Suchergebnisse

PROSPECT THEORY OFFERS POWERFUL INSIGHTS AND PROPOSITIONS INTO POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING, ESPECIALLY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT STATESMENT ARE INDEED RISK-ACCEPTANT FOR LOSSES. THIS WOULD HELP EXPLAIN OBSERVED PATTERNS IN BARGAINING, DETERRENCE, THE ORGINS OF WARS, AS WELL AS SUGGESTING WHY STATES ARE LESS LIKELY TO BEHAVE AGGRESSIVELY WHEN DOING SO WOULD PRODUCE GAINS THAN WHEN SUCH BEHAVIOR MIGHT PREVENT LOSSES.

Studies of North Korean foreign policy are increasingly turning to the thesis advanced by prospect theory of loss aversion and reference dependence to explain its risk taking. Most of these studies focus on the post-1990s as the genesis of North Korea's risk-prone behavior. I show that Pyongyang has operated from a frame of losses since the late 1960s, due to the parallel decline of ideological unity in Soviet-North Korean and Sino-North Korean relations. In particular, from 1967 to 1968, North Korea perceived both allies to be more focused on countering each other than on jointly opposing the United States. Consequently, Pyongyang for the first time saw both Moscow and Beijing as doubtful assets in its bid for hegemonic unification. North Korea therefore stressed the role of small countries in the revolutionary struggle and launched the most violent phase of its militant strategy, emphasizing the US threat as the common enemy. The strategy was therefore in part a function of fear rather than a desire for expansion. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

This study investigates how the nature of grievances can provide advantages or disadvantages to social movements. I use an experimental design to test the effects of loss aversion and omission bias on people's reactions toward grievances and the campaigns that seek to address them. The results indicate that grievances involving a loss are perceived as more immoral, unjust, and important than grievances involving a gain. Loss-based grievances also generate stronger emotions, increase willingness to engage in activism, and produce perceptions of greater public support. Similarly, grievances resulting from a commission (action), as compared to an omission (inaction), are seen as more immoral, unjust, and important. Commission-based grievances direct attribution of blame toward perpetrators, evoke higher levels of emotions, and increase willingness to participate in campaigns. These findings provide support for the idea that not all grievances are created equal in their ability to appeal to and potentially mobilize the public. Adapted from the source document.

Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama struggled to overcome widespread and persistent myths about their proposals to reform the American health care system. Their difficulties highlight the influence of factual misinformation in national politics and the extent to which it correlates with citizens' political views. In this essay, I explain how greater elite polarization and the growth in media choice have reinforced the partisan divide in factual beliefs. To illustrate these points, I analyze debates over health care reform in 1993-1994 and 2009-2010, tracing the spread of false claims about reform proposals from Bill Clinton and Barack Obama and analyzing the prevalence of misinformation in public opinion. Since false beliefs are extremely difficult to correct, I conclude by arguing that increasing the reputational costs for dishonest elites might be a more effective approach to improving democratic discourse. The congressional election of 2006 was arguably a 'Housequake.' But how momentous have the changes been for how the House operates and the policy it produces? An answer to that question requires particular attention to two interrelated institutional factors: leadership and partisanship. A closer look at three episodes involving the Appropriations Committee -- the breakdown of the markup process in 2008 and battles over open rules and 'motions to recommit' in 2009 -- reveals the extent to which the struggle for partisan advantage is trumping norms that buttress the institutional role of Appropriations and of the House. Congress needs both partisan and bipartisan capacity, but the latter is in a dangerously weakened state. The high-stakes debate over health care reform captured the public's attention for nearly a year. Options ranging from fully nationalized insurance to maintaining the status quo were considered, though little consensus as to the appropriate solution emerged. Most surveys indicated an agreement that a problem existed with the current health care system and a clear and consistent majority favored taking some action on health care reform. However, clear public support for any specific reform proposal was difficult to muster since most individuals also indicated satisfaction with their own health care. This paper explores this disconnect in public opinion within the context of loss aversion. We note that even as elites actively attempted to frame the issue to counteract the public's loss averse tendencies, these strategies met with little success in generating support for Obama's reform plan. However, we also argue that these loss averse tendencies will now work against any Republican efforts to repeal the health reform legislation. Adapted from the source document.

The paper explores the consequences of economic integration on wage and monetary policy management. It studies the possibility that openness may discipline labor unions through potential losses created by the worsening in terms of trade (international competitiveness) associated with high wage claims. We find that, contrary to some recent literature, a monetary expansion fails to affect real outcomes and only results in higher inflation, since the claimed wage-moderation mechanism does not work when it is properly modeled. Hence, recent policy recommendations for an expansionary monetary policy in open economies result to be counterproductive, whereas low-inflation targeting remains a first best policy. [Copyright 2004 The Society for Policy Modeling; published by Elsevier Inc.]