Suchergebnisse

Researchers into censorship in communist Poland have often analysed the relations existing between the censorship authorities and creatorsor publishers, but have more rarely examined the relationship between the state political authorities and the Central Office of Control of the Press, Publications and Performances (later the Central Office of Control of Publications and Performances). The author of this article considers the strength of the controlling influence of the authorities on censorship, reaching the conclusion that the impact of the communist party and state on censors' decisions was smaller than has generally been thought. The author believes that the censors had a certain degree of independence. This was the result of, among others insufficient personnel and organizational connections between the party and censorship, and faulty provisions regarding the regulation of censorship. Therefore, although censorship was an integral part of a totalitarian state, it probably did not always support its decisions, despite the party's strenuous efforts to make it so. Partly because of this, many publications have appeared in Poland that would not see the light of day in other countries, so-called communist block. ; Badacze cenzury w Polsce Ludowej wielokrotnie analizowali relacje zachodzące pomiędzy organami cenzury a twórcami i wydawcami, rzadziej natomiast powiązania władz polityczno-państwowych z Głównym Urzędem Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk (później Głównym Urzędem Kontroli Publikacji i Widowisk). Autor artykułu zastanawia się nad siłą kontrolnego oddziaływania władzy na cenzurę, dochodząc do wniosku, że wpływ partii komunistycznej i państwa na decyzje cenzury mógł być mniejszy niż zwykło się uważać. Jego zdaniem cenzura była w pewnym stopniu niezależna. Stanowiło to rezultat m.in. niedostatecznych powiązań kadrowo-organizacyjnych pomiędzy partią a cenzurą oraz wadliwych przepisów prawnych regulujących działalność cenzury. Dlatego, pomimo że cenzura była integralną częścią totalitarnego państwa, prawdopodobnie nie zawsze jej decyzje wspierały to państwo, mimo usilnych starań partii, aby tak było. M.in. dzięki temu, w Polsce ukazało się wiele publikacji, które nie ujrzałyby światła dziennego w innych krajach tzw. demokracji ludowej.

This article presents the history and the development of tthe Spanish "Indignant" movement in the long term, i.e. from the occupation of Puerta del Sol to this day. The paper discusses social functions carried out by collectives constituting the above-mentioned movement. The main focus is put on the analysis of civic groups' influence on solving problems connected with the crisis of the Spanish state and on the political and legal system of this country. The condition of Spanish state institutions (being an the example of contemporary European democratic system) is considered from the perspective of the legitimization of its resolutions and citizens' participation in making key decisions. The analysis aims at describing the place of the "Indignados" in Spanishpolitical life and forecasting the directions of the movement's development. The model of eliberative democracy by Jürgen Habermas is used in the course of the work. The selection of information and the analysis of the Indignants' actions are based on media reports and participant observations made by the author who during the last three years has participated in the actions of the movement in Sevilla, Alicante and Saragossa.

Motherhood without icing and retouching. The 'Polish Mother' icon in Polish literature created after the year 2000 and blogs Polish woman-centered symbolism has a specific dimension, which is depicted in the iconic 'Polish Mother' (Matka Polka). The iconic image is deeply rooted in Polish history and culture and it often refers to the mother of Jesus as she is expected to sacrifice her children for the motherland. As a woman, she realizes herself not only through motherhood but also in the service of her nation, and as such, she becomes a highly charged metaphor for both motherly love and patriotism. The 'Polish Mother' is a myth; a stereotype that has shaped the thinking of the nation for more than two centuries and is still largely in force. In contemporary literature (and also in various media texts and blogs) one can identify however, obvious attempts to re-evaluate this very traditional iconic image. Especially motherhood, in Poland today, has gained a new dimension. I investigate some of the most characteristic aspects of the selected texts, focusing on the discrepancy between the old clichés and expectations and the subversion of traditionally defined motherhood in a modern society, which no longer takes the 'Polish Mother' at face value.

The purpose of this study is to attempt to show the positive and negative, or favorable and unfavorable, preconditions of the Polish presidency and its assessment. The main proposition is that the presidency was an unprecedented event in Polish history and has had a significant social, political, cultural, economic and international impact, while its consequences will continue to be felt for a long time. The Polish presidency, like all EU presidencies, stirred considerable emotions and its outcomes have already produced divergent opinions among experts, researchers and politicians. It is still too early to present an exhaustive and objective assessment of the presidency, but this does not mean that it cannot be analyzed, examined or have conclusions drawn from it. The author tries to present that despite some negative preconditions that did not encourage the Polish presidency, and the absence of any spectacular successes, the assessment of the Polish presidency has been positive, and Poland deserves both credit and distinction for passing such a stern test despite lacking in experience and facing numerous difficulties. The author also tries to show that the Polish presidency was calm and focused on seeking understanding and compromise; and that it was better than the Czech or Hungarian presidencies. It is unfortunate that the global media were relatively uninterested in the Polish leadership of the Council, which was consequently overshadowed by such events as the crisis in the euro zone, the financial and economic tragedy in Greece, the Arab Spring, and the parliamentary elections in Poland and in Russia. ; The purpose of this study is to attempt to show the positive and negative, or favorable and unfavorable, preconditions of the Polish presidency and its assessment. The main proposition is that the presidency was an unprecedented event in Polish history and has had a significant social, political, cultural, economic and international impact, while its consequences will continue to be felt for a long time. The Polish presidency, like all EU presidencies, stirred considerable emotions and its outcomes have already produced divergent opinions among experts, researchers and politicians. It is still too early to present an exhaustive and objective assessment of the presidency, but this does not mean that it cannot be analyzed, examined or have conclusions drawn from it. The author tries to present that despite some negative preconditions that did not encourage the Polish presidency, and the absence of any spectacular successes, the assessment of the Polish presidency has been positive, and Poland deserves both credit and distinction for passing such a stern test despite lacking in experience and facing numerous difficulties. The author also tries to show that the Polish presidency was calm and focused on seeking understanding and compromise; and that it was better than the Czech or Hungarian presidencies. It is unfortunate that the global media were relatively uninterested in the Polish leadership of the Council, which was consequently overshadowed by such events as the crisis in the euro zone, the financial and economic tragedy in Greece, the Arab Spring, and the parliamentary elections in Poland and in Russia.

Since condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a "strategic partnership" policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn't hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fi ghters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for "Przegląd" and "Nie"). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by "Przegląd" – "How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?" – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, "Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest". In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very diffi cult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven't obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki "the prestige of Poland asa supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems". Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that "the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity". In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.