Suchergebnisse

In light of the kind of armed interventions concomitant with post-Cold War conflicts, a call is made for a redefinition of the individual soldier & the character, role, & structure of the armed forces. The present contradictory image of the soldier, particularly as involved in peacekeeping missions, is articulated. It is argued that certain archetypal warrior characteristics might sustain while the soldier shifts toward assuming a position as an element of law & order. Thus, the future soldier's motivation is deemed important as it derives from his dual commitment to participate in the defense of basic values & to act on behalf of new regional or global security structures that foster security, peaceful development, & prosperity. Noting the advances in military technology that have automated the battlefield, it is asserted that a trend toward tallying how many people were protected or rescued will be the measure of victory alongside the number of kills & amount of territory taken. In this, the emergence of the guardian soldier (as opposed to some kind of battlefield technician) is seen. Further, this changing role at the soldier level is viewed as part of a paradigmatic shift in the global security environment, wherein the adversarial approach to security is being superceded by cooperation & accompanied by a strategic shift that has implications for the armed forces. In this light, seven new guiding principles are delineated. To engage in humanitarian intervention & low-intensity conflicts, armed forces will have to eschew classical war fighting for untraditional forms of combat; the new guardian soldier can accomplish this. J. Zendejas

An examination of the changing boundaries of UN Security Council interventions during the 1990s supports UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan's contention that there is a "developing international norm" to protect civilians threatened by genocide or ethnic cleansing. Competing theories of the relationship between power & norms are assessed in relation to humanitarian interventions. The significant expansion of the boundaries of legitimate intervention that occurred in Somalia & northern Iraq is pointed out. Although the material power of Western states was instrumental in those cases, a materialist based explanation is seen as inadequate because it fails to consider changed normative context at the domestic level in Western states. Ways in which norms constrain the behavior of states are discussed & the Rwanda case is used to illustrate the moral limits of new norms of protection. The impact of 11 September 2001 on the likelihood that states will use force to protect humanitarian values is explored. Evidence from Afghanistan & Iraq suggest that states will articulate humanitarian rationales to legitimize the use of force against terrorist threats. J. Lindroth

An examination of the US war in Afghanistan focuses on two aspects of the action that are relevant for debates on humanitarian intervention. The first consideration is how the US used humanitarian concerns to hold together an increasingly unstable international coalition & to win the hearts & minds of the Afghan people. The second factor is the human suffering that invariably results when a state's institutions crumble & the government is unable or unwilling to curb terrorist groups within its territory. Even when military action against terrorists is not undertaken to assist the civilian population, a sustainable peace is likely to require both military action & civilian reconstruction. An overview of justifications used to support the first phase of US military operations in Afghanistan is followed by a look at changing war aims articulated by the Bush Administration, & the impact of these shifting goals on debates over humanitarian intervention. The reality that disintegrating state institutions often provide a haven for terrorists which in turn puts populations at risk is discussed. J. Lindroth

Argues that the 1999 international military intervention in East Timor was strikingly different from the international intervention in Kosovo during the same year. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Kosovo over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claim to sovereignty that NATO insisted it would continue to recognize. In contrast, although Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over East Timor was not recognized by the UN, the international community claimed Indonesia's consent was necessary for intervention. Attention is called to the extreme suffering of the people of East Timor during the years of non-intervention; Indonesia's resistance to any international security presence in East Timor; & Indonesian President B.J. Habibie's decision to allow the East Timorese to choose between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. The violence that erupted after the ballot prompted criticisms that Australia, the US, & the UN should have exerted more pressure on Indonesia to accept an international force to maintain security in East Timor. Further contrasts between the East Timor & Kosovo interventions are pointed out along with their implications for humanitarian interventions. J. Lindroth

Examines the causes & consequences of the UN's shift from adherence to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states to its recent involvement in a series of humanitarian interventions. The evolution of human rights law & laws of war since 1945 are traced. Provisions related to the use of force in the UN Charter are described, along with UN doctrine & practice before & after the Cold War. Disputes over humanitarian intervention within the UN; Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call to take the issue seriously; the General Assembly's lukewarm response; & challenges posed by the Bush Doctrine of September 2002 are discussed. Troublesome developments arising from interventions since 1991 that have the potential to weaken the UN are explored. Although international law does not definitively state whether states have a right to intervene in other states for humanitarian reasons, it is contended that some of these questions can be settled within the UN if that body can strike a balance between implementing international law & maintaining a limited norm of non-intervention. J. Lindroth

States' motivations for launching humanitarian military interventions are reconsidered. After contemplating circumstances that limit states' ability to intervene in humanitarian crises, it is stressed that conventional realist thought discourages states from dispatching military forces to deal with widespread human rights violations. Although most Western leaders, particularly the US president, possess considerable flexibility in ascertaining whether armed forces should be mobilized to confront humanitarian crises, it is asserted that national & international interests strongly influence states' willingness to become involved in ethnic conflicts & nations experiencing gross human rights violations; examples from the former Yugoslavia & the Kosovo War are cited to demonstrate the US government's culpability for allowing humanitarian crises to continue & for permitting revenge acts. Even though the international community has stressed the integration of human rights guidelines into nations' foreign policies, it is concluded that realist perspectives will continue to exert substantial influence over states' reasons for deploying military forces to address humanitarian crises. J. W. Parker

After the fall of the Taliban & dispersal of al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, the "war on terrorism" intersected with a long-standing desire in neoconservative policy circles to overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. To assuage opposition to war & to drum up public support, President George W. Bush decided to pursue a two-track policy of international diplomacy through the United Nations while also preparing for war.

"The author sets out to explain the European Union's military operations in Africa. Are they, he asks, humanitarian responses to alleviate human suffering at the other end of the world? And are they intended to react to an increasing number of internal conflicts before their sheer number and scope turn into a global risk? Burckhardt analyses the international role of the EU as great power versus civilian power by looking at the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the EU missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003 and 2006 in particular. He argues that the activities of the EU can best be explained in the framework of realism and by considering the EU as a great power since it intervenes to gain prestige - and not to alleviate misery and stop serious violations of human rights. Thus, Burckhardt concludes, the EU undertakes military intervention to serve first and foremost its own concerns and not acting out of humanitarian concerns. With regards to global risks, it seems that the EU uses situations that are commonly perceived as (global) risks, i.e. deadly internal conflicts in Africa, to put forward its own interest in strengthening its status as a great power. This behaviour, in turn, can lead to the emergence of other, new risks: less cooperation with other actors such as the UN and hence a weakening of multilateral institutions, arbitrary (non-)reaction to or disregard of situations in which reaction is really needed (e.g. Darfur), and over-emphasis of military responses to international threats to the detriment of preventive measures and international law." (extract)

This paper discusses the challenges of operating in the context of different cultural backgrounds for multinational military interventions promoting sustainable peace-building measures. Achieving sustainability requires gaining the full cooperation of the local population -- a difficult task. Offering security guarantees is a common means of garnering support, but cultural differences not only between the local population & the multination forces, but also within the later, make it difficult to build sufficient confidence in the security measures at the grassroots level of the society. Forging relationships in what are described as "third generational conflict theaters" demands understanding the importance of local dynamics. The analysis is based on research covering multinational interventions in Haiti (1994-1996), Bosnia (1996 & 1998-1999), Somalia (1997), & Northern Ireland (1999), the methodologies of which are described. All four cases illustrate the necessity of interoperability for successful outcomes. The conclusion focuses on this necessity & emphasizes the need for Canada to increase its training in this strategy. References. J. Stanton

Questions concerning the United Nations legal authority to promote democratization & its reasons for favoring democratic political systems in the politically variegated international community are addressed. It is demonstrated that the United Nations has regularly influenced the development of political systems in various countries, has strongly advocated self-determination, & has actively promoted democratization in consenting nations. However, the United Nations support for democratization is delineated as coercive, eg, the United Nations Security Council determines the criteria for legitimate military intervention in foreign countries & Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter allows member-states to intercede in regional disputes. After illuminating the coercive nature of the United Nations intervention in Haiti, Sierra Leone, & Somalia, it is maintained that the organization should establish a normative framework for judging the legitimacy of military intercessions; several principles to be included in this model are articulated, eg, representatives of member-states that obtained power through illegitimate means should not be seated in the United Nations. J. W. Parker

Examines legal & ethical objections to humanitarian intervention that dominate the international relations debate. It is contended that the most compelling arguments are those that stress the consequences for international order. Special attention is given to the ethical position of pluralism & concerns about "neo-imperialism" articulated by non-Western states. It is suggested that humanitarian intervention can be legitimized in extreme cases if a limited notion of "sovereignty as responsibility" is retained & the temptation to combine the protection of human rights with the right to liberal democracy is avoided. However, there is a strong consensus in both Western & non-Western states that the state is still the best agent to promote & protect human rights. Emphasis is placed on the need to improve the representativeness & effectiveness of the UN Security Council in order to reduce growing concerns about who represents the international community. The situation in Kosovo showed that humanitarian intervention can have complicated & unforeseen consequences; therefore, more attention must be paid to non-military means of operationalizing sovereignty as responsibility. J. Lindroth

Questions concerning whether United Nations transitional administrations should consult local authorities in crafting transitional plans & should be legally or politically accountable for its actions during transition periods are considered. Scrutiny of United Nations transitional administrations consultation practices with local actors in the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, & Kosovo is conducted to illustrate the difficulties arising from transitional authorities negotiations with local authorities & to indicate that prior agreement amongst international actors facilitated political transformation. Two aspects of the accountability of United Nations transitional administrations are then explored -- whether transitional governments are willing to acknowledge the military nature of its operations & how such administrations disregard of normative democratic principles hinder post-transition governance; cases involving the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo & the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor are studied to illuminate the legal & political accountability of transitional governments. It is concluded that the success of international intervention is contingent upon several factors, particularly the creation of military operations designed to properly transfer political authority to local actors. J. W. Parker