Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; The article describes the process of developing the Polish-Germany military cooperation in the 21st century. It presents the bases for the bilateral military relationships between Poland and Germany and shows their development. The paper underlines the role of Germany in the Polish participation in NATO. The Author describes the common initiatives after joining the Pact, especially the participation of Bundeswehr in training and technical modernisation of the Polish armed forces. He claims that after the year 2015, the Polish-German military cooperation will be a function of Germany's pragmatics and Poland's history politics. The main problem of the Polish government will be the German willingness to constantly build NATO military bases in Poland.
Baltic Sea, as an area of strategic importance for Russia's policy toward Europe, has become a place of showcase of Russia's military might. Its primary purpose is to show the international community the level of determination Russian authorities express to make national interests of the Federation included in the global politics. The number of incidents which cannot be a ground for military action on a larger scale – even according to Russian conventions – requires a politico- military response by regional supranational organizations. The response should take the form of smart-power strategies and the formula of military involvement must go beyond purely defensive action in response to enemy action. Hence, it is necessary to determine the scope of comprehensive EU and NATO operations (due to the need to protect the territorial sovereignty of Sweden and Finland) to offset the forms of Russian incidental activities in a way that does not elevate political tension in the region. Such a reaction is possible through effective impact on forms of activities on the waters of the Baltic Sea, which are important for Russia, notably shipping. The European Union, and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in particular, has appropriate instruments to create an effective impact. On the other hand, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty should be to prepare and conduct systematic and comprehensive operations which limit the possibility of encroaching on the treaty territory and protect the member states against Russia applying instruments of hybrid war. Key words: Baltic Sea, Russian national interests, NATO, The European Union
After the end of the World War II neoconservatism has become the most significant political doctrine in the United States of America. Many neoconservatists were Trotskyists in the beginning, however, lately they have become associated with the Republicans. The neoconservative ideology's main aim is to justify the imperial role of the USA. Neoconservative intellectuals believe in the values of American policy (like liberal democracy and economic freedom) and are concerned about the necessity of promoting it in the rest of the world, which is usually accompanied by distrust towards states opposing those values. They support increasing defence and military spending. Neoconservatists influenced politics of majority of American presidents elected after 1945, especially Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. ; Fundacja Studentów i Absolwentów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego "Bratniak"
We live in a world ruled by liberal democracy. Moreover, it is becoming commonly launched that we have reached the end of politics, as we know it, and are experiencing the beginning of postpolitics. Political life is becoming deprived of its constituents in the name of the technical approach to political processes (postpolitical). Conflict as an immanent part of politics is also becoming a thing of the past, substituted with a win-win type of politics. In our postideological and postpolitical era everyone seems to accept this central consensus. Developing this thesis, the author deliberates on the resilience of a system based on an erroneous, in his opinion, presumption – the presumption of the end of politics and the beginning of the postpolitics, of which the project of deliberative democracy is a striking example. Relating to Mouffe, the author attempts to leverage the corner stone of deliberative democracy – faith in the possibility of disqualifying the essential correlate of democracy, which is inequality, or as Mouffe describes it herself "the element of indetermination". Following the theories of Mouffe, Laclau, Chomsky, or Wallerstein, the author claims that what we really need is a contestation of the status quo, which instead of a radical change of the political system or creating a new system from scratch would consist in creating a deft sewerage system of social frustrations and the ability to manage conflicts. That is exactly what the project of agonistic democracy should serve, in which a Schmittonian oposition of friend/enemy is replaced with an opposition of friend/opponent. The inability to treat political opponents as adversaries, as I substantiate with the example of the military, following Bacevich's terminology, foreign policy of the United States, leads on to the transformation of the language of politics into a language of morality and ethics. And from this point it is not far to the Manichaean visions and managing not politics but a crusade against the evil. The essay does not provide easy answers and the author is far from moralizing. His real aim is to provoke a discussion, an encouragement of critical thinking and search for truth, the truth – as Pinter put it – hidden somewhere in our life. According to the author it is critical, if democracy is to function.
We live in a world ruled by liberal democracy. Moreover, it is becoming commonly launched that we have reached the end of politics, as we know it, and are experiencing the beginning of postpolitics. Political life is becoming deprived of its constituents in the name of the technical approach to political processes (postpolitical). Conflict as an immanent part of politics is also becoming a thing of the past, substituted with a win-win type of politics. In our postideological and postpolitical era everyone seems to accept this central consensus. Developing this thesis, the author deliberates on the resilience of a system based on an erroneous, in his opinion, presumption – the presumption of the end of politics and the beginning of the postpolitics, of which the project of deliberative democracy is a striking example. Relating to Mouffe, the author attempts to leverage the corner stone of deliberative democracy – faith in the possibility of disqualifying the essential correlate of democracy, which is inequality, or as Mouffe describes it herself "the element of indetermination". Following the theories of Mouffe, Laclau, Chomsky, or Wallerstein, the author claims that what we really need is a contestation of the status quo, which instead of a radical change of the political system or creating a new system from scratch would consist in creating a deft sewerage system of social frustrations and the ability to manage conflicts. That is exactly what the project of agonistic democracy should serve, in which a Schmittonian oposition of friend/enemy is replaced with an opposition of friend/opponent. The inability to treat political opponents as adversaries, as I substantiate with the example of the military, following Bacevich's terminology, foreign policy of the United States, leads on to the transformation of the language of politics into a language of morality and ethics. And from this point it is not far to the Manichaean visions and managing not politics but a crusade against the evil. The essay does not provide easy answers and the author is far from moralizing. His real aim is to provoke a discussion, an encouragement of critical thinking and search for truth, the truth – as Pinter put it – hidden somewhere in our life. According to the author it is critical, if democracy is to function.
Power has been one of the key issues in the study of international relations since the famous words of Hans Morgentau that in world politics power is pitted against power for supremacy and survival. The attention given to its analysis within the last 65 years has been a product of such as Morthenthau's understandings of power which see it as the most important causal force in state interactions. However, despite the amount of research on the subject, there is little agreement among scholars as to what it is and where does it come.The author briefly examines various views on the determinants of power starting from a classical realist and strictly actor-based one to a dualist approach which emphasizes the importance of international structure. He finds that all share a similar idea that power — to some extent — comes from the material capabilities of states (material determinants). Building upon previous research conducted on the validity of the democratic peace theory he then argues that it may also stem from the political system of the state (systemic determinants).Subsequently the author analyzes the significance of various material and systemic power determinants to war outcomes using nine diff erent non-linear econometric models (polynomial logit) composed of various sets of variables relating to power determinants. He then examines the degree to which particular models explain war outcomes of interstate military conflicts between 1816 and 1991 and which of the variables seem statistically significant.The results clearly show that neither the advantage in military personnel numbers, nor in the amount of money spent on arms influences the state's chances of victory. In the case of the total value of imports the findings are similar. On the other hand the value of the states exports, as well as certain systemic parameters such as competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment and executive constraints prove to be of statistical importance.
Power has been one of the key issues in the study of international relations since the famous words of Hans Morgentau that in world politics power is pitted against power for supremacy and survival. The attention given to its analysis within the last 65 years has been a product of such as Morthenthau's understandings of power which see it as the most important causal force in state interactions. However, despite the amount of research on the subject, there is little agreement among scholars as to what it is and where does it come.The author briefly examines various views on the determinants of power starting from a classical realist and strictly actor-based one to a dualist approach which emphasizes the importance of international structure. He finds that all share a similar idea that power — to some extent — comes from the material capabilities of states (material determinants). Building upon previous research conducted on the validity of the democratic peace theory he then argues that it may also stem from the political system of the state (systemic determinants).Subsequently the author analyzes the significance of various material and systemic power determinants to war outcomes using nine diff erent non-linear econometric models (polynomial logit) composed of various sets of variables relating to power determinants. He then examines the degree to which particular models explain war outcomes of interstate military conflicts between 1816 and 1991 and which of the variables seem statistically significant.The results clearly show that neither the advantage in military personnel numbers, nor in the amount of money spent on arms influences the state's chances of victory. In the case of the total value of imports the findings are similar. On the other hand the value of the states exports, as well as certain systemic parameters such as competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment and executive constraints prove to be of statistical importance.
Suzerainty and independence of state and its territorial integrality and inviolability of borders are fundamental problems of extrenal seciurity policy in politics programme polish liberal parties. In relations to alliance with United States of America and Common European Security and Defence Policy are the main politcal problems this policy. Platforma Obywatelska presents the most rational standpoint. The present moment ofshows programm a sensible equilibrium between both ofinternational subjects. Unia Polityki Realnej univocally declares strict colaboration with United States ofAmerica. This party perceptions European Union as a threat for Poland. Instead political programm ofPartia Demokratyczna makes activiy of Poland to create Common European Security and EU Defence Policy. This policy is a safeguard to security ofWestern and Central Europe. In all programme ofthese two parties NATO IS PERCEPTIONED as very important element ofsafety, no only regional but global too. All parties detect necessity build matter ofPoland in alliance. For Platforma Obywatelska and Unia Polityki Realnej military implement is important an element of formation the external security. Both of parties perceive necessity to modernize of equipment and organic structure ofarmy. The most fudamental problem is formation ofprofesional army but with elemets ofcivil guard. For both ofparties the main target oftechnical modernization of army is attained level ofmodernity so that is could co֊operare with most best army on The World wihtout problemms. ; Projekt Operacyjny Polska Cyfrowa POPC.02.03.01-00-0039/18
It is assumed that on 16 February 2001, Albanians started fighting for their rights in Macedonia with the use of force. On that day armed groups attacked Macedonian police stations in the village of Tanuševci near Tetov. The clashes of various intensity lasted until major amendments to Macedonian constitution were adopted in November 2001.In the first stage of fighting (until May 2001), the Macedonians attempted to disarm the Albanian rebels and destroy the weapons which they had accumulated. This proved difficult because of the support which the latter had in Kosovo and the Prešev Valley, and the guerrilla strategy that they had developed earlier in Kosovo and now adopted. What is more, the Macedonian military actions were slowed down by Americans with the intention of limiting the number of casualties. In April, EU members and the US managed to establish a wide coalition.The major political parties of the country, both governing and oppositional (Macedonian and Albanian) decided to start negotiations concerning the conditions of the future peace treaty - that is, concessions for Albanians living in Macedonia and awarding them more rights. At the same time, the US and members of the EU states opposed the introduction of martial law in the country in order to deal with Albanian rebels by force.The leaders of Albanian parties in Macedonia and the main leaders of the Albanian revolution signed the Prizren Agreement, which was to provide a new plain for the future peace negotiations. Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia, largely agreed with US and UE politics, but for the Prime Minister, his environment and most prominent Macedonian intellectuals - with Georgi Efremov, the President of MANU - the only solution was the division of the Macedonian territory and exchange of their minority groups. The representatives of the EU and US opposed such actions and emphasised that preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was absolutely crucial. ; It is assumed that on 16 February 2001, Albanians started fighting for their rights in Macedonia with the use of force. On that day armed groups attacked Macedonian police stations in the village of Tanuševci near Tetov. The clashes of various intensity lasted until major amendments to Macedonian constitution were adopted in November 2001.In the first stage of fighting (until May 2001), the Macedonians attempted to disarm the Albanian rebels and destroy the weapons which they had accumulated. This proved difficult because of the support which the latter had in Kosovo and the Prešev Valley, and the guerrilla strategy that they had developed earlier in Kosovo and now adopted. What is more, the Macedonian military actions were slowed down by Americans with the intention of limiting the number of casualties. In April, EU members and the US managed to establish a wide coalition.The major political parties of the country, both governing and oppositional (Macedonian and Albanian) decided to start negotiations concerning the conditions of the future peace treaty - that is, concessions for Albanians living in Macedonia and awarding them more rights. At the same time, the US and members of the EU states opposed the introduction of martial law in the country in order to deal with Albanian rebels by force.The leaders of Albanian parties in Macedonia and the main leaders of the Albanian revolution signed the Prizren Agreement, which was to provide a new plain for the future peace negotiations. Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia, largely agreed with US and UE politics, but for the Prime Minister, his environment and most prominent Macedonian intellectuals - with Georgi Efremov, the President of MANU - the only solution was the division of the Macedonian territory and exchange of their minority groups. The representatives of the EU and US opposed such actions and emphasised that preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was absolutely crucial.
The aim of the article is to analyze the two institutional set-ups that have evolved within the framework of transatlantic security relations. First, it is NATO, which was created in 1949 as a military alliance whose original purpose was to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union and to control Germany by anchoring the United States on the European continent. Since then, and especially since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone a process of transformation, but a number of primary functions continue to be extremely important. Individual theories of international relations (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism) interpret the changes in NATO differently. Second, an alternative institutional set-up to NATO may be security and defence relations between the European Union and the United States. It is more potential because the Union still has problems with its actorness in international politics. ; Celem artykułu jest analiza dwóch układów instytucjonalnych, które rozwinęły się w ramach transatlantyckich stosunków bezpieczeństwa. Po pierwsze, jest to NATO, które powstało w 1949 r. jako sojusz wojskowy, którego pierwotnym celem było przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniu ze strony Związku Radzieckiego i kontrola Niemiec dzięki zakotwiczeniu Stanów Zjednoczonych na kontynencie europejskim. Od tego czasu, a w szczególności od końca zimnej wojny, NATO przeszło proces transformacji, ale szereg pierwotnych funkcji nadal ma ogromne znaczenie. Poszczególne teorie stosunków międzynarodowych (neorealizm, neoliberalny instytucjonalizm, konstruktywizm społeczny) w odmienny sposób interpretują zmiany w NATO. Po drugie, alternatywnym układem instytucjonalnym dla NATO mogą być relacje w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i obrony pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Ma on bardziej charakter potencjalny, gdyż nadal Unia ma problemy ze swoją podmiotowością w polityce międzynarodowej.
Celem artykułu jest analiza dwóch układów instytucjonalnych, które rozwinęły się w ramach transatlantyckich stosunków bezpieczeństwa. Po pierwsze, jest to NATO, które powstało w 1949 r. jako sojusz wojskowy, którego pierwotnym celem było przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniu ze strony Związku Radzieckiego i kontrola Niemiec dzięki zakotwiczeniu Stanów Zjednoczonych na kontynencie europejskim. Od tego czasu, a w szczególności od końca zimnej wojny, NATO przeszło proces transformacji, ale szereg pierwotnych funkcji nadal ma ogromne znaczenie. Poszczególne teorie stosunków międzynarodowych (neorealizm, neoliberalny instytucjonalizm, konstruktywizm społeczny) w odmienny sposób interpretują zmiany w NATO. Po drugie, alternatywnym układem instytucjonalnym dla NATO mogą być relacje w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i obrony pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Ma on bardziej charakter potencjalny, gdyż nadal Unia ma problemy ze swoją podmiotowością w polityce międzynarodowej. ; The aim of the article is to analyze the two institutional set-ups that have evolved within the framework of transatlantic security relations. First, it is NATO, which was created in 1949 as a military alliance whose original purpose was to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union and to control Germany by anchoring the United States on the European continent. Since then, and especially since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone a process of transformation, but a number of primary functions continue to be extremely important. Individual theories of international relations (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism) interpret the changes in NATO differently. Second, an alternative institutional set-up to NATO may be security and defence relations between the European Union and the United States. It is more potential because the Union still has problems with its actorness in international politics.
Celem artykułu jest analiza dwóch układów instytucjonalnych, które rozwinęły się w ramach transatlantyckich stosunków bezpieczeństwa. Po pierwsze, jest to NATO, które powstało w 1949 r. jako sojusz wojskowy, którego pierwotnym celem było przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniu ze strony Związku Radzieckiego i kontrola Niemiec dzięki zakotwiczeniu Stanów Zjednoczonych na kontynencie europejskim. Od tego czasu, a w szczególności od końca zimnej wojny, NATO przeszło proces transformacji, ale szereg pierwotnych funkcji nadal ma ogromne znaczenie. Poszczególne teorie stosunków międzynarodowych (neorealizm, neoliberalny instytucjonalizm, konstruktywizm społeczny) w odmienny sposób interpretują zmiany w NATO. Po drugie, alternatywnym układem instytucjonalnym dla NATO mogą być relacje w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i obrony pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Ma on bardziej charakter potencjalny, gdyż nadal Unia ma problemy ze swoją podmiotowością w polityce międzynarodowej. ; The aim of the article is to analyze the two institutional set-ups that have evolved within the framework of transatlantic security relations. First, it is NATO, which was created in 1949 as a military alliance whose original purpose was to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union and to control Germany by anchoring the United States on the European continent. Since then, and especially since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone a process of transformation, but a number of primary functions continue to be extremely important. Individual theories of international relations (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism) interpret the changes in NATO differently. Second, an alternative institutional set-up to NATO may be security and defence relations between the European Union and the United States. It is more potential because the Union still has problems with its actorness in international politics.
Celem artykułu jest analiza dwóch układów instytucjonalnych, które rozwinęły się w ramach transatlantyckich stosunków bezpieczeństwa. Po pierwsze, jest to NATO, które powstało w 1949 r. jako sojusz wojskowy, którego pierwotnym celem było przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniu ze strony Związku Radzieckiego i kontrola Niemiec dzięki zakotwiczeniu Stanów Zjednoczonych na kontynencie europejskim. Od tego czasu, a w szczególności od końca zimnej wojny, NATO przeszło proces transformacji, ale szereg pierwotnych funkcji nadal ma ogromne znaczenie. Poszczególne teorie stosunków międzynarodowych (neorealizm, neoliberalny instytucjonalizm, konstruktywizm społeczny) w odmienny sposób interpretują zmiany w NATO. Po drugie, alternatywnym układem instytucjonalnym dla NATO mogą być relacje w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i obrony pomiędzy Unią Europejską a Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Ma on bardziej charakter potencjalny, gdyż nadal Unia ma problemy ze swoją podmiotowością w polityce międzynarodowej. ; The aim of the article is to analyze the two institutional set-ups that have evolved within the framework of transatlantic security relations. First, it is NATO, which was created in 1949 as a military alliance whose original purpose was to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union and to control Germany by anchoring the United States on the European continent. Since then, and especially since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone a process of transformation, but a number of primary functions continue to be extremely important. Individual theories of international relations (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism) interpret the changes in NATO differently. Second, an alternative institutional set-up to NATO may be security and defence relations between the European Union and the United States. It is more potential because the Union still has problems with its actorness in international politics.
The events of the Arab Spring in Syria have led to the re-evaluation of the regional policy of the Republic of Turkey, which has faced two options. One involves acting in compliance with the expectations of its Western allies, and promoting the principles of democracy in the Middle East by firmly reacting against any cases of human rights' violations, simultaneously showing the direction of the changes necessary in the region. Another refers to the principles included in the definition of the international policy of "Strategic Depth": avoiding problems with neighbors, which excludes all interference in the internal politics of other countries, and means the continuation of pragmatic co-operation with all political centers, including authoritarian regimes. In the face of the violent struggle between the opposition and Al-Assad supporters, a policy of the protection of democracy and human rights has been chosen. This decision, on the one hand, strengthens Turkey's relations with Western structures. On the other hand, it may lead to open conflict with a direct neighbor, Syria, which constitutes a serious threat to Turkey's security, and may result in negative consequences for its energy security and economic relations with its Middle East partners. The Republic of Turkey does not exclude direct engagement in a potential military intervention in three cases. Firstly, if Turkey's NATO allies decide to start military operations in Syria. Secondly, should it become necessary to protect its people and its territory. Thirdly, in the case of the conflict's escalation or its spread outside Syria's borders. ; Wybuch Arabskiej Wiosny w Syrii spowodował przewartościowanie polityki regionalnej Turcji. Stanęła ona przed wyborem. Czy promować w Syrii i w całym regionie Bliskiego Wschodu zasady demokracji i reagować na przypadki łamania praw człowieka, wskazując tym samym kierunek niezbędnych przemian. Czy nawiązując do zasady tzw. zero problemów z sąsiadami kontynuować pragmatyczną współpracę z reżimem. Zwyciężyła polityka ochrony demokracji i praw człowieka. Wybór ten, z jednej strony zacieśnia relacje Turcji ze strukturami zachodnimi. Z drugiej, naraża na otwarty konflikt z Syrią oraz pogorszenie relacji z Iranem, które mogą mieć negatywne konsekwencje dlajej bezpieczeństwa i powiązań gospodarczych z Bliskim Wschodem. Uwzględniając złożoną sytuację na Bliskim Wschodzie, przywódcy Republiki Turcji za optymalne uznają: utrzymanie integralności terytorialnej Syrii; zapobieżenie wybuchowi konfliktu wyznaniowego, który może rozprzestrzenić się na obszar całego Bliskiego Wschodu oraz stopniową demokratyzację ogarniętego walkami państwa. Jednocześnie nie wykluczają oni bezpośredniego zaangażowania w konflikt w trzech przypadkach. Po pierwsze, przystąpienia do interwencji zbrojnej członków Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego. Po drugie, konieczności ochrony własnej ludności i terytorium. Po trzecie, eskalacji walk, bądź ich przeniesienia poza granice Syrii.
Wybuch Arabskiej Wiosny w Syrii spowodował przewartościowanie polityki regionalnej Turcji. Stanęła ona przed wyborem. Czy promować w Syrii i w całym regionie Bliskiego Wschodu zasady demokracji i reagować na przypadki łamania praw człowieka, wskazując tym samym kierunek niezbędnych przemian. Czy nawiązując do zasady tzw. zero problemów z sąsiadami kontynuować pragmatyczną współpracę z reżimem. Zwyciężyła polityka ochrony demokracji i praw człowieka. Wybór ten, z jednej strony zacieśnia relacje Turcji ze strukturami zachodnimi. Z drugiej, naraża na otwarty konflikt z Syrią oraz pogorszenie relacji z Iranem, które mogą mieć negatywne konsekwencje dla jej bezpieczeństwa i powiązań gospodarczych z Bliskim Wschodem. Uwzględniając złożoną sytuację na Bliskim Wschodzie, przywódcy Republiki Turcji za optymalne uznają: utrzymanie integralności terytorialnej Syrii; zapobieżenie wybuchowi konfliktu wyznaniowego, który może rozprzestrzenić się na obszar całego Bliskiego Wschodu oraz stopniową demokratyzację ogarniętego walkami państwa. Jednocześnie nie wykluczają oni bezpośredniego zaangażowania w konflikt w trzech przypadkach. Po pierwsze, przystąpienia do interwencji zbrojnej członków Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego. Po drugie, konieczności ochrony własnej ludności i terytorium. Po trzecie, eskalacji walk, bądź ich przeniesienia poza granice Syrii. ; The events of the Arab Spring in Syria have led to the re-evaluation of the regional policy of the Republic of Turkey, which has faced two options. One involves acting in compliance with the expectations of its Western allies, and promoting the principles of democracy in the Middle East by firmly reacting against any cases of human rights' violations, simultaneously showing the direction of the changes necessary in the region. Another refers to the principles included in the definition of the international policy of "Strategic Depth": avoiding problems with neighbors, which excludes all interference in the internal politics of other countries, and means the continuation of pragmatic co-operation with all political centers, including authoritarian regimes. In the face of the violent struggle between the opposition and Al-Assad supporters, a policy of the protection of democracy and human rights has been chosen. This decision, on the one hand, strengthens Turkey's relations with Western structures. On the other hand, it may lead to open conflict with a direct neighbor, Syria, which constitutes a serious threat to Turkey's security, and may result in negative consequences for its energy security and economic relations with its Middle East partners. The Republic of Turkey does not exclude direct engagement in a potential military intervention in three cases. Firstly, if Turkey's NATO allies decide to start military operations in Syria. Secondly, should it become necessary to protect its people and its territory. Thirdly, in the case of the conflict's escalation or its spread outside Syria's borders.
