Suchergebnisse

Address before the Royal united service institution, London, Dec. 1, 1954.

The North Atlantic Treaty is unique among alliances in embodying a degree of peacetime military integration, strategic collaboration, and political cooperation that few wartime coalitions have achieved. This unprecedented degree of interdependence constitutes a great part of NATO's strength but also a great part of NATO's problems—especially those that spring from the dual task of combining the external security with the internal collaboration of its members. Certain military and political developments that were not foreseen when the alliance was created have seriously aggravated these problems. The prospect of several allies acquiring independent nuclear capabilities challenges the basic foundation of the alliance and calls for a reappraisal of its underlying assumptions.

In the evolution of post-war international organization no problem, it can be argued, has moved with greater persistence into the foreground than that which focuses on the effort to devise common policies in the North Atlantic Community. Pressures to this end are both internal and external to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the one hand, the close military integration achieved by members impels them towards closer political integration. On the other hand, it is increasingly evident that NATO faces a threat which presents itself not only militarily but also politically through institutions and action programs reflecting a single political will. The effort to concert NATO policies is a reflection of the desirability and, in the opinion of many, the necessity of developing greater unity within the North Atlantic Community.

The National Security Council, created by the National Security Act of 1947, is the instrument through which the President obtains the collective advice of the appropriate officials of the executive branch concerning the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. An outline of the genesis of this new governmental agency will indicate in part its present rôle.Even before World War II, a few far-sighted men were seeking for a means of correlating our foreign policy with our military and economic capabilities. During the war, as military operations began to have an increasing political and economic effect, the pressure for such a correlation increased. It became apparent that the conduct of the war involved more than a purely military campaign to defeat the enemy's armed forces. Questions arose of war aims, of occupational policies, of relations with governments-in-exile and former enemy states, of the postwar international situation with its implications for our security, and of complicated international machinery.

The articles of the United Nations Charter providing for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee and looking forward to provision for armed forces, assistance and facilities by Members introduced for many states new and perplexing problems in their relations to international organization. While it is true that military considerations are normally one of the factors influencing the formulation of the foreign policy of every state, never before has there existed one central international organization to which it was expected that all major political problems would be submitted, regardless of origin and regardless of the geographical area concerned. Coordination of military policy with political representation under these circumstances becomes, therefore, not a matter of the occasional conference at a given moment of international tension, but, instead, requires a day-to-day ìntegration in order to achieve both consistency and effectiveness.

Western European Union (WEU) is unique in the family of European organizations. Its membership comprises Great Britain in addition to the inner circle of the six nations of Little Europe. As such it was hailed as a big step forward from the continental limitations of European integration. Its special task, besides residuary powers in the cultural, social, and economic field, has been defense and the control of armaments. Western European Union was erected on the ruins of the European Defense Community (EDC) by the Paris Agreements of October 1954. Its legal basis was the Brussels Treaty Organization of 1948, a defensive alliance against future German aggression which over the years had left its military functions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and had concentrated on its cultural and social role.

"The trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history of the jurisprudence of the world and it is of supreme importance to millions of people all over the globe."
Thus spoke the President of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Lord Justice Lawrence, upon the occasion of the institution of the so-called Trial against the Major War Criminals on November 20, 1945. If his statement is correct, then the German people undoubtedly rank in first place among these millions. This also was the opinion of the chief prosecutor which recurred several times in his statements. Thus the French representative, Mr. François de Menthon, exclaimed:This work of justice is equally indispensable for the future of the German people…The initial condemnation of Nazi Germany by your High Tribunal will be a first lesson for these people and will constitute the best starting point … of re-education which must be its great concern during the coming years…Your judgment … can serve as a foundation for the moral uplift of the German people, first stage in its integration into the community of free countries. …

The role of the executive (Exec) in Canada has been shaped by a number of influences including that of British tradition, the remnant of colonial dependence on GB, the continental conditions under which the country developed, Canada's proximity to the US, problems associated with the WWII, changing military, econ & technological conditions, & contemporary group pressures. These forces have created an Exec in which Parliament is supreme, combining legislative & Exec powers; an Exec concerned with integration, balance & planning; a tendency toward long periods of one-party dominance; & a strained relationship between the Exec & legislative branches. A number of changes in the machinery of the Exec have been taking place & largely concern attempts to solve the problems which result from the accumulation of policy decisions made at the top. In the main, efforts have been directed to relieving the cabinet & its members of routine concerns. It is useful to visualize the cabinet as located at the center of a vortex of decision-making. The process of decision-making can be characterized as passing through 4 stages: gestation, formulation, confirmation & implementation. The chief participants are Parliament, pol'al parties, pressure groups, the permanent civil service & the pol'al Exec. All participate in gestation of policy; the Exec & the civil service are central in the formulation & implementation stages; & Parliament presides over confirmation. B. J. Keeley.

Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock .'Mayor Mann privately expressed concern to me over the danger that the disorder might be too great to be controlled by his small police force, and he asked for my assistance" force in an effort to prevent violence. He knew it would be difficult and recognized the gravity of the situation, but he felt sure of his men and he would certainly not show any weakness himself. I knew that he was planning to resign and that he would be happier if he were able to make an honorable exit before the crisis arose, but he did not propose to fade into retirement with even the faintest stain on his record. There were equivalent promises from his assistant chief, Eugene Smith, another competent peace officer who has since succeeded Mr. Potts. On Friday, Federal Judge Davies ordered the Governor to end his opposition to judicial authority and directed him to stop interfering with integration at Little Rock Central High School. The following is a summary of the court decision: The Court: It is very clear to this court from the evidence and the testimony adduced upon the hearing today that the plan of integration adopted by the Little Rock school board and approved by this court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has been thwarted by the Governor of Arkansas by the use of National Guard troops. It is equally demonstrable from the testimony here today that there would have been no violence in carrying out the plan of integration, and that there has been no violence. The petition of the United States of America as amicus curiae [friend of the court] for a preliminary injunction against Governor Faubus, General Clinger and Colonel Johnson and all others named in the petition is granted and such injunction shall issue without delay enjoining those respondents from obstructing or preventing by use of the National Guard or otherwise the attendance of Negro students at Little Rock High School under the plan of integration approved by this court and from otherwise obstructing or interfering with orders of this court in connection with the plan of integration. Governor Faubus's attorneys walked out of the courtroom in the middle of the hearing rather than stay to cross-examine witnesses and hear the verdict, thus challenging the court's authority. Three hours after the decision, Governor Faubus went on television to announce his withdrawal of the Guard, in compliance with the order, but he had earlier indicated he would appeal the decision of Judge Davies on the ground that the district court did not have jurisdiction against him. He said that the right of Negro children to attend white schools had been upheld by the Supreme Court but that he hoped "by their own volition the Negroes would refrain from seizing upon that right until such time as there is assurance that it can be accomplished in a peaceful manner." He closed with an appeal for "reason and clear thinking and good order." Eisenhower's Reaction In Washington, President Eisenhower called the withdrawal of the Guard "a necessary step in the right direction." He went on to say that he was confident that the citizens of Little Rock would demonstrate that in their city proper orders of a United States court would be executed promptly and without disorder. My wife and I boarded the train for Little Rock early Saturday morning in a driving rain which continued all day. It fitted my mood. Late in the afternoon I was met at a station two hours out of Little Rock by my friend, Clyde Lowry, who drove me the remaining distance in his car so he could counsel with me on the gravity of the situation. My wife continued on the train. Clyde was interested in the political phases of the conflict. He felt that my efforts toward mediation had been applauded but that, since they had apparently failed, I should not jeopardize my political future. It was not the counsel of timidity or defeatism but the product of his deep concern for my political influence and position. Neither of us could see any avenues of further service opening for me. As I look back on it now, and I am sure he would share this feeling, I wonder why we thought that there was nothing left to do. Back in the familiar surroundings of the Sam Peck Hotel, I could only hope that, as the collision between State and federal authorities approached, violence would be avoided and no undue strain placed upon existing relationships. I saw this conflict in the framework of a seething South and a disquieted nation. There were vast repercussions abroad, and I was eager for our national prestige not to be damaged. World peril was too great to permit indifference to the foreign-policy aspects of the struggle. I had endeavored in my talks with the Governor to suggest a condition that would not make federal military policing inevitable. An unexpected call from Mayor Mann came early Sunday morning. The mayor was once again responsible for preserving order in the city, and members of the Little Rock police force took over the guard duty as the National Guardsmen left the school. In a public statement, Mr. Mann had urged Little Rock residents to accept integration peacefully and warned that local law-enforcement officers would be on hand to deal with persons who did not co-operate. Privately, he now expressed concern to me over the danger that the disorder might be too great to be controlled by his small police force, and he asked for my assistance. First Mention of U. S. Troops When I had decided to return to Little Rock I told the press that I now considered my responsibilities heavier than ever, since they were related to the preservation of the peace, and I now assured the mayor of my support. The White House informed me that they wanted to keep the Federal Government from coming into the picture and hoped that local forces could do the job. The school board met in emergency sessions over the week end but no final decisions were made until Sunday concerning entry of the Negro students on Monday, September 23. It was suggested that the city might need federal financial help, at least, in order to pay for temporary police that might be necessary. Police Chief Potts said again he would do his duty, that he would "de-fend" all students, white or black, but he balked at pledging an "escort." At this time Sherman Adams indicated that, if requested by appropriate authority, the Administration might make troops available at the State border in the event that the situation got out of hand. Meanwhile, Governor Faubus flew to Georgia to attend the Southern Governors' Conference and left Lieutenant Governor Nathan Gordon as the State's acting chief executive. When asked in Atlanta if he thought the Little Rock U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959 129

Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock . . ."In August the President had said . . . that he could not conceive of a situation in which he would send federal troops into a State to enforce integration orders" police could handle the situation, the Governor replied: "I wouldn't want to say. I don't want to say anything which might tend to be construed to be inflammatory." When asked if he believed there would be violence at the school, however, he answered, "I think so." Henry Woods, law partner of former Governor Sid McMath, called me on Sunday to say that the mayor wanted my advice in regard to his effort to maintain order at Central High the next morning-assuming that the Negro students would try to enroll. Would I please come back out to Woods's home for a conference? I was not sure I should go. It might draw me into the orbit of political opposition to Governor Faubus, and I was trying hard to escape involvement in the feud which had developed between McMath and the Governor. McMath and the mayor were apparently collaborating in plans that at least appeared to the public to have political overtones. I asked Virgil Blossom what to do. "You should see the mayor," he said, and he agreed to go with me. His advice was based on the realization that, with the National Guard withdrawn, if violence threatened the next day, any hope of preserving peace would depend upon local police and such other help as the mayor could muster. Still we were eager not to be publicly identified with political interests, so we made no public announcement of our destination when we left the hotel. "Plans for Protecting Negroes" When we entered the living room of the Woods home, we found, in addition to Woods and the mayor, Governor McMath, Ed Dunaway, McMath's close friend and Winthrop Rockefeller's attorney, and Harry Ashmore. The purpose of their conferring, it developed, was to make plans for protecting the Negro students should they appear at the school. No one seemed to know what their intentions were. I was determined not to make any contacts with the NAACP officials, either national or local. I disagreed with their tactics and, in the Little Rock situation, I could not even discuss the question with them without appearing to approve projection of the national organization into Little Rock's difficulties. I knew only one NAACP official, and I had assumed that he had had nothing to do with NAACP's pressures on the school board. This official was their lobbyist, Clarence Mitchell, whose attitudes and actions had always appeared, in the few contacts I had had with him, to be honorable. One can oppose, as I do, the national organization's strategy and still believe strongly in their right to function as an agent of their people's interests, just as I believe that White Citizens Councils should not be prevented by court procedures or otherwise from holding meetings or propagating their views. The risks of our governmental system include freedom for organizations to function, even when their methods and objectives are distasteful. These organizations are creatures of freedom. In the meeting at the Woods residence I do not recall that Governor Faubus was mentioned. It was assumed that the obligation for policing rested on Mayor Mann. I was asked about the White House or Justice Department plans for supplementing local police facilities, but I could bring very little light to bear on that question. I knew, of course, as many others did that the Department of Justice had not approved use of deputy marshals. We discussed the propriety of using the Marine Corps Reserve component in Little Rock-most of whose members were local veterans and enrollees. Another possibility discussed was a request to be made of Lieutenant Governor Gordon to appeal for federal military assistance in suppressing a riot if real trouble should develop. Also one of the group mentioned that a small assignment of the Air Force Military Police, based 12 miles away, might be sufficient if they were legally available. In August the President had said in a news conference in Washington that he could not conceive of a situation in which he would send federal troops into a State to enforce integration orders. For this reason, perhaps little thought had been given by anyone to the use of outside federal troops to supplement local forces. Troops at Camp Chaffee, Ark., may have been mentioned in this conference, but they were not thought of as importations, and anyway a request of the State government, temporarily under Lieutenant Governor Gordon's direction, for help was regarded as a condition to federal military assistance. There were many precedents for such help. I am sure that no one in the group at that moment anticipated the dramatic and frightening appearance of paratroopers at Central High School within 60 hours. To be sure, Harry Ashmore had persisted in the opinion that the Federal Administration should consider no other military action than federalizing the National Guard and instructing them to comply with court orders. With the withdrawal at Christmastime of the last paratroopers, that is exactly what we had in Little Rock. To all appearances, this mayor's conference on Sunday was for the sole purpose of laying plans to prevent violence. The bitterest opponent of Mayor Mann could have found nothing to condemn in his expressed purposes, unless one wanted violence for the accomplishment of a desired end. No one in the group knew what Daisy Bates of the local NAACP proposed to do, and no one volunteered to advise her. The suggestion was made that Thurgood Marshall, representing the national NAACP, might still be in Little Rock and if contacted might be induced to counsel the nine to stay away for a few days. If the decision had been left with the mayor's group that day, I believe they would have said, "Let them start tomorrow-a delay will give time to the extremists to build up for another demonstration and we will really have trouble." I had no strong opinion-the situation was so ominous that I merely wished the counsel of numbers. I agreed to use my Washington contacts to locate Thurgood Marshall in case it was decided that someone should seek his aid in averting disaster. This required more than one call, but I finally got his phone number in Richmond, Va. I did not call him and to my knowledge no others of the group did. The mayor's deportment that Sunday was above criticism. Here was the greatest crisis he had ever faced, and as a "lame duck" he lacked the confidence of the people. I felt sorry for him. A Request for U. S. Deputies In the late afternoon of that Sunday, Virgil Blossom met me in the Sam Peck lobby with this question: "Should I talk with Judge Davies about the necessity of having 130 U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959

The book, ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS A FUNCTION OF PERSONALITY by Bjorn Christiansen, which is translated from the Norwegian & reviewed, is distinctive in its exclusively psychol'al approach to understanding pol'al opinions. This contrasts with the usual socio-psychol'al approach of relating att's to soc characteristics of A's after which hyp's as to the underlying psychol'al factors are developed. Strictly psychol'al analyses are necessary to build a body of knowledge of variables operating in the same functional systems. In the theoretical section of the book res approaches which relate diff classes of psychol'al variables to att's toward foreign affairs (FA), (dependent variable) are examined while the results of empirical studies are reported in another section. A's were applicants to & students of military & naval academies in Norway. Attitudinal data were obtained by use of p & p items of hypothetical international situations & relationships among variables were examined by r techniques. From the empirical data support is obtained for several hyp's; (a) a low positive (statistically signif) relationship found between att's toward FA & generalized personality characteristics of inwardly & outwardly directed aggression as expressed in everyday interpersonal events; & a negative relationship existed between 'destructive tendencies in international att's' & the taking of responsibility for solving daily conflicts; (b) latent (unconscious) att's, particularly of oral aggression, influence FA att's through the mechanism of displacement; & (c) nationalistic att's of patriotism are positively related to aggressive international att's. However, international affairs att's were not found to be related to diff measures of insecurity & to knowledge of international affairs. The crudity of scoring procedures, esp of the Blacky Test, & inadequacies of r techniques leave considerable doubt as to the validity of the conclusions & to the specific org of pol'al opinions in personality. Though the hyp's tested derive from diff intellectual traditions they may not be as distinctly diff as first appears (the latency hypothesis can be viewed as a generalization from unconscious motives & perceptions). Moreover, the generalization hypothesis deals with low-level empirical relationships among cognitive structures while the latency hyp involves psychodynamic factors largely antecedent to international att's. The study thus would have benefited from a more intensive analysis of the hyp's & an attempt at greater theoretical integration. C. M. Coughenour.