Suchergebnisse

The development of the process of military-civilian integration (VGI) in the PRC, which in recent years has adopted the scale of a national strategy and aimed at creating an effective innovative system of science, technology and production in the country, combining military and civilian resources, in order to increase the capabilities of the military-industrial complex for the production of weapons and military equipment of a new generation for modernization of the PLA and at the same time — facilitating the transition of China's economic system to world-class high-tech production to ensure the country's international competitiveness in a new era. The goal of civil-military integration is to create a unified civil-military system and a unified strategic potential of China, in order to plan the development of the military and civil spheres on this basis with the rational use of resources. The estimates of Chinese analysts are given, who believe that the VGI should cover China's top-level national strategies (the "Going Out" strategy, the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, innovation-based development, strategies for achieving the status of a world power in critical areas: advanced high-tech manufacturing, space, the world ocean, artificial intelligence) and at the regional level (development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei zone, the Yangtze River Economic Belt, the West, the Northeast renewal strategy). The article analyzes the successes in the implementation of the VGI at the present stage, the problems on the way to its deepening and measures to resolve them. In the author's field of view is the efforts made in recent years in China to extend the strategy of the VGI to foreign economic activity and international scientific and technical cooperation.

Preventing the recurrence of civil war has become a critical problem for both scholarship and policy. Conventional wisdom urges the creation of capable, legitimate, and inclusive postwar states to reduce the risk of relapse into civil war, and international peacebuilders have often encouraged the formation of a new national army that would include members of the war's opposing sides. However, both the theoretical logics and the empirical record identifying military integration as a significant contributor to durable post–civil war peace are weak. An analysis of eleven cases finds little evidence that military integration played a substantial causal role in preventing the return to civil war. Military integration does not usually send a costly signal of the parties' commitment to peace, provide communal security, employ many possible spoilers, or act as a powerful symbol of a unified nation. It is therefore both unwise and unethical for the international community to press military integration on reluctant local forces.

"This book explores why countries undergoing transitions from war to peace decide to integrate armed groups into a statutory security framework, with a focus on the case of South Sudan. In the 1960s, only 10% of peace agreements included some element of political-military accommodation - namely, military integration. From Burundi to Bosnia to Zimbabwe, that number had increased to over 50% by the 2000s. However, relatively little is understood about this dimension of power-sharing often utilized during war-to-peace transitions. Through an examination of the case of South Sudan between 2005 and 2013, this book explores why countries undergoing transitions from war to peace decide to integrate armed groups into a statutory security framework. The book details how integration contributed to short-term stability in South Sudan, allowing the government to overcome wartime factionalism and consolidate political-military power prior to the referendum on self-determination in 2011. It also examines how the integration process in South Sudan was flawed by its open-ended nature and lack of coordination with efforts to right-size the military and transform the broader defense sector, and how this led the military to fragment during periods of heightened political competition. Furthermore, the book explains why integration ultimately failed in South Sudan, and identifies the wider lessons that could be applied to current or future war-to-peace transitions. This book will be of great interest to students of war and conflict studies, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, African security issues and International Relations in general, as well as to practitioners"--

The aim of the article is to study European integration and the expansion of the European union together with the Atlantic alliance during George W. Bush's second term (2004-2008), for which the historical method was used. Despite the tendency that most researchers in the field of modern history and political science tend to focus on current events, and according to this logic it would be more appropriate to analyze Trump's foreign policy, in order to better understand the contemporary tension between the EU and the United States, today it is imperative to take a look at some contemporary historical processes. It is concluded that, to which George W. Bush's rhetoric has much in common with Donald Trump, he also laid the groundwork for change in U.S. foreign policy during Barack Obama's presidential term (2008-2016). The one-sided approach promoted primarily during George W. Bush's first term went from a gradual transformation of coalition building and the full support of the Atlantic alliance allies for the operation in Afghanistan in 2001, to more controversial rhetoric about "rebel states."

In early 2012, Congolese army deserters formed the M23 rebel movement. This article analyses the insurgency and other armed group activity in the eastern DRC in the light of the politics of rebel-military integration. It argues that military integration processes have fuelled militarization in three main ways. First, by creating incentive structures promoting army desertion and insurgent violence; second, by fuelling inter- and intra-community conflicts; and third, by the further unmaking of an already unmade army. We argue that this is not merely the product of a 'lack of political will' on behalf of the DRC government, but must be understood in the light of the intricacies of Big Man politics and Kinshasa's weak grip over both the fragmented political-military landscape in the east and its own coercive arm. Demonstrating the link between military integration and militarization, the article concludes that these problems arise from the context and implementation of integration, rather than from the principle of military power sharing itself. It thus highlights the crucial agency of political-military entrepreneurs, as shaped by national-level policies, in the production of 'local violence'.