The media policy of a country is a part of its overall policy and depends on the totality of socio-historical circumstances, the level of cultural and economic development, as well as the possible social consensus on the necessity for acceptance and implementation of experiences and standards from the democratic world in this field. Unlike other areas for which local/state politics is defined, the media field has only recently become interesting from this point of view and, as it is often the case in transition countries, it is still not recognized as a clearly defined position of the ruling circles. This paper analyzes the process of major changes in the media system of Serbia after the democratic changes and government actions, which in the long run cannot be considered a precisely constituted media policy, but whose consequences have an impact on the state of the public sphere and of the media, and thus receive political significance. The most important indicator of the will of political circles is undoubtedly the regulatory level, which is why this paper deals particularly with the preparation, adoption, and practical implementation of media legislation enacted from 2000 onward. Considering the official Serbian aspirations to join the European Union, the issue of state media policy is also seen through the prism of European media policy.
By reporting on some conflicts but not on others, and by representing conflicts they report on in particular ways, the media strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of democratisation conflicts, and thus also shape the prospects of success of conflict parties. This paper explores the literature on media and conflict by focusing on the ways in which media frame inter-state and civil wars, institutionalised conflicts and social movements in western democracies, and conflicts in nondemocratic and democratising states. Much of the literature discusses the ways in which western media frame foreign conflicts and domestic election campaigns and policy debates, while there is considerably less focus on domestic conflicts in nonwestern settings, such as those that arise during and after transitions from nondemocratic rule. There are only limited attempts to draw parallels between the media coverage of disparate conflicts. In contrast, this study builds upon research findings in these related areas to draw lessons for empirical research of media framing of the contentious dimension of contemporary democratisation. This study concludes that the political context is the main factor that shapes the media framing of various forms of political conflict. Several dimensions of the political context matter in this respect, such as regime type, international (foreign) or domestic perspective, elite consensus or conflict, policy consensus or uncertainty, policy area, more or less institutionalised nature of the political conflict at stake, and the stage of democratisation. Also, the literature suggests that media framing strongly influences political outcomes and thus fosters or undermines democratic institutions in new democracies. .
Са политичким преокретом 2000. године у Србији отпочео је истовемено и процес идеолошког преобликовања јавних простора. Међу најпроминентнијим видовима оваквог деловања је именовање или преименовање урбаног простора, првенствено улица и тргова, те бављење постојећим споменицима и меморијалима, као и градња и планирање нових. Овакви су случајеви посебно били уочљиви у Београду. Њима су се у неколико наврата супротставиле одређене политичке партије, те неполитичке групе које су организовале уличне акције 'против-именовања' београдских улица, те кампање против новопланираних јавних споменика. Односи моћи и идентитетске политике у овим случајевима биће коментарисани у овом раду. Пропратиће се праксе неколико уметничких и политичких скупина које су спровеле акције и перформансе незваничног преименовања улица, или су пак дискутовале и противиле се подизању новопредложених споменика. (Пре)именовањем одређених градских простора, хегемонске политичке коалиције покушавају да конституишу сигнификантна симболичка места, док, са друге стране, опозиционе противакције покушавају да преузму та иста места и да их реинтерпретирају. У овом ће се раду покушати да прикажу и анализирају поједине идеолошке политике и званични дискурси сећања, те поједине уметничке и политичке контраполитике и опозиционе праксе алтернативне комеморације ; With the onset of political overturn in Serbia in 2000, the process of the ideological reconfiguration of public places was simultaneously being put in motion. One of the most promi- nent means of this endeavor was naming and renaming of urban space, primarily of streets and squares, but also treatment of existing memorial sites and monuments and commissioning and erection of new ones. These undertakings were especially prominent in Serbia's capital Belgrade. Such processes were opposed several times by certain political parties and groups which organized street-actions of counter-naming of Belgrade's thoroughfares and campaigns against newly designated public monuments, and power-play and identity politics of such proceedings will be commented on here. This paper will discuss practices of several artistic and political groups which carried out unofficial street-renaming actions and performances, or discussed and opposed proposed new memorials. By (re)naming certain urban spaces, hegemonic political coalitions are trying to construct significant symbolic places, while oppositional counter-actions are seeking to overtake those same places and reinterpret them. This paper will attempt to sum up and inquire into the ideological politics of official memory discourses and artistic and political counter-politics and actions of opposition or alternative commemoration.
У овом раду дискутује се o позиционирању кључних друштвено-политичких актера у савременој Србији у контексту прихватања скупа симбола јавног наратива дефинисаног као "европске вредности". На примеру одржавања тзв. "Параде поноса", разматра се однос медија и елита према једном догађају који се перципира као суштински услов за "европске интеграције", али према коме истовремено постоји амбивалентан однос, проистекао из етаблираног традиционалистичког политичког дискурса, који подразумева отпор према прихватању сексуалних различитости. Циљ овог рада је да укаже на комплексну природу идентификовања основних симболичких вредности друштва у савременој Србији, која се испољава, пре свега, у виду хегемонијских борби које се воде на линији промоције конзервативних вредности, насупрот ономе што се доживљава као "опасни" уплив либералних "европских" идеја, попут промоције права сексуалних мањина. У раду се анализирају медијски наративи везани за одржавање "Параде поноса" 2010. и 2014. године, са циљем утврђивања промене наратива у склопу декларисаног "европског пута" Србије, и то, пре свега, кроз деловање и позиционирање кључних актера, од политичких елита до припадника екстремно десних организација и навијачких група. ; This paper discusses the position of the key social and political actors in contemporary Serbia, referring to the broadly accepted concept defined as "European values". The article focuses on the so-called "Belgrade Pride Parade", a highly contested event in the Serbian public, which is at the same time considered as the essential part of the EU accession process. Through the analysis of the media discourses related to the "Pride" events in 2010 and 2014, the paper shows the complex relation between the officially proclaimed politics of "European integration" and still very strong nationalist discourses, inherited from the 1990s. The aim of the article is to analyse the present hegemonic struggles between the political forces defending "traditional", conservative values and the political agents that promote "dangerous", liberal "European" ideas, such as protecting the rights of sexual minorities. The comparative analysis of the media representation of two events in 2010 and 2014 shows the changes in the public narrative. I argue that the violent clashes that occurred in 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade between the police and the members of right wing organisations were mostly the result of the lack of the political will among the Serbian elites, followed by ambivalent media representations, promoting at the same time the necessity of accepting "European values" and justification of violence. On the other hand, the absence of violent events in 2014 shows the will of the state apparatus to secure the "Pride". However, the media reports on the event, as well as the public statements made by Serbian officials, still remain ambivalent towards the very nature of the "Pride", justifying it only by the pressure made by the EU and the protection of constitutional rights. Moreover, the presence of new narratives in the media, discussing the high price of organizing such event, shows the shift in the public discourse from common nationalist arguments to the new, neoliberal rhetoric. This change doesn't indicate the radical shift of the social climate in Serbia from conservative to liberal, but, more likely, establishes Serbia as just one of the many states on the European periphery, operating within wider framework of neoliberal agendas. ; Тема броја – Конфликт и помирење на Балкану (ур. Александар Крел) / Topic of the Issue - Conflict and Reconciliation in the Balkans (ed. Aleksandar Krel)
Demokratski optimizam devedestih godina prošlog veka zamenjuje osobita forma javnog razočarenja u demokratiju. Kriza demokratije praćena institucionalnim deficitima, konfuzijom, niskim stepenom upravljačke sposobnosti da se rešavaju pitanja siromaštva, nezaposlenosti, imigracije, korupcije, simptomi su ovoga stanja. Globalni val populizma najizoštreniji je izraz ove političke patologije. Početak novoga veka rađa uzlet otvorenog neprijateljstva prema demokratiji. Deskriptivni pristupi oslonjeni na proceduralnu dimenziju režima moći ("hibridni režimi", "ograničena demokratija" "iliberalna demokratija", "kompetitivni autoritarizam" ) pokazuju se nedostatnim. U ovome radu autor se vraća klasičnom konceptu "despotizma" i pokazuje normative i teorisjke prednosti ovoga koncepta ("novi despotizam") u analizi novoga režima moći koji izrasta na pretpostvkama sve šireg nepoverenja u demokratske instituciije. ; The democratic optimism of the 1990s has been replaced by a particular form of public disillusionment with democracy. The crisis of democracy, accompanied by institutional deficits, confusion, low levels of management capacity to tackle poverty, unemployment, immigration, corruption, are symptoms of this condition. The global wave of populism is the sharpest expression of this political pathology. The beginning of the new century has given birth to an open hostility to democracy. Descriptive approaches based on the procedural dimension of the regime of power ("hybrid regimes", "limited democracy", "liberal democracy", "competitive authoritarianism") are proving insufficient to capture the new political system. In this paper, the author returns to the classical concept of "despotism" and shows the normative and theoretical advantages of this concept ("new despotism") in the analysis of a new regime of power that grows on the premise of growing distrust of democratic institutions.
Članak razmatra uspon, oblike i posledice protesta u nedemokratskim režimima, oslanjajući se na noviju literaturu iz uporedne analize političkih režima i društvenih pokreta. Oblik režima značajno oblikuje izglede za izbijanje protesta, kao i njegove oblike i posledice. Protesti često proizvode bitne promene u personalnom sastavu i politici vlasti, koje značajno utiču na strukturu i delovanje nedemokratskih režima, i ponekad vode promeni režima. Primeri su navedeni iz kasnog komunističkog autoritarizma u Poljskoj i Jugoslaviji, u kojima su dugotrajni protesti doprineli padu režima i države, i postkomunistički autoritarni režimi u Srbiji i Ukrajini koji su više puta uzdrmani a zatim i dokrajčeni "pritiskom odozdo". ; The paper explores the politics of protest in non-democratic regimes using insights from comparative regime analysis and social movement theory. A regime type strongly shapes factors that trigger popular mobilization, the repertories of collective action and their implications. Protest politics may produce a considerable political change, such as policy and personality change in the political establishment, as well as important shifts in the structure and operation of non-democratic regimes, even regime change. The paper provides evidence from the late communist authoritarian Poland and Yugoslavia, in which sustained protests contributed to the collapse of regime and state, and the post-communist competitive authoritarian Serbia and Ukraine, which experience repeated protest waves and were brought down by protest politics.