Straipsnio tikslas yra isnagrineti Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija rinkimu kampanijos metu ir nustatyti, kurie kanalai labiausiai gali susieti auditorija tarpusavyje. Straipsnyje apzvelgiama fragmentacijos reiksme demokratijai ir jos tyrimuose vartojamos savokos, pristatomi empirinio tyrimo poziuriai, besiremiantys auditorijos sutapimo analize. Remiantis reprezentatyvios apklausos duomenimis ir pristatytais poziuriais, analizuo-jama Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija. Kadangi nustatytas gana didelis skirtingu kanalu susiklojimas, straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija kol kas nera labai fragmentiska. Taciau palyginimas su ankstesniu metu duomenimis rodo tam tikrus fragmentacijos didejimo polinkius. Labiausiai Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija susiejantis kanalas yra televizija, taciau vis didesne svarba igyja ir populiarus interneto portalai The aim of the article is to analyse the extent of media audience fragmentation in Lithuania during the 2012 Parliament election campaign and to define which media channels are best able to unify the audience. The article reviews the significance of fragmentation in terms of democracy and concepts used in its analysis, and presents approaches for its empirical study, based on audience duplication. On the basis of this approach and data from a representative survey, the fragmentation of Lithuanian media audience is analysed. Since the analysis shows a considerable overlap of audience of different media outlets, the main conclusion is made that the Lithuanian media audience is not (yet) fragmented. The media that unites the biggest share of the audience is television, although popular internet portals are also becoming very important. Adapted from the source document.
Public space is realized as social & communicative arena, civic forum. The whole of individuals becomes a market of information consumers where arguments are presented & public opinion is formed. Conception of public space is related to alternation of state organization & communication models. While a modern state is being created, press forms a bourgeois public space. Radio & television invoked public discussions in the last century. Conception of public radio & television formed in Europe prolonged the tradition of public service. Community delegates to the state certain regulation functions which secure the right of a citizen to receive information & to participate in formation of public opinion. The monopoly of radio & television broadcast granted to democratic state has to guarantee pluralism & word freedom. Goals of public broadcaster are to expand civic society, stimulate activities of non-commercial & non-political groups, nourish national values. Main principles of an audiovisual public service are accessibility, pluralism, universality, independence. Citizens control (public services) & finance (subscription fee) public broadcasters. An antimonopolic wave formed in the eighth decade of previous century forced to liberalize the sector of European audiovisual communication. A new political consensus was achieved: only competition can secure pluralism. Traditional conception of public space varies. Market of audiovisual mass communication growing rapidly formed public space being regulated & activated in a special way. Efforts of generated communication (public relations) & competitive media invoke an opposite effect -- decreasing interest in public life. According to the opinion of radical democratic theory conception of public space formed by liberal democracy fell into desuetude, because community was split to heterogenous groups which don't have the vision of the common goal. Information community evolves in the direction of demassification & diversification; it will be supplied with products of media according to individual demand. The model of vertical communication dominating in public space is replaced by horizontal interactive communication. In such a way models of popular & qualitative communication become equally important. However the idea of public audiovisual service becomes more & more popular. It is believed that only it can guarantee functioning of democracy not allowing forming community of two speeds where not all of them will have an access to information resources. Adapted from the source document.
In comparative studies of transitional justice in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, Lithuania is ranked among the countries which have taken the strictest lustration measures. In contrast, a very negative perception of the issue dominates the Lithuanian public discourse. Lustration is often described as impotent or failed in the media. Despite its high political importance, there has been no systemic analysis evaluating the results of Lithuania's lustration policy (LLP). This article aims at analyzing the effectiveness of LLP. The main object of this article is the LLP which consists of three sets of laws: 1998 laws aimed at restricting the former KGB employees, 1999 law aimed at KGB's secret collaborators, and 2010 law allowing publishing remaining KGB documents. This article corresponds with the last wave of transitional justice studies, in which the results and/or impact of transitional justice measures is evaluated. The findings of this article suggest a rather positive evaluation of LLP, further contradicting the opinion dominant in the local media. This could encourage future studies to explore the reasons of this inconsistency. Adapted from the source document.
Influence the television enjoys over the political processes, creating a community opinion, should be interconnected with its distribution, attainability & communicational suggestion. Audiovisual media took back the intonations of spoken language to the mass communication. Radio created a new talk, the so-called stylistic dualism, when a huge audience is addressed in a personal & intimate way. Radio has created the new forms of dialogue, audience being affected to an anonymous voice, created new relationship between the politicians & the community. Regular appeals of politics leaders through the radio to the nation became a usual phenomenon of political life. Simplicity & honesty of speech became important components of a successful political communication. Television set forth the tune of intimacy, chamberness formulated by radio. The context of view, text & sound let transmit information through all channels of public communication. Anonymous radio voice became the face of a show, which performs a ritualistic teller's role in television. History of the television development can be divided into two phases -- paleo- & neo-television. Clear gradation of genres is characteristic to the first phases, performance is distinguished from documentary, television & audience are tied by vertical hierarchic connections. Fragmentarity, convergence of genres, vanishing barriers between documentary & performance are characteristic to the conception of neo-television. Interests of the audience are taken into account much more, political, civil & private spheres come closer. Representatives of each of them perform specific roles in television: politicians make decisions (engaged word), citizens force to make decisions (expert word), & the ordinary people observe (vox populi). The approach of political & civil sphere prove the growing role of "a man from the street," naivety & familiarity is demonstrated by politicians. Openness, unforced refusal of privacy, become an important part of political life. Deflection from classical debates (word direction) to talk shows (performance of conflict) & reality shows (performance of trueness) show the alternation of dialogue genres of television. Television creates a new democracy of performance, where facts are replaced by emotions, reflection -- by action, ideas -- by personalities. Television offers its own rules of democratic discourse, politicians & citizens are motivated to become participants of this communication performance. Adapted from the source document.
The paper discusses women's images & women related themes as they were presented in the Lithuanian national mass-media in the EP elections (May-June, 2004). Monitoring of the two largest Lithuanian dailies demonstrated that the EP elections had a second-rate status, which was enhanced by the first-round of the nation-wide Presidential elections, taking place on the very same day (May 14, 2004). Newspapers provided superficial references to women & did not produce any articulated discourse about women's representation in the EP. The result -- the Lithuanian delegation to the EP has 5 women among its 13 members -- is to be attributed to national political culture, appearance of the new populist party & individual candidates' electoral strategies, but not to women-friendly public discourse & political communication. Adapted from the source document.
Sign Lithuania has joined NATO & the EU. However, one should ask themselves a question whether the integration process has already ended & whether we have become an integral part of Europe. Such doubts appear after taking a closer look at our information space, which contains signs of informational cultural expansion from the East. In the information age the concept of power is changing. Some countries compete for ideological & cultural dominance in the information space of other countries and, consequently, the latter seek to protect their space from such influences. Lithuania has also entered such a battlefield, therefore, the conception of a national information space & information attacks towards that space should be analyzed more thoroughly. At the present moment, the main goal is to make the Lithuanian academic society & especially the general public aware of the problem of the information warfare, its threats as well as the principles of information security in respect of an individual & the whole of society. In Russia, the theoretical level of this issue has been traversed a long time ago & practical actions are being taken today: strategic documents concerning information security were adopted five years ago, concrete institutions responsible for the implementation of a particular information policy in the "near abroad" countries are being established Russia has been aiming & still aims to keep Lithuania in the sphere of its control. Thus, Russia has started to employ new tools of power, namely, information resources, telecommunications & the media. The consequences of such information pressure from the East are evident: the results of a research conducted by RAIT last September show that the majority of Lithuanians prefer watching Russian films with Lithuanian subtitles & English or other Western films dubbed in Lithuanian. In order to change the present situation, an active & independent information policy in the Lithuanian information space is necessary. The article analyses changes in the concept of power in the information age. Soft power, comprised of information & media control, is presented as a significant lever used by major states in informational & geopolitical warfare. The article also discusses a transformed concept of geopolitics & the concept of neocolonialism. The general understanding of information space is presented & measures how to influence it are discussed. The programs broadcast by the Lithuanian television networks are presented as a specific reflection of the Lithuanian information space. An assumption is made based on the analysis of the Russian share of TV broadcasts in Lithuania that there are evident signs of informational-cultural expansion from the East in the Lithuanian information space. Adapted from the source document.
With the so-called war on terror launched by the USA in 2001, a new era started in one of the fields of the propaganda war -- the Internet. Ability to disseminate information to as wide as possible audience due to globality of the Internet has become a powerful mean of influence. Many Muslim politically engaged religiously motivated groups, who perceive themselves to be in the state of such war, create their own elaborate web-sites. "KavkazCenter" is just one of them. "KavkazCenter" declares itself to be a product of the Chechen Independent International Islamic Internet Agency, which was set up in 1999 in Grozny by the Chechen National Center for Strategic Research & Political Technologies. However, its content is somewhat problematic, as the site appears to have been solely a propaganda tool for the Chechen Jihadist group Riyadhu as-Salihin, led by the late Shamil Basayev, who often boasted about his organized bloody attacks, frequently against civilians. Lithuania first noticed the site in early 2003, when it started being serviced by a Lithuanian firm "Microlink Data," which at the time hosted the site on its server. Back then the Lithuanian State Security Department (SSD) declared the site to be free from terrorist propaganda & insisted it did not pose any threat to Lithuania, though it was known that the site had been earlier closed down in the USA & the UK. However, half a year later the very same SSD confiscated the server of the firm "Elneta," which at that time hosted the site, thus shutting down its operations from Lithuania. This launched a long marathon of legal deliberations going all the way up to the Constitutional Court. The case divided the Lithuanian public into two parts -- those, who considered the "KavkazCenter" to be an information agency of independence-seeking Chechen freedom fighters & those, who considered the site to contain terrorist propaganda. The "defenders" group was championed by some MPs, Soviet-era dissidents, while the "accusers" group was led by the SSD. The unfolding of the case revealed that both sides were ill-prepared to meet the challenge the site "KavkazCenter" had caused. One can argue that even state institutions were taken by surprise by it. This first of all applies to the SSD, who showed itself at its worst -- its lack of professionalism was astonishing. At the same time, gaps in legislation & by extension in the work of courts were exposed. Most journalists, who took to bashing of the SSD for presumed persecution of media on the freedom of expression grounds, displayed ignorance & lack of deeper insight into the case. The general public was left puzzled. Moreover, Russia's involvement, though often referred to in the media, has never been fully revealed. The epopee of the "KavkazCenter" in Lithuania sucked both the Lithuanian government & the general society into the whirlpool of the global information wars. And though the experience shows that most of the actors were ill-prepared or not prepared at all, the very experience is very useful -- it allowed for identifying of the weaknesses in political, legal & social life of the country. Learning from its mistakes, the society can progress & improve. It is plausible to hope that in the event of another "kavkazcentr," the Lithuanian government & non-state actors will be better informed & equipped to tackle the issue. Adapted from the source document.
Siame straipsnyje analizuojama Lietuvos valstybes valdomu imoniu vadovu kaita ir politizacija 1990-2012 m. Ziniasklaidoje daznai aptariami konkreciu imoniu vadovu politizacijos atvejai, taciau sistemines analizes sioje srityje stoka neleidzia daryti pagristu apibendrinimu. Del to pagrindinis straipsnio tikslas - remiantis statistine mineto laikotarpio duomenu analize ne tik identifikuoti politizacijos masta bei pasikeitimus VVI vadovu postuose, bet ir nustatyti, kaip juos veikia siu imoniu teisinis statusas, valdymo sritis, vyriausybiu tipai, partiju isitvirtinimas valdzioje ir ju nariu skaicius. Tyrimo rezultatai atskleide, kad vadovu kaita suprasti padeda valdanciosios daugumos pasikeitimai ir vyriausybiu tipai, taciau sie veiksniai savaime nepaaiskina politizacijos. Norint suprasti ta reiskini, yra butina analizuoti valdymo sriti. Analize parode, kad labiausiai politizuoti sektoriai yra miskininkyste ir energetika This article analyses the turnover and politicisation of CEO positions in the Lithuanian state-owned enterprises between 1990 and 2012. Although some individual cases of politicisation of CEO positions get detailed media coverage, there is an obvious lack of systematic large-N analysis in this field. Therefore, the main aim of the article is to identify the scope of politicisation and changes in CEO positions, as well as to account for variation in the extent of politicisation in terms of different legal statuses of these enterprises, policy fields, types of government, party entrenchment and membership. The results of this article revealed that CEO turnover is best explained by the factors of changing ruling majorities and governments. However, neither of these two factors explains CEO positions' politicisation. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is essential to distinguish among policy fields, which showed that forestry and energy are the most politicised sectors. This conclusion points to different patterns of politicisation in different sectors of the economy. Adapted from the source document.
Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.