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Cover -- Copyright and Use -- Title Page -- Contents -- A Note on the Author -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1. Introducing the Issues -- 1.1 Some Everyday Moral Utterances -- 1.2 What are they about? -- 1.3 The Attractions of a Popular Picture -- 1.4 Rules: A Patch on Morality's Surface? -- 1.5 From Angry Young Men and Women to …? -- 1.6 Metaethics and Normative Ethics Revisited -- 1.7 Summary and Reflection -- Chapter 2. Cognitivism and Noncognitivism -- 2.1 The Basic Distinction -- 2.2 Moral Realism and Moral Irrealism -- 2.3 Error and Success Theories -- 2.4 Moral Knowledge Again -- 2.5 The Truth Conditions of Moral Statements -- 2.6 Critical Reflections on the Proposed Truth Conditions of Moral Statements -- 2.7 Divine Command Theory of Morality -- 2.8 Kantianism -- Chapter 3. Objectivist Realism under Siege -- 3.1 A Philosophical Health Warning -- 3.2 David Hume -- 3.3 Hume's Arguments Considered -- 3.4 Mackie's Argument from Queerness -- 3.5 So Where are We? -- 3.6 Emotivism -- Chapter 4. Out on the Street -- 4.1 The Death of God -- 4.2 The Death of Deference -- 4.3 Moral Disagreement -- 4.4 Multiculturalism -- 4.5 Rejection of Specific Moral Beliefs -- 4.6 Seedy Underbelly of Conventional Morality -- 4.7 Decline in Communal and Symbolic Life -- 4.7 Reluctance to be Judgemental -- 4.8 Postmodern Irony -- Chapter 5 A Naturalist Objectivist Realism? -- 5.1 The Basic Features -- 5.2 Moore's Open Question Argument -- 5.3 Empirical Reasoning and Moral Facts -- 5.4 Morality and Objectivist Naturalism -- 5.5 Ethics and Natural Disciplines -- Bibliography.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship in the field. Its broad purview includes work at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those. who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here. - ;The contents of

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship in the field. Its broad purview includes work at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments. in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here. - ; Oxford Studies

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recentdevelopments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do wel

The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. Three of the essays are new, while seven have previously been published. All of them are concerned with the viability of naturalistic and realistic accounts of the nature of morality, or, more generally, with the viability of naturalistic accounts of reasons

"A reassessment of metaethics that attempts to undermine the nature/normativity or world/language divide, and offer an alternative account of the world-language relationship. Advocates the need to replace the metaphor of foundations with a metaphor about stability. Incorporates Wittgenstein and contemporary feminist ethicists"--Provided by publisher