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I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expectations, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels.

I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expections, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

The institution of bicameralism, as a distinct constitutional element, is examined. Bicameralism exerts a stabilizing effect on legislatures by supporting a non-empty core in majority voting games. This effect was originally established for two-dimensional policy spaces & extends to the n-dimensional case. The mechanism by which bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria is the institutionalization of opposition between mutually oriented median voters. Multicameralism may generate the same stabilizing effect, but only under conditions of substantial opposition between chambers. The linkage of this analysis of bicameralism with the standard median voter model & with more traditional analyses of bicameralism is discussed. 3 Figures, 8 References. Adapted from the source document.

RECENT PAPERS HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT BICAMERALISM CAN SUPPORT A NON-EMPTY CORE IN MAJORITY VOTING GAMES IN TWO DIMENSIONAL POLICY SPACES. THE AUTHORS GENERALIZE THIS RESULT TO THE N-DIMENSIONAL CASE, AND PROVIDE A DISCUSSION OF MULTI-CAMERALISM. BICAMERALISM GENERATES A CORE OF POTENTIALLY STABLE EQUILBIRIA BY INSTITUIONALIZING OPPOSITION BETWEEN MUTUALLY ORIENTED MEDIAN VOTERS, THIS PROVIDES A CLEAR LINK WITH THE STANDARD MEDIAN VOTER MODEL AND WITH MORE TRADITIONAL ANALYSES OF BICAMERALISM.

THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THE CONSOCIATIONAL MODEL HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIZATION AND THAT IT HAS SERVED SOUTH AFRICA--ALL SOUTH AFRICANS--VERY WELL. IT TAKES ISSUE WITH MICHAEL KELLY CONNOR'S ARTICLE, "THE ECLIPSE OF CONSOCIATIONALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION," AND SHOWS CONNORS WRONG ON FOUR COUNTS.

The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.