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We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

This article investigates the long-term historical impact of missionary activity on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, missionaries were among the first to invest in modern medicine in a number of countries. On the other hand, Christianity influenced sexual beliefs and behaviors. We build a new geocoded dataset locating Protestant and Catholic missions in the early 20th century, as well as their health investments. Using a number of different empirical strategies to address selection in missionary locations and into health investments, we show that missionary presence has conflicting effects on HIV today. Regions close to historical mission stations exhibit higher HIV prevalence. This negative impact is robust to multiple specifications accounting for urbanization, and we provide evidence that it is specific to STDs. Less knowledge about condom use is a likely channel. On the contrary, among regions historically close to missionary settlements, proximity to a mission with a health investment is associated with lower HIV prevalence nowadays. Safer sexual behaviors around these missions are a possible explanatory channel.

The Transportation Elimination-by-Aspects (TEBA) framework, a new evaluation and decision makingframework (and methodology) for large transportation projects, is proposed to elicit, structure andquantify the preferences of stakeholder groups across project alternatives. The decision rule used forgroup decision making within TEBA is the individual non-compensatory model of choice elimination byaspects (EBA). TEBA is designed to bring out the decision rule employed by decision makers whenranking the options presented, incorporate various criteria types and ease communication of relevantinformation related to options and criteria for multiple stakeholder groups. It is a platform fordemocratizing the decision making process. The TEBA framework was tested using a case studyinvestigating alternative land connections between Beirut and Damascus. Key results showed that (1)stakeholders have employed EBA in making decisions, (2) a defined group of decision makers will rankoptions differently when provided with modified sets of criteria, (3) the public sector and general publicgroups ranked Impact on Employment among the top criteria, (4) the most important criterion per groupfrom EBA was as expected; (5) the EBA analysis suggested that only 3 to 4 criteria are significant inreaching a decision; (6) aggregation of user assigned weights masked relative importance of criteria insome cases; and (7) analysis of user assigned weights and Minimum Threshold (MT) values suggesthigher risk perception with increased criterion importance. Policy implications include recommendationto reach out to stakeholders for input on decisions, including the "people" but refrain from relying oncriteria weights assigned by "experts" and reduce the "experts"' role in decision making. Also, it isrecommended to model the decision making in a probabilistic framework rather than a deterministic "onescore" approach, seek to identify a consensus ranking, place particular attention on determining the valuesof the criteria that emerged as "top" at the ...

The Transportation Elimination-by-Aspects (TEBA) framework, a new evaluation and decision makingframework (and methodology) for large transportation projects, is proposed to elicit, structure andquantify the preferences of stakeholder groups across project alternatives. The decision rule used forgroup decision making within TEBA is the individual non-compensatory model of choice elimination byaspects (EBA). TEBA is designed to bring out the decision rule employed by decision makers whenranking the options presented, incorporate various criteria types and ease communication of relevantinformation related to options and criteria for multiple stakeholder groups. It is a platform fordemocratizing the decision making process. The TEBA framework was tested using a case studyinvestigating alternative land connections between Beirut and Damascus. Key results showed that (1)stakeholders have employed EBA in making decisions, (2) a defined group of decision makers will rankoptions differently when provided with modified sets of criteria, (3) the public sector and general publicgroups ranked Impact on Employment among the top criteria, (4) the most important criterion per groupfrom EBA was as expected; (5) the EBA analysis suggested that only 3 to 4 criteria are significant inreaching a decision; (6) aggregation of user assigned weights masked relative importance of criteria insome cases; and (7) analysis of user assigned weights and Minimum Threshold (MT) values suggesthigher risk perception with increased criterion importance. Policy implications include recommendationto reach out to stakeholders for input on decisions, including the "people" but refrain from relying oncriteria weights assigned by "experts" and reduce the "experts"' role in decision making. Also, it isrecommended to model the decision making in a probabilistic framework rather than a deterministic "onescore" approach, seek to identify a consensus ranking, place particular attention on determining the valuesof the criteria that emerged as "top" at the evaluation stage and continue to emphasize risk measures.Keywords: Transportation Investment, Collective Decision Making, Cost Benefit Analysis, Elimination by Aspects,Consensus Model / Joint Decision Making, Index of Dispersion, Behavioral Choice

The Transportation Elimination-by-Aspects (TEBA) framework, a new evaluation and decision makingframework (and methodology) for large transportation projects, is proposed to elicit, structure andquantify the preferences of stakeholder groups across project alternatives. The decision rule used forgroup decision making within TEBA is the individual non-compensatory model of choice elimination byaspects (EBA). TEBA is designed to bring out the decision rule employed by decision makers whenranking the options presented, incorporate various criteria types and ease communication of relevantinformation related to options and criteria for multiple stakeholder groups. It is a platform fordemocratizing the decision making process. The TEBA framework was tested using a case studyinvestigating alternative land connections between Beirut and Damascus. Key results showed that (1)stakeholders have employed EBA in making decisions, (2) a defined group of decision makers will rankoptions differently when provided with modified sets of criteria, (3) the public sector and general publicgroups ranked Impact on Employment among the top criteria, (4) the most important criterion per groupfrom EBA was as expected; (5) the EBA analysis suggested that only 3 to 4 criteria are significant inreaching a decision; (6) aggregation of user assigned weights masked relative importance of criteria insome cases; and (7) analysis of user assigned weights and Minimum Threshold (MT) values suggesthigher risk perception with increased criterion importance. Policy implications include recommendationto reach out to stakeholders for input on decisions, including the "people" but refrain from relying oncriteria weights assigned by "experts" and reduce the "experts"' role in decision making. Also, it isrecommended to model the decision making in a probabilistic framework rather than a deterministic "onescore" approach, seek to identify a consensus ranking, place particular attention on determining the valuesof the criteria that emerged as "top" at the evaluation stage and continue to emphasize risk measures.Keywords: Transportation Investment, Collective Decision Making, Cost Benefit Analysis, Elimination by Aspects,Consensus Model / Joint Decision Making, Index of Dispersion, Behavioral Choice

The Transportation Elimination-by-Aspects (TEBA) framework, a new evaluation and decision makingframework (and methodology) for large transportation projects, is proposed to elicit, structure andquantify the preferences of stakeholder groups across project alternatives. The decision rule used forgroup decision making within TEBA is the individual non-compensatory model of choice elimination byaspects (EBA). TEBA is designed to bring out the decision rule employed by decision makers whenranking the options presented, incorporate various criteria types and ease communication of relevantinformation related to options and criteria for multiple stakeholder groups. It is a platform fordemocratizing the decision making process. The TEBA framework was tested using a case studyinvestigating alternative land connections between Beirut and Damascus. Key results showed that (1)stakeholders have employed EBA in making decisions, (2) a defined group of decision makers will rankoptions differently when provided with modified sets of criteria, (3) the public sector and general publicgroups ranked Impact on Employment among the top criteria, (4) the most important criterion per groupfrom EBA was as expected; (5) the EBA analysis suggested that only 3 to 4 criteria are significant inreaching a decision; (6) aggregation of user assigned weights masked relative importance of criteria insome cases; and (7) analysis of user assigned weights and Minimum Threshold (MT) values suggesthigher risk perception with increased criterion importance. Policy implications include recommendationto reach out to stakeholders for input on decisions, including the "people" but refrain from relying oncriteria weights assigned by "experts" and reduce the "experts"' role in decision making. Also, it isrecommended to model the decision making in a probabilistic framework rather than a deterministic "onescore" approach, seek to identify a consensus ranking, place particular attention on determining the valuesof the criteria that emerged as "top" at the evaluation stage and continue to emphasize risk measures.Keywords: Transportation Investment, Collective Decision Making, Cost Benefit Analysis, Elimination by Aspects,Consensus Model / Joint Decision Making, Index of Dispersion, Behavioral Choice

This paper addresses the issue of high speed trains (TGV) and spatial equity through the example of France. We begin with an examination of various concepts corresponding to the word equity. With these concepts, we address the TGV's impacts on the French regions from three dimensions: economic development, prices and financing. First, with a simple model, we show that high speed rail has contrasting territorial effects on growth of GDP per capita, combining polarization and diffusion. Beyond that, the pricing system, applying some methods of yield management, is not fair either. As for the financing of LGV network, the amount and nature of the contributing are highly dependent on the infrastructure considered. Regarding this question, the development of high-speed lines is spatially unfair. ; Ce papier vise à qualifier les effets des trains à grande vitesse (TGV) en France sur l'équité spatiale. A cette fin, nous commençons par examiner divers concepts contenus par ce mot polysémique. Avec ces concepts, nous nous interrogeons sur les impacts du TGV sur les régions françaises à partir de trois dimensions : le développement démographique et économique, les prix et le financement. Nous montrerons tout d'abord, par un modèle simple, que la grande vitesse ferroviaire présente des effets territoriaux contrastés sur la croissance du PIB par habitant, combinant polarisation et diffusion. Au-delà, la tarification propre au TGV, fondée sur une forme de « yield management », apparaît comme opaque, peu orientée par les coûts et spatialement inéquitable. Quant au financement du réseau de LGV, le montant et la nature des contributeurs varient fortement selon la ligne considérée. En cela, le développement des lignes à grande vitesse est spatialement inéquitable.

This paper addresses the issue of high speed trains (TGV) and spatial equity through the example of France. We begin with an examination of various concepts corresponding to the word equity. With these concepts, we address the TGV's impacts on the French regions from three dimensions: economic development, prices and financing. First, with a simple model, we show that high speed rail has contrasting territorial effects on growth of GDP per capita, combining polarization and diffusion. Beyond that, the pricing system, applying some methods of yield management, is not fair either. As for the financing of LGV network, the amount and nature of the contributing are highly dependent on the infrastructure considered. Regarding this question, the development of high-speed lines is spatially unfair. ; Ce papier vise à qualifier les effets des trains à grande vitesse (TGV) en France sur l'équité spatiale. A cette fin, nous commençons par examiner divers concepts contenus par ce mot polysémique. Avec ces concepts, nous nous interrogeons sur les impacts du TGV sur les régions françaises à partir de trois dimensions : le développement démographique et économique, les prix et le financement. Nous montrerons tout d'abord, par un modèle simple, que la grande vitesse ferroviaire présente des effets territoriaux contrastés sur la croissance du PIB par habitant, combinant polarisation et diffusion. Au-delà, la tarification propre au TGV, fondée sur une forme de « yield management », apparaît comme opaque, peu orientée par les coûts et spatialement inéquitable. Quant au financement du réseau de LGV, le montant et la nature des contributeurs varient fortement selon la ligne considérée. En cela, le développement des lignes à grande vitesse est spatialement inéquitable.

The literature demonstrates the likely reduction of wholesale electricity prices due to a larger penetration of renewable energy sources (RES). When markets are organized as two or more inter-connected sub-markets within a larger power market the final impact of increasing RES production may be less straightforward given the presence of network constraints. We tests this phenomenon by analyzing the impact of RES production on the probability of congestion and on the size of congestion cost in Italy. Using a database with hourly observations for a five year period we estimate two econometric models on five zonal pairings: a multinomial logit model for the occurrence and direction of congestion and a three stage least square model for the size of congestion costs. The analysis suggests that the effect of a larger local wind and solar supply is to decrease the probability of suffering congestion in entry and to increase the probability of causing a congestion in exit compared to no congestion case. Increasing hydroelectric production has a similar effect. These results hold for both importing and exporting regions, but importing regions are less likely to cause congestion in exit, therefore the installation of new RES capacity in these zones may have a positive effects in terms of flow balance between regions. Concerning the cost level, a larger local RES supply seems to push the congestion cost towards negative values as it decreases the marginal cost for balancing the system. This is true for all zones in the case of explicit congestion cost, but it is only verified in importing regions in the case of implicit congestion cost. This result suggests that the increase of RES production should be promoted in importing zones, but the overall growth should be controlled in order to avoid congestion in the opposite direction.

Using the most recent available data on a sample of 40 developing countries, this paper addresses the effects of oil rent on inequality. Mobilizing a dynamic panel data specification over the period 1996–2008, the econometric results yield two important findings. First, there is a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between oil rent and inequality. Specifically, oil rent lowers inequality in the short run. This effect then diminishes over time as the oil revenues increase. Our complementary finding is that the fall in income inequality as a result of the increase in the oil rent is fully absorbed by the increase in corruption. Further, the paper examines the channels of causality underlying this relationship. The graphical analysis shows the consistency of the data with the hypothesis according to which corruption, military expenditure, and inflation mediate the effect of oil rent on income inequality. ; Etudes & documents

This paper addresses the issue of high speed trains (TGV) and spatial equity through the example of France. We begin with an examination of various concepts corresponding to the word equity. With these concepts, we address the TGV's impacts on the French regions from three dimensions: economic development, prices and financing. First, with a simple model, we show that high speed rail has contrasting territorial effects on growth of GDP per capita, combining polarization and diffusion. Beyond that, the pricing system, applying some methods of yield management, is not fair either. As for the financing of LGV network, the amount and nature of the contributing are highly dependent on the infrastructure considered. Regarding this question, the development of high-speed lines is spatially unfair. ; Ce papier vise à qualifier les effets des trains à grande vitesse (TGV) en France sur l'équité spatiale. A cette fin, nous commençons par examiner divers concepts contenus par ce mot polysémique. Avec ces concepts, nous nous interrogeons sur les impacts du TGV sur les régions françaises à partir de trois dimensions : le développement démographique et économique, les prix et le financement. Nous montrerons tout d'abord, par un modèle simple, que la grande vitesse ferroviaire présente des effets territoriaux contrastés sur la croissance du PIB par habitant, combinant polarisation et diffusion. Au-delà, la tarification propre au TGV, fondée sur une forme de « yield management », apparaît comme opaque, peu orientée par les coûts et spatialement inéquitable. Quant au financement du réseau de LGV, le montant et la nature des contributeurs varient fortement selon la ligne considérée. En cela, le développement des lignes à grande vitesse est spatialement inéquitable.

This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety creation. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration or minimum standards as commercialisation rules. The main result is that the combination of minimum standards and PBRs (patents) provides higher incentives for sequential and initial innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator when sunk investment costs are low (high) and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high (low). ; Cet article porte sur l'impact de la législation dans le secteur semencier, en particulier sur les incitations à la création variétale. La première catégorie de règles consiste en des droits de propriété intellectuelle et est présente pour corriger des problèmes d'incitation à innover. La seconde catégorie concerne des règles de commercialisation dans le but de remédier à un problème de sélection adverse. Nous proposons un modèle dynamique d'équilibre de marché avec une différenciation verticale des produits. Ceci nous permet de prendre en compte les conséquences économiques de l'utilisation d'un Certificat d'Obtention Végétale (COV) ou un brevet comme DPI et d'un catalogue ou des standards minimum comme règle de commercialisation. Le résultat principal est que la combinaison des standards minimum et des COV (brevet) apporte une plus grande incitation à la fois pour une innovation initiale ou séquentielle et peut être préférée par les autorités publiques quand les coûts de R&D sont bas (haut) et que la probabilité de succès est suffisamment haute (basse).

This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety creation. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration or minimum standards as commercialisation rules. The main result is that the combination of minimum standards and PBRs (patents) provides higher incentives for sequential and initial innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator when sunk investment costs are low (high) and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high (low). ; Cet article porte sur l'impact de la législation dans le secteur semencier, en particulier sur les incitations à la création variétale. La première catégorie de règles consiste en des droits de propriété intellectuelle et est présente pour corriger des problèmes d'incitation à innover. La seconde catégorie concerne des règles de commercialisation dans le but de remédier à un problème de sélection adverse. Nous proposons un modèle dynamique d'équilibre de marché avec une différenciation verticale des produits. Ceci nous permet de prendre en compte les conséquences économiques de l'utilisation d'un Certificat d'Obtention Végétale (COV) ou un brevet comme DPI et d'un catalogue ou des standards minimum comme règle de commercialisation. Le résultat principal est que la combinaison des standards minimum et des COV (brevet) apporte une plus grande incitation à la fois pour une innovation initiale ou séquentielle et peut être préférée par les autorités publiques quand les coûts de R&D sont bas (haut) et que la probabilité de succès est suffisamment haute (basse).

This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety creation. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration or minimum standards as commercialisation rules. The main result is that the combination of minimum standards and PBRs (patents) provides higher incentives for sequential and initial innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator when sunk investment costs are low (high) and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high (low). ; Cet article porte sur l'impact de la législation dans le secteur semencier, en particulier sur les incitations à la création variétale. La première catégorie de règles consiste en des droits de propriété intellectuelle et est présente pour corriger des problèmes d'incitation à innover. La seconde catégorie concerne des règles de commercialisation dans le but de remédier à un problème de sélection adverse. Nous proposons un modèle dynamique d'équilibre de marché avec une différenciation verticale des produits. Ceci nous permet de prendre en compte les conséquences économiques de l'utilisation d'un Certificat d'Obtention Végétale (COV) ou un brevet comme DPI et d'un catalogue ou des standards minimum comme règle de commercialisation. Le résultat principal est que la combinaison des standards minimum et des COV (brevet) apporte une plus grande incitation à la fois pour une innovation initiale ou séquentielle et peut être préférée par les autorités publiques quand les coûts de R&D sont bas (haut) et que la probabilité de succès est suffisamment haute (basse).

This article delves into the relationship between newspaper readership and civic attitudes, and its effect on economic development. To this end, we investigate the long-term consequences of the introduction of the printing press in the 19th century. In sub-Saharan Africa, Protestant missionaries were the first both to import the printing press technology and to allow the indigenous population to use it. We build a new geocoded dataset locating Protestant missions in 1903. This dataset includes, for each mission station, the geographic location and its characteristics, as well as the educational and health-related investments undertaken by the mission. We show that, within regions located close to missions, proximity to a printing press significantly increases newspaper readership today. We also document a strong association between proximity to a printing press and contemporary economic development. Our results are robust to a variety of identification strategies.