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AbstractSince the last decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the use of metaphysics by philosophers when approaching conceptual problems in biology has increased. Some philosophers call this tendency in philosophy of biology 'Metaphysics of Biology' (Guay and Pradeu in Synthese 1–20, 2017). In this paper, I aim at characterizing Metaphysics of Biology by paying attention to the diverse ways philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual problems in biology. I will claim that there are two different modes of doing Metaphysics of Biology, namely MetaphysicsforBiology and MetaphysicsinBiology.

Metaphysics: An Introduction combines comprehensive coverage of the core elements of metaphysics with contemporary and lively debates within the subject. It provides a rigorous and yet accessible overview of a rich array of topics, connecting the abstract nature of metaphysics with the real world. Topics covered include: Basic logic for metaphysicsAn introduction to ontologyAbstract objectsMaterial objectsCritiques of metaphysicsFree willTimeModalityPersistenceCausationSocial ontology: the metaphysics of race This outstanding book not only equips the reader with a thorough knowledge of the fun

The great German idealist philosopher G. W. F. Hegel has exerted an immense influence on the development of philosophy from the early 19th century to the present. But the metaphysical aspects of his thought are still under-appreciated. In a series of essays Robert Stern traces the development of a distinctively Hegelian approach to metaphysics and certain central metaphysical issues. The book begins with an introduction that considers this theme as a whole, followed by a section ofessays on Hegel himself. Stern then focuses on the way in which certain key metaphysical ideas in Hegel's system

AbstractNaturalized metaphysics aims to establish justified metaphysical claims, where metaphysics is meant to carry its usual significance, while avoiding the traditional methods of metaphysics—a priori reasoning, conceptual analysis, intuitions, and common sense—which naturalized metaphysics argues are not epistemically probative. After offering an explication of what it means to do metaphysics, this paper argues that naturalized metaphysics, at the outset, is hospitable to doing metaphysics. The underdetermination of metaphysics by science, however, changes the picture. Naturalized metaphysics has to break this underdetermination, but the criticism of the traditional methods of metaphysics leaves no resources with which to do so. Naturalized metaphysics must therefore be more restrictive than originally intended to ensure that some metaphysical features avoid underdetermination. In this restrictive naturalized metaphysics, however, metaphysicians are only left the task of surveying the opinions of scientists which, it is argued, does not qualify as doing metaphysics. Thus, to fulfill its promise to save metaphysics, naturalized metaphysics displaces the metaphysician. Furthermore, the attempt to re-employ them via the principle of naturalistic closure is argued to fail. Metaphysicians should therefore not be happier with naturalized metaphysics than they are with the more explicitly eliminative trends in contemporary metametaphysics, such as neo-Carnapian deflationism, despite the promise of naturalized metaphysics, likely to Carnap's dismay, to deliver justified claims about ultimate reality.

Chapter 1: Why Metaphysics and Morality? -- Chapter 2: Ordinary Morality and Its Detractors -- Chapter 3: Propositions and the First-Order Moral -- Chapter 4: Truth, Facts, and Properties -- Chapter 5: Moral Properties -- Chapter 6: The Metaphysics of Moral Reality

In this collection of new and previously published essays, noted philosopher Eric Schliesser offers new interpretations of the signifance of Isaac Newton's metaphysics on his physics and the subsequent development of philosophy more broadly. In particular, he explores the rich resonances between Newton's and Spinoza's metaphysics. The volume includes a substantive introduction, new chapters on Newton's modal metaphysics and his theology, and two postscripts in which Schliesser responds to some of his most important critics, including Katherine Brading, Andrew Janiak, Hylarie Kochiras, Steffen Ducheyne, and Adwait Parker. The collection provides new and varied analyses on familiar focuses of Newton's work, adding important perspectives to the recent revival of interest in Spinoza's metaphysics.

Ian Hunter has made a name for himself as a critic of German university metaphysics, finding its progeny at work in places where many of us would not even think of looking, for example in the late twentieth-century celebration of theory in the humanities. Some of his recent work has focused on a rather different issue: the methodological task of making intellectual history empirical. Here he builds on Quentin Skinner's rationale for the Cambridge School's efforts to make the history of political thought more properly historical. Skinner's argument draws on the work of R. G. Collingwood, at least in its earlier versions, and on neo-Kantian tendencies in mid-twentieth century Oxford philosophy. Thus, in aligning his methodological programme with Skinner's argument, Hunter may risk bringing elements of university metaphysics back in another form. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]