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As the international community grapples with restoring democratic governance in Niger after the July 26 coup, many factors point to a possible military action there in the future. But any intervention must first address the burden of what it might mean for stability in the Sahel region.

Twenty-one years ago, the U.S. and its allies invaded Iraq in the erroneous belief that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction and was allied with al-Qaida, the terror group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. created an occupation authority, but failed to restore order and helped spawn the insurgency that bedeviled it by dismissing the entire Iraqi military and the most experienced civil servants. Coalition troops fought a losing battle, regained their footing with the 2007 troop surge, and finally departed in 2011. U.S. troops returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State and they remain there to this day, though ISIS was largely eliminated by 2019.In January 2020, Iraq's parliament voted on a nonbinding measure to remove the U.S. troops from Iraq, but the Americans remain at the request of the Iraqi government. However, in response to the parliament's 2020 vote, Iraq and the International Coalition changed the mission of the troops from a combat mission to one of advisory and training.Iraq's prime minister, Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani, will meet U.S. President Joe Biden on April 15, primarily to discuss the U.S. troop presence. Though the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission is reviewing the troop presence issue, will the U.S. side stall fearing it may have to agree to a smaller presence and constrained operations? Possibly, so Sudani may want a public commitment from Biden to force the march to a constructive, timely decision.Aside from the troops issue, Sudani wants to strengthen Baghdad's ties with Washington, which he considers Iraq's top bilateral relationship, and to add an economic dimension to Iraq's ties with America.When Americans think of Iraq in economic terms it's all about the oil, but in November 2023 ExxonMobil, America's biggest oil company, exited Iraq with nothing to show for a decade-long effort. The departure will lower the expectation of other U.S. companies, but Sudani wants to revitalize economic ties, and he will be accompanied by many of the country's top businessmen.U.S.-Iraq trade has room for growth. In 2022, the U.S. exported $897 million in goods, the top product being automobiles. Iraq, in turn, exported $10.3 billion in goods, most of it crude oil.A key economic objective of Iraq is the $17 billion Development Road, an overland road and rail link from the Persian Gulf to Europe via Turkey, that will host free-trade zones along its length.Biden and Sudani should consider the shape of the future U.S.-Iraq relationship, which has to now been governed by military considerations, and has become the best example of The Meddler's Trap, "a situation of self-entanglement, whereby a leader inadvertently creates a problem through military intervention, feels they can solve it, and values solving the new problem more because of the initial intervention. …A military intervention causes a feeling of ownership of the foreign territory, triggering the endowment effect." Iraq is the only real democracy in the Arab world, and many young Iraqis want a separation of religion and state, something that should resonate with Americans and, Iraqis hope, cause the U.S. to deal with Iraq as Iraq, not a platform for operations against Syria and Iran, or to support Washington's Kurdish clients.Washington damaged itself in Iraq by killing Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January 2020. Baghdad had moved the PMF, once a militia, into the government in 2016 (no doubt with American encouragement), so the killing of Muhandis, then a government official, increased popular support the PMF.What are some clouds on the horizon for the U.S. and Iraq?Corruption. Pervasive corruption in Iraq has slowed economic development and subjected Iraqi citizens to ineffective governance. The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International ranked Iraq 154 of 180, a slight improvement from 2022 when it ranked 157 of 180.Iraq was previously described by TI as: "Among the worst countries on corruption and governance indicators, with corruption risks exacerbated by lack of experience in the public administration, weak capacity to absorb the influx of aid money, sectarian issues and lack of political will for anti-corruption efforts."Sudani has not ignored corruption, calling it one of the country's greatest challenges and "no less serious than the threat of terrorism."Elizabeth Tsurkov. Tsurkov is a Russian-Israeli academic who was kidnapped in 2023 by Kata'ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-influenced Iraqi militia. Tsurkov, a doctoral student at Princeton University in the U.S., entered Iraq with her Russian passport and did not disclose that she was an Israeli citizen and Israeli Defense Forces veteran. (A 2022 Iraqi law criminalized any relations with Israel.)Tsurkov's family wants the Biden administration to designate Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism for failing to secure her release. Sudani's office announced an investigation into the matter and the issue may arise when Sudani meets Biden, though the best outcome for Iraq and the U.S. is a Russia-brokered deal between Israel and Iran.If Biden designates Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism that will irreparably damage the relationship and open the door for China.China. The U.S. is Iraq's top relationship, but not its only relationship. China will respond to the ostracism of Baghdad by extending invitations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, the latter of which can fund infrastructure projects through the New Development Bank. PetroChina replaced ExxonMobil in West Qurna 1, one of Iraq's biggest oil fields, and is ideally positioned for further expansion. And Iraq was the "leading beneficiary" of China's Belt and Road Initiative investment in 2021.Sudani has said Iraq should not be a cockpit of conflict for the U.S, and Iran, but when Iran is concerned it, in Washington, is always 1979. Though Sudani has many challenges to face, Biden has more: he must reorient his government away from its colonial mentality in West Asia, recognize that Baghdad must reach a modus vivendi with Tehran that may not be to Washington's pleasure, and not smooth the way for Beijing's greater penetration of West Asia.

The podcast addresses recent GOP advocacy of military intervention to curb cross-border drug trafficking.

Nigerian President Bola Tinubu recently sought the Nigerian national legislature's backing for a possible military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to turn back a coup that toppled the government of Niger. An ECOWAS intervention would have a better chance of succeeding if other nations joined the effort.

Resistance to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm is often attributed to its association with military intervention and regime change. Political friction and contestation showcased at the recent United Nations General Assembly annual R2P debate point to broader problems for atrocity prevention at the UN.

When Napoleon Bonaparte staged a coup d'état to oust the civilian government of the Directorate in France, he justified his actions as necessary to save the spirit of the Revolution. The army, in Napoleon's view, had a solemn obligation to defend the nation against threats both at home and abroad.The notion that a military, as guardians of a national spirit, has the right to seize the authority of the state became known as Bonapartism. This seemingly persistent belief in certain militaries in Africa emphasizes the need for comprehensive reform.Military regimes can perceive themselves to be better at governance than civilians. The simplicity of efficiently carrying out orders stands in stark contrast to the seemingly endless bureaucracy impeded by incompetence and corruption. In crises where politics leads to impasses in service delivery, the military's projection as being "above politics" can help it seize and keep power in fragile states.Despite the anti-French rhetoric of coup leaders in Africa, many of them nonetheless invoke this spirit of Bonapartism in acting to "save" the state. As the French Revolution began to eat itself under the Reign of Terror, for Napoleon the only means to preserve the Revolution was for its defenders to remove the civilian leadership by force.This was no singular event. Several times in the 19th and 20th centuries, the French army forced dramatic changes in the state whenever the national spirit had been challenged. Bonapartism furthermore formed a significant part of military formation in France's colonies, particularly in Africa.The problem with Bonapartism is that it has greatly undermined attempts to professionalize security forces. When we speak of professional soldiers outside of a (former) colonial setting, we mean a trained soldier who readily accepts and defends civilian authority. Such a situation is so taken for granted today that we do not always appreciate how necessary this is for a thriving democracy.If a military perceives itself to be better, more competent, or in some way less fallible than the civilian government, then a risk of Bonapartism can persist regardless of how well trained they might be. U.S. training of officers, such as those in Niger, may unintentionally lead to a growing confidence in the military about their competence and increase the risk of a takeover.The officers leading the coups in Niger and Gabon cite persistent civilian misrule, aided in no small part by continued French dominance in domestic political and economic policies in both countries, as the primary justification for their intervention. They present themselves as acting in the best interests of the nations they are nominally intended to protect. Seizing power away from incompetent civilians is merely a continuation of their duty.Scenes of crowds celebrating the removal of decades-long dictatorships do indicate at least a modicum of legitimacy for the military's actions in Gabon. Many coup leaders across Africa have justified their actions on the demonstrable misrule by civilian governments. In almost every scenario, however, the coup leaders merely became the new dictators. These actions further emulate Napoleon's hold on power, although few did so as blatantly as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, who declared himself Emperor 4 December 1977.Bonapartism is not solely a francophone problem and can exist in any state with weak democratic institutions. In the cases of Zimbabwe and Egypt, despite the civilian façade, the spirit of Bonapartism still lingers. For both states, the military has long been the true source of the state's authority.Zimbabwe's elections are a mere formality, a political tradition rather than any substantive effort to change the civilian authority. Aside from the Egyptian military's brief foray into relinquishing power to the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, the civilian leadership serves at the pleasure of the military, not the electorate. When the military felt that Egypt was at risk under the leadership of the Brotherhood, they acted to save the state by retaking authority, a quintessential Bonapartist action.The coup in Sudan that ousted Omar al-Bashir was a remarkably similar instance of a military acting to change the civilian leadership during a crisis. However, the current infighting among senior officers points to an entirely different matter. It's actually a misnomer to refer to states like Sudan as "weak." Rather, the problem lies in the fact that the state is too powerful in relation to other aspects of the society, particularly the economy.Such states are the 'only game in town' in terms of attaining mobility, income, and basic security. Fights over who controls the state become so violent because of a lack of options. As long as other sectors remain underdeveloped, the risks of coups will persist. In such cases, it may well be counter-productive to invest too much in the militaries, and making control of the military all the more tempting.There are steps the African Union and other international bodies can take to militate against Bonapartism. The first concerns the AU's Lomé Declaration of 2000, which established a norm against unconstitutional regime changes by stating that any extra constitutional changes in a government is grounds for immediate suspension. In practice, this commitment has been far from rock solid, with the AU making numerous exceptions over the years.Moreover, tougher penalties could be applied, especially in the form of mandating Security Sector Reform (SSR) as necessary processes to return to the AU.SSR entails a comprehensive overhaul of a state's security sector. The security sector includes not only the military but also the police, judiciary, and any intelligence services. Importantly, SSR requires more than mere training, as the Niger and Burkina Faso cases demonstrate. Therein lies the rub of military governance and strengthening democracies: the only body with the authority to restructure the military is the military itself.Save for the odd counter-example, democratic promises by army officers have rarely been realized. Even in instances where elections have been held, the military nonetheless retains inordinate influence over the civilian leadership, and the threat of future coups persists.SSR is neither cheap nor easy to adequately implement. One of the most important factors is rewriting a constitution with sufficient judicial strength to ensure that an elected legislative body has the ultimate authority over all security forces. Doing so must result in the end of Bonapartism for the military and the conclusion that they are not the sole nor ultimate defenders of the nation.The rush to hold elections after a coup is often seen as an act of good faith by coup-leaders to return a country to democracy. However, to be a democracy does not only mean having elections, as democracy contains a set of values, including civilian oversight and regulation of all coercive forces in a state.Every soldier needs to be educated on the importance of civilian leadership as they are far more likely to know what is in the best interests of the civilian population than a general. Military training by foreign experts without complementary democracy training is, as Niger bears out, counter-productive to the overall mission objectives of combating Islamist insurgencies. US foreign military training reportedly includes instruction on safeguarding democracy and human rights.While US policy is to immediately halt all military aid following a coup, the policy has not always been strictly enforced, more rigorous enforcement may be more effective in the long term. These recent coups raise the difficult question on the efficacy of democracy and human rights training for militaries who are evidently not receptive to the message.Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte attempted a similar overthrow of a civilian government as his more illustrious uncle in 1851. This more foolhardy power grab led Karl Marx to quip that "history repeats itself, the first as tragedy, the second as farce." Unless the right lessons are learned, the Bonapartism lurking in African militaries will continue the tragedy of military rule.

The New York Times headline said it all: "Middle East War Adds to Surge in International Arms Sales." The conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and beyond may be causing immense and unconscionable human suffering, but they are also boosting the bottom lines of the world's arms manufacturers. There was a time when such weapons sales at least sparked talk of "the merchants of death" or of "war profiteers." Now, however, is distinctly not that time, given the treatment of the industry by the mainstream media and the Washington establishment, as well as the nature of current conflicts. Mind you, the American arms industry already dominates the international market in a staggering fashion, controlling 45% of all such sales globally, a gap only likely to grow more extreme in the rush to further arm allies in Europe and the Middle East in the context of the ongoing wars in those regions.In his nationally televised address about the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine wars, President Biden described the American arms industry in remarkably glowing terms, noting that, "just as in World War II, today patriotic American workers are building the arsenal of democracy and serving the cause of freedom." From a political and messaging perspective, the president cleverly focused on the workers involved in producing such weaponry rather than the giant corporations that profit from arming Israel, Ukraine, and other nations at war. But profit they do and, even more strikingly, much of the revenues that flow to those firms is pocketed as staggering executive salaries and stock buybacks that only boost shareholder earnings further.President Biden also used that speech as an opportunity to tout the benefits of military aid and weapons sales to the U.S. economy:"We send Ukraine equipment sitting in our stockpiles. And when we use the money allocated by Congress, we use it to replenish our own stores, our own stockpiles, with new equipment. Equipment that defends America and is made in America. Patriot missiles for air defense batteries, made in Arizona. Artillery shells manufactured in 12 states across the country, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas. And so much more."In short, the military-industrial complex is riding high, with revenues pouring in and accolades emanating from the top political levels in Washington. But is it, in fact, an arsenal of democracy? Or is it an amoral enterprise, willing to sell to any nation, whether a democracy, an autocracy, or anything in between?Arming Current ConflictsThe U.S. should certainly provide Ukraine with what it needs to defend itself from Russia's invasion. Sending arms alone, however, without an accompanying diplomatic strategy is a recipe for an endless, grinding war (and endless profits for those arms makers) that could always escalate into a far more direct and devastating conflict between the U.S., NATO, and Russia. Nevertheless, given the current urgent need to keep supplying Ukraine, the sources of the relevant weapons systems are bound to be corporate giants like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. No surprise there, but keep in mind that they're not doing any of this out of charity.Raytheon CEO Gregory Hayes acknowledged as much, however modestly, in an interview with the Harvard Business Review early in the Ukraine War:"[W]e don't apologize for making these systems, making these weapons… the fact is eventually we will see some benefit in the business over time. Everything that's being shipped into Ukraine today, of course, is coming out of stockpiles, either at DoD [the Department of Defense] or from our NATO allies, and that's all great news. Eventually we'll have to replenish it and we will see a benefit to the business over the next coming years."Hayes made a similar point recently in response to a question from a researcher at Morgan Stanley on a call with Wall Street analysts. The researcher noted that President Biden's proposed multi-billion-dollar package of military aid for Israel and Ukraine "seems to fit quite nicely with Raytheon's defense portfolio." Hayes responded that "across the entire Raytheon portfolio you're going to see a benefit of this restocking on top of what we think will be an increase in the DoD topline as we continue to replenish these stocks." Supplying Ukraine alone, he suggested, would yield billions in revenues over the coming few years with profit margins of 10% to 12%.Beyond such direct profits, there's a larger issue here: the way this country's arms lobby is using the war to argue for a variety of favorable actions that go well beyond anything needed to support Ukraine. Those include less restrictive, multi-year contracts; reductions in protections against price gouging; faster approval of foreign sales; and the construction of new weapons plants. And keep in mind that all of this is happening as a soaring Pentagon budget threatens to hit an astonishing $1 trillion within the next few years.As for arming Israel, including $14 billion in emergency military aid recently proposed by President Biden, the horrific attacks perpetrated by Hamas simply don't justify the all-out war President Benjamin Netanyahu's government has launched against more than two million inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, with so many thousands of lives already lost and untold additional casualties to come. That devastating approach to Gaza in no way fits the category of defending democracy, which means that weapons companies profiting from it will be complicit in the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe.Repression Enabled, Democracy DeniedOver the years, far from being a reliable arsenal of democracy, American arms manufacturers have often helped undermine democracy globally, while enabling ever greater repression and conflict — a fact largely ignored in recent mainstream coverage of the industry. For example, in a 2022 report for the Quincy Institute, I noted that, of the 46 then-active conflicts globally, 34 involved one or more parties armed by the United States. In some cases, American arms supplies were modest, but in many other conflicts such weaponry was central to the military capabilities of one or more of the warring parties.Nor do such weapons sales promote democracy over autocracy, a watchword of the Biden administration's approach to foreign policy. In 2021, the most recent year for which full statistics are available, the U.S. armed 31 nations that Freedom House, a non-profit that tracks global trends in democracy, political freedom, and human rights, designated as "not free."The most egregious recent example in which the American arms industry is distinctly culpable when it comes to staggering numbers of civilian deaths would be the Saudi Arabian/United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led coalition's intervention in Yemen, which began in March 2015 and has yet to truly end. Although the active military part of the conflict is now in relative abeyance, a partial blockade of that country continues to cause needless suffering for millions of Yemenis. Between bombing, fighting on the ground, and the impact of that blockade, there have been nearly 400,000 casualties. Saudi air strikes, using American-produced planes and weaponry, caused the bulk of civilian deaths from direct military action.Congress did make unprecedented efforts to block specific arms sales to Saudi Arabia and rein in the American role in the conflict via a War Powers Resolution, only to see legislation vetoed by President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, bombs provided by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin were routinely used to target civilians, destroying residential neighborhoods, factories, hospitals, a wedding, and even a school bus.When questioned about whether they feel any responsibility for how their weapons have been used, arms companies generally pose as passive bystanders, arguing that all they're doing is following policies made in Washington. At the height of the Yemen war, Amnesty International asked firms that were supplying military equipment and services to the Saudi/UAE coalition whether they were ensuring that their weaponry wouldn't be used for egregious human rights abuses. Lockheed Martin typically offered a robotic response, asserting that "defense exports are regulated by the U.S. government and approved by both the Executive Branch and Congress to ensure that they support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives." Raytheon simply stated that its sales "of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia have been and remain in compliance with U.S. law."How the Arms Industry Shapes PolicyOf course, weapons firms are not merely subject to U.S. laws, but actively seek to shape them, including exerting considerable effort to block legislative efforts to limit arms sales. Raytheon typically put major behind-the-scenes effort into keeping a significant sale of precision-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia on track. In May 2018, then-CEO Thomas Kennedy even personally visited the office of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Robert Menendez (D-NJ) to (unsuccessfully) press him to drop a hold on that deal. That firm also cultivated close ties with the Trump administration, including presidential trade adviser Peter Navarro, to ensure its support for continuing sales to the Saudi regime even after the murder of prominent Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi.The list of major human rights abusers that receive U.S.-supplied weaponry is long and includes (but isn't faintly limited to) Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Such sales can have devastating human consequences. They also support regimes that all too often destabilize their regions and risk embroiling the United States directly in conflicts.U.S.-supplied arms also far too regularly fall into the hands of Washington's adversaries. As an example consider the way the UAE transferred small arms and armored vehicles produced by American weapons makers to extremist militias in Yemen, with no apparent consequences, even though such acts clearly violated American arms export laws. Sometimes, recipients of such weaponry even end up fighting each other, as when Turkey used U.S.-supplied F-16s in 2019 to bomb U.S.-backed Syrian forces involved in the fight against Islamic State terrorists.Such examples underscore the need to scrutinize U.S. arms exports far more carefully. Instead, the arms industry has promoted an increasingly "streamlined" process of approval of such weapons sales, campaigning for numerous measures that would make it even easier to arm foreign regimes regardless of their human-rights records or support for the interests Washington theoretically promotes. These have included an "Export Control Reform Initiative" heavily promoted by the industry during the Obama and Trump administrations that ended up ensuring a further relaxation of scrutiny over firearms exports. It has, in fact, eased the way for sales that, in the future, could put U.S.-produced weaponry in the hands of tyrants, terrorists, and criminal organizations.Now, the industry is promoting efforts to get weapons out the door ever more quickly through "reforms" to the Foreign Military Sales program in which the Pentagon essentially serves as an arms broker between those weapons corporations and foreign governments.Reining in the MICThe impetus to move ever more quickly on arms exports and so further supersize this country's already staggering weapons manufacturing base will only lead to yet more price gouging by arms corporations. It should be a government imperative to guard against such a future, rather than fuel it. Alleged security concerns, whether in Ukraine, Israel, or elsewhere, shouldn't stand in the way of vigorous congressional oversight. Even at the height of World War II, a time of daunting challenges to American security, then-Senator Harry Truman established a committee to root out war profiteering.Yes, your tax dollars are being squandered in the rush to build and sell ever more weaponry abroad. Worse yet, for every arms transfer that serves a legitimate defensive purpose, there is another — not to say others — that fuels conflict and repression, while only increasing the risk that, as the giant weapons corporations and their executives make fortunes, this country will become embroiled in more costly foreign conflicts.One possible way to at least slow that rush to sell would be to "flip the script" on how Congress reviews weapons exports. Current law requires a veto-proof majority of both houses of Congress to block a questionable sale. That standard — perhaps you won't be surprised to learn — has never (yes, never!) been met, thanks to the millions of dollars in annual election financial support that the weapons companies offer our congressional representatives. Flipping the script would mean requiring affirmative congressional approval of any major sales to key nations, greatly increasing the chances of stopping dangerous deals before they reach completion.Praising the U.S. arms industry as the "arsenal of democracy" obscures the numerous ways it undermines our security and wastes our tax dollars. Rather than romanticizing the military-industrial complex, isn't it time to place it under greater democratic control? After all, so many lives depend on it.This piece has been republished with permission from TomDispatch.

Viele vergleichende Studien untersuchen die Effekte von Vermittlung, Sanktionen oder militärischen Interventionen auf Dauer und Verlauf bewaffneter Konflikte. Sie nehmen dabei an, dass die verfügbaren Daten das Auf und Ab der tödlichen Gewalt über Zeit sowie Unterschiede je nach Ort hinreichend gut abbilden. Einige Arbeiten leiten aus ihren Befunden Empfehlungen für die Politik ab. Auch das jährliche Friedensgutachten nutzt die Daten eines führenden Anbieters. Dessen Angaben dienen des Weiteren dazu, die Eskalation von Auseinandersetzungen zu prognostizieren. Ihre breite Verwendung wirft die Frage auf, wie sehr man sich auf diese Konfliktdaten verlassen kann.
Author information





Thorsten Gromes



Dr. Thorsten Gromes ist Projektleiter und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der HSFK im Programmbereich "Innerstaatliche Konflikte". Seine Forschung konzentriert sich auf Nachbürgerkriegsgesellschaften und sogenannte humanitäre militärische Interventionen. // Dr Thorsten Gromes is a Project Leader and Senior Researcher at PRIF in the Research Department "Intrastate Conflicts". His research focuses on post-civil war societies and so-called humanitarian military interventions.

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Der Beitrag Wie verlässlich sind Daten zu Todesopfern in bewaffneten Konflikten? erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

On 26 July, Niger's presidential guard launched a coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, announcing their seizure of power in a televised broadcast. As the dust of the coup begins to settle, Niger — and the international community — stand at a crossroads. The military junta's success in maintaining power is far from guaranteed and has been widely condemned. Several states and supranational organisations, including the US, France, the EU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU) have threatened the military junta with sanctions if it does not reinstate President Bazoum, and have even considered military intervention. However, the Sahel's track record of successful coups suggests that Niger is likely to see further democratic backsliding, ...

Ein Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestages befasst sich mit den letzten anderthalb Jahren des Einsatzes in Afghanistan und vor allem mit dem desaströs verlaufenen Abzug. Zudem beleuchtet eine Enquete-Kommission des deutschen Parlaments das gesamte internationale Engagement von 2001 bis 2021 und formuliert Lehren für die Zukunft. Während die Befunde dieser beiden Gremien abzuwarten bleiben, gibt es bereits zahlreiche Publikationen zum Scheitern des internationalen Einsatzes in Afghanistan. Ein Teil dieser Ursachenforschung legt Folgerungen nahe, die ein kritisches Abwägen des Ob und Wie künftiger Einsätze erschweren.
Author information





Thorsten Gromes



Dr. Thorsten Gromes ist Projektleiter und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der HSFK im Programmbereich "Innerstaatliche Konflikte". Seine Forschung konzentriert sich auf Nachbürgerkriegsgesellschaften und sogenannte humanitäre militärische Interventionen. // Dr Thorsten Gromes is a Project Leader and Senior Researcher at PRIF in the Research Department "Intrastate Conflicts". His research focuses on post-civil war societies and so-called humanitarian military interventions.

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Der Beitrag Scheitern in Afghanistan: Wenn es sich Ursachenforschung zu einfach macht erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

By Paniz Musawi Natanzi. Following the military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, private universities in Kabul became sites of marketisation and models for other cities in the country. In the process of neoliberal transformation, gender mainstreaming was a key cross-sectoral tool, intersecting foreign development and military policies, which included higher education. Funding for the development of university degree programmes and scholarships in gender studies came with conditions of adhering to an anti-social political and epistemological understanding of gender that builds on expanding "individualisation and financialisation", while claiming to serve communities through entrepreneurialism. The hegemony of finance under neoliberal imperialism, the current manifestation of capitalism and process of empire-building, in sites of military and humanitarian-developmental intervention, reconfigured social, political, economic and epistemological structures also through the university. A critical analysis.

Niger's July 26 military coup, which ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, has created a volatile situation. While France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threaten military action against the Nigerien junta under the guise, respectively, of protecting French diplomatic and military facilities and restoring Niger's constitutional order, the crisis risks escalating into a regional conflict.Each of Niger's seven neighbors has a unique set of interests and perspectives on Niger's situation. Algeria, which shares a 620-mile border with Niger, is focused on promoting stability and a return to Niger's constitutional order while also preventing foreign powers from violating the country's sovereignty.Algiers is concerned about instability spilling into neighboring countries (including Algeria) and violent extremists exploiting the turmoil in Niger itself. Memories of Algeria's "Black Decade" (1991-99), in which a jihadist insurgency and a state-led crackdown led to much bloodshed, remain vivid in Algerian minds. No Algerian takes peace and stability at home for granted."National security officials in Algiers already have their hands full due to increasing tensions with Morocco to the west, continued instability in Libya to the east, and the worsening economic situation in Tunisia, also to the east," Gordon Gray, the former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, told RS. "Uncertainty to the south, i.e., along the border with Niger, is yet another problematic development they will need to deal with."In 2012, three hardline jihadist terrorist groups — al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar Dine — gained control of two-thirds of Mali, including territory bordering Algeria. Algerians worried about these armed extremists' ability to threaten Algeria's security. The 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis further informed Algeria's understandings of its vulnerability to transnational terror groups operating in neighboring countries. Today, Algerian officials have similar concerns about instability in Niger creating opportunities for the ISIS- and al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups operating in the country to wage attacks throughout the region.Algerian officials also worry about the devastating impact that the situation could have on Niger's 25 million people. ECOWAS-imposed sanctions on Niger in the wake of the July 26 coup do not include humanitarian exemptions, and Algeria's government worries that political turmoil and a worsening economic situation in Niger could prompt refugee flows into Algeria and other neighboring countries, further threatening regional stability.Algeria's concerns about Niger's crisis go beyond the threat of terrorism and worsening humanitarian disasters. Although in favor of restoring Niger's constitutional order, Algiers strongly opposes military intervention by foreign forces."Algeria opposes all kinds of external intervention in North Africa and the Sahel, whether it is military or political. Algiers stands firm by the principle of sovereignty and considers any foreign presence in its neighborhood as an infringement on the local countries' sovereignty, regardless of the nature of the foreign intervention or presence," Ricardo Fabbiani, North Africa project director for the International Crisis Group, told RS."For Algeria, a military intervention against Niger would be a catastrophe. The Algerians point out that the previous interventions in Libya and Mali have exacerbated pre-existing problems, rather than solving them," he added. "These operations have a significant political and security impact, with repercussions that can be felt for decades."In this sense, Algeria occupies a somewhat unique position — at odds with both France and ECOWAS threatening to wage a military campaign to reverse the coup on one side, and Burkina Faso and Mali vowing to militarily assist Niger's junta if ECOWAS attacks on the other.Seeing itself as a regional heavyweight, Algeria's sensibilities and principles guide the country's foreign policy. Having existed as a French colony before waging a war for independence (1954-62), Algerians view national sovereignty as sacrosanct. This history helps one understand the North African country's past opposition to foreign interventions in Libya, Iraq, Mali, and Syria.Viewing itself as a vanguard in anti-imperialist, pan-African, and Arab nationalist causes, Algeria will always oppose Western (especially French) military intervention in Africa, the Middle East, or anywhere in the Global South. Whereas many states evolve in their foreign policy strategies, Algeria's firm commitment to certain principles, concepts, and institutions has remained consistent over the decades, making Algiers' stance vis-a-vis Niger both predictable and characteristic.Within this context, Algeria is playing a leading role in advocating for a diplomatic solution to the Nigerien crisis that prevents any external military intervention. Last month, Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf visited three ECOWAS member-states — Nigeria, Benin, and Ghana — on orders from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. After the visits, Attaf proposed a six-month transition plan to bring civilian rule and democracy back to Niger.He stressed Algeria's opposition to foreign military intervention and affirmed that external actors will be barred from transiting Algerian airspace as part of any intervention. The six-point plan's objective is to "formulate political arrangements with the acceptance of all parties in Niger without excluding any party" within the six-month-window, according to Algeria's top diplomat, who has also had contacts with junta members, as well as Nigerian civilian leaders. Overseeing this process should be a "civilian power led by a consensus figure."Before Attaf announced Algeria's plan, Niger's military leadership, backed by Burkina Faso and Mali, laid out its own very different plan. The junta called for a three-year transition period to restore constitutional order. ECOWAS has summarily rejected that plan, asserting that three years is much too long. Some members even called the junta's proposal a "provocation."Algeria is hoping that its proposal offers a middle ground that saves face on all sides but also leads to a restoration of democracy in Niger while preventing any military action against the landlocked and sanctioned country.Fortunately for Algeria, there is growing international support from foreign governments, such as Italy's, for its mediation efforts as the standoff over Niger intensifies. "If successful, this diplomatic effort could strengthen Algeria's role in the Sahel, which is one of Algeria's long-term goals in the area," said Fabiani.Washington has not yet taken a position on Algeria's plan and has generally followed a more cautious approach than Paris, a source of irritation between the two NATO allies. Despite an early unsuccessful mission by a top State Department official to engage the junta, the U.S. has thus far declined to label Bazoum's ouster a "coup," a legal determination that would require the U.S. to end military aid to Niamey, a key counterterrorism partner in the Sahel for years."The United States remains focused on diplomatic efforts toward a peaceful resolution to preserve Niger's hard-earned democracy," a State Department spokesperson told RS. "We all want a peaceful end to this crisis and the preservation of the constitutional order."Looking ahead, officials in Algiers understand that they must address the Nigerien crisis pragmatically while accepting the limitations of Algeria's influence in Niamey. Algerian policymakers are "working on a shortened timeline for the transition" and Algiers "thinks that the coup is difficult to reverse," which leaves them believing that "the quickest route out of this predicament is by accelerating the transition announced by the military junta and guaranteeing Bazoum's personal safety," explained Fabiani. "Yet, it is unclear what leverage Algeria has to make this happen and, most importantly, how willing to listen are the military authorities, given the regional polarization around this issue.""Today, Algiers doesn't want to antagonize the military junta in Niger, nor does it want to push for a military intervention," Dalia Ghanem, a Middle East and North Africa Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, told RS. "Yet, Algiers learned that this noninterference stance is no longer efficient because it leaves the door open to foreign meddling like in Libya. The country's [leadership is] hence stuck between an old doctrine and the new regional realities. The country had no other [option] than [to] maximize security at its borders and this can't be done without hard choices being taken."In the public eye, Algeria will continue investing diplomatic energy into its six-month transition plan. Yet, as Gray told RS, "Behind the scenes, Algeria will be seeking ways to cooperate with the military junta to ensure the security of its southern border."

Ties between big finance and the weapons industry are not new. The first venture capital firm in the U.S. was founded to profit from new technologies developed for use in WWII, and the role of military spending in turning Silicon Valley into a tech hub is well documented.But today's biggest VC titans are making transformative investments in military technology that pose serious consequences far beyond another hype-driven tech bubble. Weaponizing their financial assets to expand the production of war material will not only divert technological resources away from other critical domestic priorities, but also forge novel devices of warfare that will generate demand for battlefield testing grounds both at home and abroad. But before the defense tech evangelists can resurrect the age of American global supremacy, they must transform the way the Pentagon does business. This involves seducing Pentagon planners with exotic promises ranging from "attritable autonomous systems" (or swarm) technology to subscription models for weapons systems — not because these fit some strategic framework but because they align with the VC business model. Venture capital and private equity is about making limited investments in mobile assets (technologies, engineers) to get a startup to the IPO stage (or trim the fat from an existing operator) and cash out. This is at odds with a military industrial complex that boasts millions of employees and a handful of oligopolistic firms with billions of dollars of permanent infrastructure, huge up-front costs, long time horizons, and extremely complex procurement processes. The fingerprints of VC priorities are everywhere: from the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital and the Small Business Investment Company/SBIC initiative to the Defense Innovation Board, a collection of Silicon Valley scions elevated to a permanent department under the Secretary of Defense in October 2023. Typically, the Pentagon acquires technologies or equipment through private contracts with a company or by supplying grants to provide funds for research and development. The new Office of Strategic Capital, established in December 2022, lets the Pentagon behave less like a public agency and more like a VC investor. It was in this new spirit that Silicon Valley investors in March 2023 lobbied the Pentagon to bail out Silicon Valley Bank (where many of them had hundreds of millions deposited) by claiming that they would be damaged (thereby losing the Pentagon critical capabilities) if they weren't rescued. Deploying the argument that a run on SVB would be a "national security risk," the Pentagon and its supporters advocated for federal government intervention, according to The Intercept, and the Treasury Department ultimately interceded to bail out SVB on March 12, protecting investors.*The financial services sector is likewise providing innovative products to facilitate the expansion of VC-backed defense tech in Pentagon contracting. One example is Leonid Bank, which is an invoice factoring company that basically lends to defense tech startups based on the DOD invoices that those startups have for future projects, to provide them with more money (over and above the contract value) which is not something that has ever existed for Pentagon contracts. Much of the VC discourse emphasizes the benefits of reforming the procurement system to acquire more "commercial" off-the-shelf items not custom built just for the Pentagon. This transformation is marketed as a way of matching the production methods of global adversaries, because development is faster and cheaper; if there are venture investors and other funds involved then the government is footing less of the upfront bill. However, if the success of the product and the firm that develops it is dependent on the widespread adoption of that technology commercially this will introduce a new range of militarized technologies into a global system that is already awash with lethal tech, dystopian surveillance products, and an ideology that depicts weapons production as the primary avenue to innovation, economic growth, decent industrial jobs, and infrastructure spending. The stated desire of venture capital (and the increasing number of private equity funds focused on military tech) is to disrupt an industry they see as monopolistic, inefficient, and too close to government bureaucracy. This rationale is easy to understand, as the path to innovation for the prime contractors has for decades been external: find small firms developing marginally improved technologies or hardware parts, acquire them and integrate their products into existing large weapons platforms. The financial industry – VC firms, asset managers, PE fund managers – have observed (correctly) that if they can find the small tech firms first (or fund them into existence) then the potential profits are enormous. VCs also identify startups working on civilian technologies and steer them toward developing military applications. Startups working on technologies to improve navigation in driverless vehicles may find that after a new round of investment their objective is to apply those technologies to weapons targeting systems. Individual engineers working on civilian tech are also being lured away by the promise of better funding and broader impact from defense investors. If startups want to see their technologies advance they're much more likely to find the necessary funding if they pivot to military applications. Venture capitalists are eagerly supplying geostrategic justifications and policy blueprints to the Pentagon on how to reshape its contracting ecosystem to facilitate this shift. An example from one of the most well-known VC funds, Andreesen Horowitz, focuses on the promise of "attritable" warfare – specifically a model of warfare that uses technology to develop cheaper, simpler weapons in large quantities. One example of this style of warfare is the Pentagon's "Replicator" initiative to develop drone swarm capabilities — basically the capacity to field literally thousands (maybe tens of thousands) of drones simultaneously. And this is "attritable" because each individual drone unit is cheap and simple to deploy, so that the moment it's knocked out of the sky it's already been replaced by two more. But this requires an enormous amount of coding, and constant re-coding and re-writing which is not necessarily a capability that exists in the big primes. Predictably, the response from major think tanks (whose primary funders are the primes) is that these kinds of initiatives are "crowding out" the focus on "long-range precision fire programs" — which is code for the huge range of super expensive fighter jets and missile systems that are the bread and butter of firms like Lockheed and Northrop Grumman. So VC firms like Andreesen Horowitz kindly offer guidance for this transition: "As general computing platforms become applicable to a host of defense applications, from programming autonomous behavior to conducting live targeting analysis, sweeping advances in software and other technologies not originally designed for defense have unintentionally compounded computing's impact on war…..Responding to the paradigm shift requires reengineering the Pentagon's DNA for a new era." [author's italics] The AH authors emphasize that this reengineering will allow for a "reduction in operational complexity, driving lower costs through commoditization" with "smaller" "modular modern production" that uses "'just-in-time' manufacturing techniques like 3D printing to cut latency" allowing for "decentralizing a military's industrial footprint."This reads a lot like outsourcing the military industrial supply chain, which may sound revolutionary. But the huge weapons platforms in use by the U.S. military already incorporate parts and materials from all over the world, including a lot of stuff from China. So this modification is more about transforming production so VC-backed firms have an entry point into production chains currently dominated by the primes.To achieve this, Andreesen Horowitz advocates what they call "Broad and open API standards" that would presumably enable startups to propose the use of cheaper/more widely-available materials and technology for incorporation into the expensive platforms built by the primes. This would mean that some material the primes consider proprietary would have to be opened up to tinkering. Not to be outdone, the primes are putting their own pressure on the Pentagon to counter the challenge from VC-backed startups. Their latest efforts focus on speeding up and expanding the scope for foreign military sales by allowing overseas customers to purchase research and development services to design new weapons. And they're pushing for other modifications that would turbocharge technology transfer and joint ventures to help lock-in future exports.In the battle between the primes and the VC-backed tech firms to expand the U.S. arsenal, the Pentagon is ill-equipped to responsibly navigate the competing interests, least of all since its senior members are routinely bought off with (entirely legal) sinecures. It's a battle with a sadly predictable outcome, because no matter which side wins, we all will pay the cost. Editor's Note: The story has been edited to accurately reflect the timeline of when and how defense tech investors lobbied the Pentagon for SVB bailout in March 2023.

My letter to The Economist:Republicans' isolationismYour review of how the Republicans in the US have moved back
and forth between isolationism and internationalism is informative and
interesting (Losing their religion", October 28, 2023). However, I think you underestimate
the importance of whether the party is in the presidency or in the opposition
to explain its wavering foreign policy choice.As for your data since World War
I, when the Democrats were in the White House and favored internationalist
policies, especially in periods of foreign agitation and major conflicts, such
as with presidents Wilson and F. D. Roosevelt, the Republicans were
isolationists and protectionists. But when the Republicans were in office, such
as with Eisenhower, Reagan, and G. W. Bush, they promoted international trade
and foreign military interventions, even openness to immigration. The
exception, as you underline, was Trump and his tariffs, although he renewed
NAFTA with Canada and Mexico as USMCA.A couple of your quotes may
clarify why the party tends to change its position depending on whether it is
in power or not. As Republican Senator Raft expressed, "In the great field of
foreign policy, the president has arbitrary and unlimited power," so it is not
interesting for the opposition party to support his policies and reinforce the
incumbent. Your reference to the conservative Heritage Foundation also fits: it
was "among the most fulsome supporters for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan"
during the presidency of Republican G. W. Bush, while now it "is rallying
against additional American spending on Ukraine" facing a Democratic president.
In the superpower US, foreign policy is always the most important policy, and,
thus, the central arena for party competition, after all.JOSEP M. COLOMERGeorgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC

The events in Niger over the past few months have been alarming to watch. What began as a military coup now risks spiraling into a wider war in West Africa, with a group of juntas lining up to fight against a regional force threatening to invade and restore democratic rule in Niamey.The junta have explicitly justified their coup as a response to the "continuous deterioration of the security situation" plaguing Niger and complained that it and other countries in the Sahel "have been dealing for over 10 years with the negative socioeconomic, security, political and humanitarian consequences of NATO's hazardous adventure in Libya." Even ordinary Nigeriens backing the junta have done the same. The episode thus reminds us of an iron rule of foreign interference: Even military interventions considered successful at the time have unintended effects that cascade long after the missions formally end.The 2011 Libyan adventure saw the U.S., French and British governments launch an initially limited humanitarian intervention to protect civilians that quickly morphed into a regime change operation, unleashing a torrent of violence and extremism across the region.There was little dissent at the time. As Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's forces battled anti-government rebels, politicians, the press and anti-Gaddafi Libyans painted an overly simplistic picture of unarmed protesters and other civilians facing imminent if not already unfolding genocide. Only years later would a UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report publicly determine, echoing the conclusions of other post-mortems, that charges of an impending civilian massacre were "not supported by the available evidence" and that "the threat to civilians was overstated and that the rebels included a significant Islamist element" that carried out numerous atrocities of its own.Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), and John Kerry (D-Mass.) all called for a no-fly zone. "I love the military ... but they always seem to find reasons why you can't do something rather than why you can," complained McCain. The American Enterprise Institute's Danielle Pletka said it would be "an important humanitarian step." The now-defunct Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) think tank gathered a who's who of neoconservatives to repeatedly urge the same. In a letter to then-President Barack Obama, they quoted back Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech in which he argued that "inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later."Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reportedly instrumental in persuading Obama to act, was herself swayed by similar arguments. Friend and unofficial adviser Sidney Blumenthal assured her that, once Gaddafi fell, "limited but targeted military support from the West combined with an identifiable rebellion" could become a new model for toppling Middle Eastern dictators. Pointing to the similar, deteriorating situation in Syria, Blumenthal claimed that "the most important event that could alter the Syrian equation would be the fall of Gaddafi, providing an example of a successful rebellion." (Despite Gaddafi's ouster, the Syrian civil war continues to this day, and its leader Bashar al-Assad is still in power).Likewise, columnist Anne-Marie Slaughter urged Clinton to think of Kosovo and Rwanda, where "even a small deployment could have stopped the killing," and insisted U.S. intervention would "change the image of the United States overnight." In one email, she dismissed counter-arguments:"People will say that we will then get enmeshed in a civil war, that we cannot go into another Muslim country, that Gaddafi is well armed, there will be a million reasons NOT to act. But all our talk about global responsibility and leadership, not to mention respect for universal values, is completely empty if we stand by and watch this happen with no response but sanctions."Despite grave and often-stated reservations, Obama and NATO got UN authorization for a no-fly zone. Clinton was privately showered with email congratulations, not just from Blumenthal and Slaughter ("bravo!"; "No-fly! Brava! You did it!"), but even from then-Bloomberg View Executive Editor James Rubin ("your efforts ... will be long remembered"). Pro-war voices like Pletka and Iraq War architect Paul Wolfowitz immediately began moving the goalposts by discussing Gaddafi's ouster, suggesting escalation to prevent a U.S. "defeat," and criticizing those saying Libya wasn't a vital U.S. interest.NATO's undefined war aims quickly shifted, and officials spoke out of both sides of their mouths. Some insisted the goal wasn't regime change, while others said Gaddafi "needs to go." It took less than three weeks for FPI Executive Director Jamie Fly, the organizer of the neocons' letter to Obama, to go from insisting it would be a "limited intervention" that wouldn't involve regime change, to professing "I don't see how we can get ourselves out of this without Gaddafi going."After only a month, Obama and NATO allies publicly pronounced they would stay the course until Gaddafi was gone, rejecting the negotiated exit put forward by the African Union. "There is no mission creep," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen insisted two months later. Four months after that, Gaddafi was dead — captured, tortured and killed thanks in large part to a NATO airstrike on the convoy he was traveling in.The episode was considered a triumph. "We came, we saw, he died," Clinton joked to a reporter upon hearing the news. Analysts talked about the credit owed to Obama for the "success." "As Operation Unified Protector comes to a close, the alliance and its partners can look back at an extraordinary job, well done," wrote then-U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo Daalder and then-Supreme Allied Commander in Europe James Stavridis in October 2011. "Most of all, they can see in the gratitude of the Libyan people that the use of limited force — precisely applied — can affect real, positive political change." That same month, Clinton traveled to Tripoli and declared "Libya's victory" as she flashed a peace sign."It was the right thing to do," Obama told the UN, presenting the operation as a model that the United States was "proud to play a decisive role" in. Soon discussion moved to exporting this model elsewhere, like Syria. Hailing the UN for having "at last lived up to its duty to prevent mass atrocities," then-Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth called to "extend the human rights principles embraced for Libya to other people in need," citing other parts of the Middle East, the Ivory Coast, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.Others disagreed. "Libya has given [the mandate of 'responsibility to protect'] a bad name," complained Indian UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, echoing the sentiments of other diplomats angry that a UN mandate for protecting civilians had been stretched to regime change.It soon became clear why. Gaddafi's toppling not only led hundreds of Tuareg mercenaries under his employ to return to nearby Mali but also caused an exodus of weapons from the country, leading Tuareg separatists to team up with jihadist groups and launch an armed rebellion in the country. Soon, that violence triggered its own coup and a separate French military intervention in Mali, which quickly became a sprawling Sahel-wide mission that only ended nine years later with the situation, by some accounts, worse than it started. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the majority of the more than 400,000 refugees in the Central Sahel were there because of the violence in Mali.Mali was far from alone. Thanks to its plentiful and unsecured weapons depots, Libya became what UK intelligence labeled the "Tesco" of illegal arms trafficking, referring to the British supermarket chain. Gaddafi's ouster "opened the floodgates for widespread extremist mayhem" across the Sahel region, retired Senior Foreign Service officer Mark Wentling wrote in 2020, with Libyan arms traced to criminals and terrorists in Niger, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria and Gaza, including not just firearms but also heavy weaponry like antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. By last year, extremism and violence was rife throughout the region, thousands of civilians had been killed and 2.5 million people had been displaced.Things are scarcely better in "liberated" Libya today. The resulting power vacuum produced exactly what Iraq War critics predicted: a protracted (and forever close-to-reigniting) civil war involving rival governments, neighboring states using them as proxies, hundreds of militias and violent jihadists. Those included the Islamic State, one of several extremist groups that made real Clinton's pre-intervention fear of Libya "becoming a giant Somalia." By the 2020 ceasefire, hundreds of civilians had been killed in Libya, nearly 900,000 needed humanitarian assistance, half of them women and children, and the country had become a lucrative hotspot for slave trading.Today, Libyans are unambiguously worse off than before NATO intervention. Ranked 53rd in the world and first in Africa by the 2010 UN Human Development Index, the country had dropped fifty places by 2019. Everything from GDP per capita and the number of fully functioning health care facilities to access to clean water and electricity sharply declined. Far from improving U.S. standing in the Middle East, most of the Arab world opposed the NATO operation by early 2012.Only five years later, Clinton, once eager to claim credit, distanced herself from the decision to intervene. "It didn't work," Obama admitted bluntly as he prepared to leave office, publicly deeming the country "a mess" and, privately, "a shit show." The New York Times collected the damning verdicts of those involved: "We made it worse"; "Gaddafi is laughing at all of us from his grave"; "by God, if we can't succeed here, it should really make one think about embarking on these kind of efforts."Libya offers numerous cautionary tales about well-meaning U.S. military interventions, from the way they rapidly escalate beyond their initial goals and limited nature, to their penchant for unforeseen knock-on effects that are hard to control and snowball disastrously. As Obama's "success" in the country now threatens to spark a regional war in Niger that could even drag the United States into the fighting, it should remind us that the consequences of military action and rejection of negotiated solutions last much longer than, and look very different years after, the initial period of triumphalism.