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AbstractStandard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first-order logic, they involve the standard structures of model theory, as sets of objects from which the extralogical symbols of the language receive their denotations. I argue that there is an alternative, holistic, approach to the task of defining logical consequence for a formal language. It specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for an assignment of truth values to all the sentences of the language to be compatible with the intended interpretation of its logical constants. It achieves this without invoking possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, or the formal resources that are employed to generate these. I show how this approach can be successfully applied to modal propositional logic and to first-order logic, modal as well as nonmodal. I show that the holistic definitions of logical consequence that I supply for these languages are equivalent to the standard atomistic definitions.

Intro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- DEDICATION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENT -- AN INTRODUCTORY WORD-BY JOHN DEWEY -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER ONE: THE METAPHYSICS OF THE INSTRUMENT -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- CHAPTER TWO-THINKING AS INSTRUMENTAL -- I -- II -- III -- CHAPTER THREE-THE METAPHYSICS OF "LEADING PRINCIPLES" -- I -- II -- III -- III -- IV-Leading Principles, Novelty and the "Paradox of Inference -- V -- VI-Leading Principles and the Theory of Probability -- VII-The Metaphysics of Knowledge -- CHAPTER FOUR-CATEGORIAL ANALYSIS -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- CHAPTER FIVE-OF HUMAN FREEDOM.

The aim of this paper is to show that Ronald Dworkin's objective to isolate ethics from metaphysics is not sufficiently grounded, and a certain metaphysics is inherent even in his own position of autonomous ethics. While opposing those thinkers who seek to ground ethics by finding an external – neutral and non-evaluative – ground, Dworkin identifies this externality to ethics with metaphysics and aims to show its fallibility. However, such a conception of metaphysics seems to be too narrow and one-sided and leads his own position into contradictions. This paper aims to demonstrate these contradictions and to argue that even the position that is inner to ethics and stems from a first-person agent's perspective can only be developed while considering such metaphysical ideas as freedom, dignity, person.

In this article, Italian philosopher and politician Gianni Vattimo (born 1936) problematizes the concept of "the end of metaphysics," which was announced in the 20th century. In Vattimo's opinion, the early 21st century sees a return of metaphysics. This points to a certain human need. Starting from two classic narratives – Friedrich Nietzsche's postulation of the death of God, and Martin Heidegger's critique of metaphysics – Vattimo proposes two alternatives: a «metaphysics of the authorized» and the «metaphysics of the downtrodden». Although the former has discredited itself, the latter hasn't. It may be this latter metaphysics that answers the profound human need without offering totalitarian forms of control, oppression, or certainty in the existence of a single truth for all.