNT BY PERMITTING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF POLICY DECISIONS. POLICY ELITES HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN POLICY-MAKING WHEN THEY HAVE MORE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POLITBURO & THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEIR REPRESENTATION HAS GROWN SINCE 1953--IRREGULARLY--BUT THE PARTY ELITE STILL HAS THE MAJORITY IN THESE PARTY ORGANS. POLICY ELITES HAVE INFLUENCE AS THERE IS A CONSTANT FLOW OF THEIR MEMBERS INTO THE PARTY ELITE. THIS MAKES THE PARTY ELITE LESS COHERENT & CAUSES MORE INTERNAL DISPUTES. YET THE POLICY ELITES ARE NOT CONTENT WITH POSSIBILITIES TO INFLUENCE POLICY MAKING; THEY ARE IN OPPOSITION TO THE PARTY ELITE THAT DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THEM MORE INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS. HA.

The history of Surinam's economy & class development is analyzed, providing the basis for explanation of how privileged & nonprivileged classes were determined. Racial characteristics & class position are closely related. An attempt is made to demonstrate in which ways class & race have affected the development of political parties after WWII. The creation of political parties can be considered the reaction of different racial elites to the necessity of democratically legitimizing their power. Until now elites have been able to preserve an advantageous position in influencing basic policy decisions within their parties. Elites govern by means of informal compromises & coalitions, which constitutes a threat to the stability of the system. Surinam, on the verge of independence, awaits a long period of political instability & faces the possibility of external interference. 1 Table. Modified HA.

Explanation is given to the dismal predictions of the Club of Rome studies concerning long-run consequences of economic growth & population increases, & why they are not translated into policy changes affecting those variables. The domestic function of economic growth, providing bargaining space for the solution of political conflicts, & the propensity of policy makers to give priority to short-run problems affecting their own position inhibit these policy changes. Focus is on the theory of W. Harich, (KOMMUNISMUS OHNE WACHSTUM? BABEUF UND DER CLUB OF ROME [Communism without Growth? Babeuf and the Club of Rome], Rheinbeck: Rowohlt, 1975) a philosopher from the German Democratic Republic who argued for rigid centralization of political & economic power at the global level. Although Harich did not include concepts such as `liberty', `democracy', & `constitution' in his theory, this can be compared to some of the political reactions to the challenge in Western Europe. Proposals made by Tinbergen & the Mansholt plan however are found to be more promising. 3 Figures. Modified HA.