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Over the past two decades, the relationship between China's civilian and military industrial sectors has been undergoing a major realignment brought on by the transformation of the country's economic and technological landscape. Whereas the defense sector had been the undisputed leader of Chinese industrial technology for most of the PRC's history, the predominantly non-state civilian economy has begun to catch up with and even surpass comparable military capabilities in many key areas since the 1990s. The Chinese leadership recognizes the enormous potential of the civilian sector for China's military modernization program, especially in light of the often disappointing results of various technology initiatives spearheaded by the state sector, despite massive investments. Serious efforts are now under way to facilitate the entry of non-state sector firms into the military market. However, many obstacles remain, of which the entrenched interests of the defense industry stands out.

Civil wars are far less likely to end in peace agreements than are international wars, and more than a third of civil wars restart within a few years. This may be due to the time-inconsistency of peace settlements in civil wars: once the rebels demobilize, they lose bargaining power and the government can renege on its promises. This makes rebels reluctant to stop fighting and quick to remobilize for a fight. A self-enforcing agreement could prevent this, but it is difficult to create such agreements. Recent efforts to structure self-enforcing agreements after civil wars have involved the integration of former rebels in a new national army. This solution should make unilateral defection from peace settlements more costly. This is an increasingly popular mechanism used in peace settlements, but it is not yet well understood. We do not know if it works or under what conditions it is likely to be used. This article provides the first systematic study of rebel—military integration agreements and considers if and how such agreements can help build peace. It also analyzes the conditions under which such agreements will be reached and implemented. The analysis suggests that rebel—military integration has not been an effective peacebuilding mechanism, but this is often due to poor implementation of the agreements.

Book Review: Reviewed Book: Germuska, P.: Unified Military Industries of the Soviet Bloc. Hungary and the Division of Labour in Military Production. Lanham, MD & London: Lexington Books, 2015. ; Non peer reviewed

The post 9/11 environment has been characterized by domestic policy actors being incorporated into a globalizing defense industrial sector through the concept of civil-military integration. From administration to administration, the push for increased civil-military integration has spread beyond its original boundaries and has reached the frontlines of the American military. This begs the question, can the market-driven logic of the commercial sector be integrated into the objectives and values of the noncivilian, military sector? More precisely, is civil-military integration the appropriate solution to the post 9/11 strategic shift? The purpose of this study is not to address the detailed merits or limitations of the increased reliance on private contractors. Rather, this study's primary focus is to examine the policies that set into motion and continue to promote the cornerstone of civil-military integration: strategic outsourcing. This study argues that in today's threat environment, the extent of civil-military integration poses unique challenges for U.S. strategic policy. With contactors on the battlefield, basic doctrinal issues emerge. The most basic of these is the notion that in a war zone military members are asked to risk their lives for their country. But, while people are willing to risk their lives for their country, they may not be willing to risk their lives for their company.

Die Arbeit beinhaltet im Kern einen Maßnahmenkatalog für eine umfassende Militärreform der irakischen Streitkräfte sowie Empfehlungen zur Verbesserung der militärischen Integration.

This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received limited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto open-door nature of South Sudan's integration process created incentives for armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan's security sector. Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.