Suchergebnisse

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.

Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides an in-depth analysis. He argues that a correct understanding of dialogue about moral matters leads to an understanding of moral epistemology and normative language that supports this view.

This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with 'schmoral' judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls 'the fundamental desire'; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation

In diesem Buch wird eine lange vernachlässigte Position in der Metaethik verteidigt – der sogenannte moralische Realismus. Demnach existieren moralische Tatsachen, die moralische Urteile als wahr oder falsch ausweisen. Diese Tatsachen werden jedoch nicht dadurch konstituiert, dass jemand (eine Person, eine Gesellschaft oder eine Kultur) behauptet, dass sie existieren. Es handelt sich bei ihnen um einen eigenständigen Bestandteil der Wirklichkeit, wenngleich sie etwas anderes als naturwissenschaftliche Tatsachen sind. Moralische Tatsachen sind nicht nur objektiv, sondern auch intrinsisch normativ und motivational wirksam. Folgt daraus aber nicht eine Wiedereinführung eines obskuren Reichs der Werte? Diese Frage wird vom Autor verneint und im Rahmen einer Kritik an gängigen Naturalisierungsstrategien in der Metaethik plausibilisiert. In konstruktiver Hinsicht wird schließlich ein sogenannter expansiver Naturalismus expliziert, auf dessen Basis der moralische Realismus vertreten werden kann

Intro -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Tables -- PREFACE: HOW TO USE THIS BOOK, THE INTENDED AUDIENCE, THE SECOND EDITION, AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Overview of Contemporary Metaethics and Normative Ethical Theory -- Methodological Issues: Re ective Equilibrium -- Part I: Central Topics in Metaethics -- Chapter 1: Moral Realism -- Chapter 2: Ethical Expressivism -- Chapter 3: Constructivism and the Error Theory -- Chapter 4: Subjectivism, Relativism, and Contextualism -- Chapter 5: Morality and Practical Reason -- Chapter 6: Moral Psychology -- Chapter 7: Moral Responsibility, Praise, and Blame -- Chapter 8: Experimental Ethics -- Chapter 9: Biology, Evolution, and Ethics -- Part II: Central Approaches in Ethical Theory -- Chapter 10: Morality and Religion -- Chapter 11: Confucian Ethics -- Chapter 12: Consequentialism -- Chapter 13: Kantian Ethics -- Chapter 14: Virtue Ethics -- Chapter 15: Feminist Ethics -- Chapter 16: Moral Generalism and Moral Particularism -- Part III: Additional Resources -- Important Technical Terms in Ethics -- Resources for the Fields of Metaethics and Normative Theory -- Epilogue -- Contributors -- Index.

Universal egoism runs rampant in Western ethics. Too many theories justify intrinsic moral value only in terms of some moral 'self' that is defined by a concrete set of identity conditions. Such theories have failed to justify the value of non-human natural phenomena such as landscapes, plants, and animals because these theories require a basic similarity, or shared identity that grants them moral status. Understanding and acting upon the value of others, especially radically different others becomes increasingly important in a time of melting polar ice, rising sea levels and increasingly polarized political discourse. Only if we supplement identity arguments with alterity arguments can we create an ethics that not only overcomes universal egoism but also offers insight into how we face new ecological consciousness and crisis. Alterity arguments differ from identity arguments because the characterization of the other need not be particular, epistemically closed or metaphysically secure. An ethics of alterity can be grounded in resources from the phenomenal-existential tradition. Relying on insights from classic phenomenology and West-coast phenomenology, alterity arguments can justify intrinsic moral value for non-human natural phenomena such as landscapes, plants, and animals. Indeed, when paired with identity arguments, we can justify action-guiding norms and principles as well. Using resources from the phenomenological-existential tradition also allows us to reconceptualize ethics in a way that addresses both the is/ought distinction and the relationship between metaethics, ethics, and applied ethics.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- PREFACE -- PART 1 INTRODUCTION -- 1 What Is Philosophical Ethics? -- Ethical Opinion and Human Life -- Ethical Inquiry: Normative Ethics -- Philosophical Inquiry About Ethics: Metaethics -- Philosophical Ethics -- A Plan of Study -- PART 2 METAETHICS -- 2 Metaethics: The Basic Questions -- The Objective Purport of Ethical Conviction -- What Is There for Ethical Convictions to Be About? -- A Related Problem Concerning Evidence in Ethics -- A Fundamental Dilemma of Metaethics -- Suggested Reading -- 3 Naturalism -- Metaphysical Naturalism and Ethics -- Ethical Naturalism -- Problems for Ethical Naturalism -- Suggested Reading -- 4 Theological Voluntarism -- Reductive Versus Nonreductive Supernaturalism -- Theological Voluntarism -- What Theological Voluntarism Is Not -- A Reductive Account of God's Authority -- Problems for Theological Voluntarism -- Suggested Reading -- 5 Rational Intuitionism -- Irreducibility and Objective Purport -- Ethical Perception? -- The Nature of Rational Intuitionism -- Necessity and Rational Perception -- Problems for Rational Intuitionism -- Suggested Reading -- 6 The Ideal Judgment Theory -- Hume's Challenge, Again -- Three Models of Ethical Judgment -- Aspects of Ideal Judgment -- Problems for the Ideal Judgment Theory -- Another Version of the Ideal Judgment Theory? Ideal Practical Judgment or Agency Theory -- Suggested Reading -- 7 The Error Theory and Ethical Relativism -- The Error Theory -- Ethical Relativism -- What Ethical Relativism Is Not -- Could Ethical Relativism Be True? -- Suggested Reading -- 8 Noncognitivism -- Varieties of Noncognitivism -- The Sources of Noncognitivism -- Problems for Noncognitivism and Possible Responses -- Suggested Reading -- 9 Interlude -- PART 3 PHILOSOPHICAL MORALISTS -- 10 Hobbes I

Aesthetic; beautiful emotion is defined as beauty and is limited to this definition. The view that aesthetics is only related to the field of philosophy and that it is limited in this way is wrong. The transition to context-centered studies in folklore has been delayed. For this reason, interdisciplinary studies should be carried out within the understanding of contemporary science. In line with these thoughts, we put forward the Metaethics Theory of Folklore and developed the Folklore Grounding Method Metaethics Analysis as the analysis method of the theory. An aesthetic expression was made in the Book of Dede Korkut. While writing the work, the author tried to reflect the aesthetics in the essence of the work. Based on this thought; The subject of our study is to express sexuality with aesthetic discourse and to determine the place of our ethical value in folk philosophy. It is aimed to make an exemplary study at the point of applying the Metaetic Theory of Folklore to the narratives. Keywords: Metaethics, Theory, Aesthetics, Sexuality, Discourse, Grounding, Analysis.

This book explores the problem of moral metaphysics through investigations of four pivotal philosophers. It uses the contemporary idea of moral sentimentalism as a comparative category to explore the problems and challenges inherent in the project of moral metaphysics.

Why exemplarism? -- Admiration -- Exemplars -- Virtue -- Emulation -- A good life -- Right, wrong, and the division of moral linguistic labor -- Exemplarist semantics and metaethics

Formerly CIP Uk. - Includes bibliographical references (p. [154]-159) and index. - Introduction -- Sidgwick's metaethics -- Sidgwick's moral epistemology -- Utilitarianism versus dogmatic intuitionism -- Utilitarianism versus egoism