Suchergebnisse

SUMMARYIn this paper, we attempt to renew the interest in marginal employment subsidies. Such subsidies are paid only for a firm's additional employment exceeding some reference level and create larger employment stimuli at lower fiscal costs than general wage subsidies for all workers. If the hiring of a new employee also entails subsidizing an incumbent worker (double marginal subsidization), the replacement of regular paid workers by outsourcing employment to newly established firms – a standard critique of marginal employment subsidies – can be avoided. This additional subsidy reduces the incentive to crowd out regular employment and results in even larger employment effects. Applying the subsidy scheme to the low‐skill labor market in Germany, we show that employment can be substantially increased without imposing additional fiscal burden.

In many European countries, marginal part-time, (solo-)self-employment and secondary jobs have been increasing since the last decades. The question about the provision of social protection and labour legislation for these types of employment is the starting point for a project entitled "Hybrid working arrangements in Europe", directed by the WSI. Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Denmark and Austria comprise the group of countries selected in order to investigate "hybrid work" in the context of different welfare state regimes. The following paper by Jacqueline O'Reilly and Christine Lewis is one of the seven country studies giving a detailed description about labour law regulations and the national insurance systems for self-employed, secondary jobs and marginal part-time employment.