Suchergebnisse

The economic relation between market structure, government preferences, & the incidence of corruption is analyzed, drawing on Rose-Ackerman's (1975, 1978) microeconomic model of corruption. In this model, three types of agents are posited: the (honest) policymaker, the lower-level bureaucrat whose purchasing decisions may include bribes, & firms offering the government goods or services. The likelihood of corruption is assessed in the cases of corruption where the government has well-defined/unclear preferences, the goods are homogeneous/differentiated, & private markets for the goods exist. The policy implications of this model for encouraging/discouraging corruption & the usefulness of penalties are discussed. Efficient firms & nonstandard goods lead to a higher incidence of corruption; political influence may also play a role. 4 Figures, 1 Appendix. M. Pflum

Examines the 1980s-1990s British economic model as a test case for modern conservative capitalism. The conservative capitalist model that emerged during the prime ministership of Margaret Thatcher had four unequivocal points: low taxes, small governments, production oriented to profit, & a naturalization of inequality. This model is shown to have reduced inflation, revitalized British management, & raised a number of economic indicators in the intermediate terms. However, as a long-term model, it is argued that conservative capitalism is a failure. The 1990s has seen a drastic rise in inequality, substantial growth in poverty, concerted loss of public morale, & net reduction in private ownership of property. The failure of conservative capitalism is traced to large macroeconomic mistakes, gross misunderstandings of microeconomics, & a hypercompetitive ethic that prevented cooperation, thus leading to a need for more governmental regulation. 1 Table. D. Ryfe