Suchergebnisse

(1) Vorbestimmung des Themas -- (2) Die frühgriechische Philosophie als anfängliche -- (3) Das Staunen als Ursprung der Philosophie -- (4) Die Verwandtschaft der Philosophie mit den älteren Gestalten des Wissens -- (5) Die Verwandtschaft der Philosophie mit den Wissenschaften -- (6) Der eigentümliche Gegenstand der anfänglichen Philosophie -- (7) Die Unbegründbarkeit des Anfangs der Philosophie -- I. Abschnitt/Die 'Physiologische' Auslegung der Gesamtheit Des Erscheinenden -- (1) Die philosophische Aneignung der älteren Kosmogonie (Thaies) -- (2) Der Übergangscharakter des Erscheinens und der Gegensatz (Anaximander) -- (3) Die Vermittlung des Gegensatzes in den Grundstoffen (Anaximenes) -- II. Abschnitt/Die Frage Nach dem Menschenmöglichen Wissen von der Gesamtheit des Erscheinenden -- (1) Die Rangordnung des Wißbaren und die Bedingungen des Wissens (Pythagoras) -- (2) Die bildende Kraft des Wissens und seine 'Mathematisierung' (frühe Pythagoreer) -- (3) Die Grenzen menschenmöglicher Einsicht und das Erdenken des Wahrscheinlichen (Xenophanes) -- III. Abschnitt/Die Begründung der Eigenständigkeit des Philosophischen Wissens (Heraklit) -- (1) Die Eigenart der heraklitischen Lehre -- (2) Die Ordnung des Erscheinenden -- (3) Der gegensätzliche Grund alles Erscheinenden -- (4) Das Verhältnis des Lebendigen zum Gegensatz -- (5) Der Zugang zur Erkenntnis der Gegensätzlichkeit -- 6) Der eigentümliche Gegenstand philosophischen Wissens -- (7) Der Gegensatz des philosophischen Wissens und der Meinungen -- (8) Die Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit bei dem Wißbaren -- IV. Abschnitt/Die Frage Nach der Menschenmöglichen Erkenntnis der Wahrheit (Parmenides) -- (1) Die Fragerichtung des Parmenides -- (2) Die Eigenart der Darstellung -- (3) Das Verlassen des überkommenen Gegenstandsbereichs der Philosophie -- (4) Das Gefüge des philosophischen Wissens -- (5) Die Auffassungen der 'Sterblichen' -- (6) Die Herkunft der Auffassungen der 'Sterblichen' -- (7) Der Ort der Wahrheit -- (8) Der Dreiweg des Erfragens der Wahrheit -- (9) Das Erkennen der Wahrheit und der Selbstwiderspruch -- (10) Die Erkenntnis des zeitweilig Wahren und die möglichen Widersprüche -- (11) Das Bestreiten des Scheins von Wahrheit -- (12) Das 'Seiende' und die 'Zeichen' -- (13) Die Vollständigkeit der Wahrheit -- (14) Die Zuverlässigkeit der Wahrheit -- (15) Die Begründung der Wahrheit -- (16) Die Wahrheit und ihre Erfüllung -- (17) Das Verhältnis der Wahrheit zu den Auffassungen der 'Sterblichen' -- V. Abschnitt/Die Entdeckung der Dialektik (Zenon) -- (1) Überlieferung und Gliederung des zenonischen Werkes -- (2) Das Erscheinende als das Viele -- (3) Das Erscheinende als das Bewegte -- (4) Die dialektische Methode -- (5) Die Verwandlung des Themas der älteren Philosophie -- (6) Das Eigentümliche des zenonischen Ansatzes -- Nachwort/Die Einheit des Gegenständes der Frühgriechischen Philosophie.

I. Introduction -- II. Seven Axes of Bias -- III. Bias in the Arts and the Sciences -- IV. Four Typical Syndromes -- V. The Romantic Syndrome: Poetry -- VI. Contrasts Between the Romantic Syndrome and the Enlightenment Syndrome: Metaphysics -- VII. Contrasts Between the Romantic Syndrome and the Enlightenment Syndrome: Political Theory -- VIII. Some Applications and Some Limitations.

Elijah Jordan (1875-1953) was one of the most original social and, legal philosophers in the history of American thought. Jordan spent his life in the midwest, near the rural setting from which he came, serving as professor of philosophy at Butler College in Indianapolis from his appointment in 1913 until his retirement 31 years later. Jordan wrote a half dozen volumes that comprise for American philosophy a unique contribution the full significance of which has still to be measured: The Life of Mind,' Forms of Individuality, Theory of Legislation, The Aesthetic Object, The Good Life Essays in Criticism, and on the eve of his death he was at work on his Metaphysics. Generally neglected and attracting attention only toward the end of his life, Jordan's work has begun to win increasing consideration from philosophers and social thinkers in recent years. In accord with the rising interest in Jordan's philosophy, it is the purpose of this paper (1) to explore this philosophy so far as it bears upon the topic of law and social order and the metaphysics implicated therein, and (2) since Jordan is not widely known, to conduct this exploration as much as possible by letting the philosopher speak for himself through quotations drawn from his writings.

The body of the Federalists [even] were always, and yet are, essentially democratic in their political notions … willing to hazard the experiment of an … almost unqualified proportion of democracy…. The Federal Constitution was as good, or very nearly as good, as our country could bear; … Our materials for government were all democratic; and whatever the hazard of their combination may be, our Solons and Lycurgeses in the convention had no alternative, nothing to consider, but how to combine them…. We should have succeeded worse if we had trusted our metaphysics more.Experience must be our physician, though his medicines may kill.

Political theory never stands by itself. Any theoretical explanation of politics depends on attitudes and positions which stem from metaphysics, theology, ethics, or science. An understanding of the political thought of a man, then, will require some insight into the relationship between his politics and the presuppositions on which it is based. To write about the political theory of Descartes, however, presents special difficulties, for Descartes cannot be considered an important political thinker in his own right. His actual references to politics are scant. His influence on later thinkers did not arise from his thought about politics. Nevertheless, in political theory Descartes must be considered, for it was Descartes who set the patterns of speculative thought after him, including thought about politics. After Descartes the scientific and mechanical orientations of thought replaced the traditional Christian and Aristotelian molds in which politics had been considered.

By "The Social Sciences and Public Administration," the title assigned me by Professor Clokie, I am assuming he meant "Special Teaching in the Social Science Departments of Canadian Universities for Students Contemplating the Civil Service as a Career," which is both more definitive and (being of eight words or over) even long enough for copyright. It is to "lead off" a symposium on "Training for Public Administration," a vasty frame of reference indeed, taking in (some might go so far as to think) a course in the great school of Practical Politics itself.Insinuating this role upon me, Professor Clokie pointed out that I had been a long time in the Public Service, and was now a teacher in a university. It is the logic of the redoubtable Pott, Mr. Pickwick's editor-friend, on Chinese metaphysics—an impregnable logic, says Mr. Bernard Shaw. In my case, however, whilst I was undoubtedly in the Service a long time indeed, at Toronto I am only what is called a "Visiting Professor," i.e., one who lectures merely on what he knows, and can be let out at any time. Moreover, that new flower, the Course in Public Administration, which (again in the search for the particular) seems to represent a fortiori the "special teaching" aforesaid, was unknown in my generation as a student, and late-blooming in my generation as a civil servant. But one must not let one's style be cramped, and today therefore I take it as a sort of text, if only in the grand manner to which educationally speaking so old-fashioned a civil servant is accustomed.

In times of crisis and transition the common man is a political philosopher. An example of how, as part of the widespread concern with the basic problems of our politics, the learned world and the world of practical politics today find themselves close neighbors, was the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy. That this Congress, meeting in Amsterdam in August, 1948, has been described by Professor F. H. Heinemann of Oxford in an article entitled "The West in Search of a Metaphysics," may also indicate how those who think in terms of practical political leadership for the West and those concerned with wider inquiries concerning life and nature have not yet found acceptable common answers. On the one hand at the meeting were the Thomists, or Neo-Thomists, who had already at their disposal some twenty-five Thomist periodicals and who were, in general, "the best organized contemporary philosophical school." There were also the Marxists and socialists, who, although they had recently gained some professorships in the French and Italian universities, aroused no very great interest. A third organized element was that of Unesco, the leadership of which achieved for itself an organizational control to extend over future Congresses and their affiliated activities; yet Unesco, with its attempted promotion of a scientific humanism, failed to make progress toward either the integration of a western outlook or the building of a bridge between East and West. The speech of its director-general, Julian Huxley, advocating his well-known evolutionary humanism, "fell flat," evincing, as Dr. Heinemann put it, that "this sort of naturalism … is totally inadequate for the solution of the spiritual crisis of our time." It appeared also that a spiritual regeneration probably cannot be achieved by means which are largely political.