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For the political scientist in America there can scarcely be a more fascinating or more elusive study than the Soviet Union. The first enticement is the menacing importance of Soviet power. Then there is the miracle which in a single generation has changed a defeated and disintegrating agrarian society into one of the two greatest industrial and military States of our day. But these are claims to everybody's attention. The peculiar challenge to the professional student of social phenomena is another matter. For him Russia now is an enormous but dimly lighted laboratory in which doctrine is tested by experience, where the strain between ideology and reality is carried to a pitch never previously attempted, where techniques are developed by which a small elite secures a steady ninety-nine per cent of formal acquiescence from a population of two hundred millions, where political and economic strength is accumulated by processes in which what we consider normal human reactions are choked off by fear or concealed in the trite responses of an authorized litany.

The year 1959 was a crucial one for Venezuela. Politically, it marked the end of an era of military dictatorship. Economically, with the appearance of a world surplus of oil, it marked the termination of a period of prosperity unique in type and unparalleled in degree. This turning point in the destiny of the nation would seem to be a fitting time for an appraisal of Venezuela's recent growth record.Such an appraisal reveals the fact that during the past twenty years Venezuela's remarkable economic gains were brought about by a unique combination of growth factors. Some of these Venezuela possessed in common with other Latin-American countries. But others, in particular those of a spatial and temporal character, have been singularly its own.

The United States occupation of Haiti — despite benevolent intentions — was a thinly-disguised military dictatorship. The official view of the Department of State that the numerous U. S. officials there were merely advisers to the legitimate Haitian government, acting in accordance with limitations prescribed by treaty, was a polite fiction. It deceived no one, particularly the large number of Haitians who resented foreign experiments in benevolent despotism in their land.The real ruler of Haiti, as the system had evolved by the pivotal year of 1928 — the last "normal" year before the political crisis which precipitated withdrawal — was General John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps, the U. S. High Commissioner. The nominal ruler, President Louis Borno, generally relied upon his U. S. advisers. In Russell's own words "[Borno] has never taken a step without first consulting me." When differences arose, usually as a result of pressures exerted on Borno by local politicians, General Russell was free to make appropriate concessions. But his will prevailed in any showdown conflict. The General was noted for his fairness, however, and his relations with Haitian officials were usually harmonious. Yet his military background, combined with his devotion to efficiency and economy, was not well-suited to preparing a dependent people for enlightened self-rule.

The important role played by the army in the pol'al life of Latin America is revealed by the history of these nations. To begin with, the military conquistadors were quickly replaced by a civil bureaucracy which was under the complete control of the Spanish crown. The financiers were constantly seeking to sell military titles while the need for a defense against Indians & pirates called for the creation of a militia. The wars of liberation brought the generals to the fore, though Spanish customs had already given the military the benefits of a privileged class. These soldiers now found that they had no outlet for their military prowess because South America was far removed from the area of major conflicts. The generals entered into an alliance with the large landowners to form a pol'al system resembling the Spanish one, a type of caudillism, that is to say a dictatorship depending upon the army. Toward the end of the 19th cent, modifications in the recruitment of soldiers & in the formation of officer corps tended to do away with the influence of the military on pol'al life. It was the crisis that followed WW1 that brought back the influence of the military, but this time in a diff fashion. The officer corps had become much less conservative & had been seriously affected by doctrines inspired by Fascism & Communism. The army also tended to intervene indirectly to support particular pol'al views by allowing the leaders who had the army's support to maintain order. In several states, then, the police, frequently organized with the help of the US, began to play a role formerly held by the army. The Gov's therefore began to depend for their existence on an equilibrium between the army, police, & militia. Frequently, also, the various armed forces were at odds, with the navy & the Air Force generally being more liberal than the Army. Military careers appeared to be instruments of soc promotion & made it possible, in nations where marked diff's in class existed, for individuals to achieve a fair degree of success. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

By Latin-American standards, Chile has enjoyed a remarkably stable government. Yet, there have been significant intervals of political unrest marked by violence and internal disorder. At both the beginning and the end of the nineteenth century, Liberals and Conservatives clashed in bloody battles, opening wounds that festered for many years. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the military revolted three times in the space of eight years (1924-1932) in order to promote social reform. Marmaduke Grove Vallejo figured prominently in these events, first as a participant in the January uprising of 1925, later as an opponent of the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, and finally as a leader of the military forces that overthrew the government of Juan Esteban Montero Rodríguez and established the Socialist Republic of Chile.

How to make credible an intent to defend a smaller ally (pawn) from attack is a persistent theoretical & practical problem of deterrence strategy. Several hyp's about variables enhancing credibility are noted: the defender must have strategic superiority; he must have local military superiority; the pawn must be of substantial size & importance; the defender deliberately increases the potential loss to himself if he fails to carry out his threat; an explicit public promise by the defender. These & other hyp's are tested by a comparative examination of 17 cases of attempted deterrence since 1935. 3 outcomes are distinguished:& 'success, ' where the attacker desisted from his attack on the pawn; a failure where the defender lost the pawn to the attacker; & a failure where major war broke out between attacker & defender. The tests revealed: (1) no association between success & size of pawn as measured by relative pop or G. N. P., (2) no association between success & explicit defender's promise in a treaty, executive agreement, or public statement, (3) neither strategic or local military superiority is a condition of success for the defender, though (4) either strategic or local equality is a necessary but not sufficient condition of success, (5) success is not dependent upon the type of pol'al system (democracy or dictatorship) of the nation making the deterrent threat. Further tests suggested, however, that success did vary with the strength of the ties between defender & pawn. Military cooperation & econ interdependence between defender & pawn were found much more frequently in cases of success than of failure. Pol'al interdependence, chiefly as a present or past alliance, was also associated, but less strongly, with success. Similar tests were conducted to determine what variables helped determine whether, if the attacker pressed on, the defender actually went to war. Again, size, explicitness of promise, military strength, & pol'al system were not related to outcome, but the strength of the ties between pawn & defender were. In explanation of these results a utility-probability model is offered, whereby a defender's decision to stand by the pawn depends upon whether the prospective gains from a policy of& 'firmness, ' weighted by the probability of success & discounted by the cost & probability of war, exceed the prospective costs from abandoning the pawn. It is suggested that the existence of close military, pol'al, & econ ties between defender & pawn will increase heavily the latter cost, frequently enough to tip the decision in favor of standing by the pawn. These costs will include not only tangible assets, but self-esteem & the credibility of future deterrent threats. It is inferred that in many cases of success the attacker perceived these costs to the defender & hence was restrained. AA.

The problems of a tolerable and enduring peace under the circumstances of tentative peace through balance of terror are political. The contest of power is between two blocs, each built around a hegemonic nation of imperial tech nological, economic, and military strength. Democracy may be a necessity of justice, but the authoritarian oligarchy of the Soviet Union changed a backward and feudal Russia into a technically competent modern state, a material revolution which the poorer nations of the world desire for themselves. Democracy is not uniformly relevant everywhere; depending upon cultural and economic variables, compounds of democracy and dictatorship are inevitable. The United States must learn the difference between reversible nondemocratic regimes and regimes irreversible because theirs is a fanatic communism. Although of imperial size and strength, the United States has a strong tradition of anti-imperialism, attributing imperialism to monarchy. The Soviet Union uses the charge of imperialism as a weapon against the West, attributing imperialism to capitalism. The creative aspects of imperialism are not ap preciated by either side. In terms of peace, some decisions are not for either the United States or the Soviet Union, the heg emonic nations, to make. Unpredicted and unpredictable emergencies arise in the course of history. One can only affirm that the defense of an open society is not futile and that the burden of the defense will ennoble rather than corrupt the culture that bears it.—Ed.