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Is there a common notion amongst the political and military leadership in Sweden on how to defend the country? Several events in the arena of international politics during the 20th century argue for the importance of coherence between political and military thinking. Different focus during peacetime has subsequently caused fatal consequences in times of war. This thesis studies a less obvious case: Sweden, a small-state, during the 1990's in the aftermath of the Cold War. In the effort of identifying inconsistency between the political and military level the study deals with a more comprehensive issue for any democratic society: How shall the elected political leadership exercise control over an authority (subordinated the government and) with deeply rooted professional values and with authority vested in it of crucial importance for national survival? Although several of government authorities play key roles in this respect the Armed Forces stands out to be the single most important entity. The thesis approaches the problem by studying one measure of control: the defence doctrine. The doctrine is analysed by studying various documents provided by the political decisionsprocess and with interviews involving a significant number of actors in the politico-military leaderships. The purpose has been to identify whether there is any inconsistency prevailing in the perception of values to be protected by the Armed Forces in case or war, what poses threat to these values and finally how to counter the threats. Hence, the political and military views on defence doctrine are examined. The last element of the doctrine, how to deal with the perceived threats, is embodied in the strategy for countering threats. Comparative studies involving Norway and Finland have been made to provide relevant references for the findings and provide a framework for elaboration on the differences between political and military priorities encapsulated in the research hypothesis. In addition, the research hypothesis involved the assumption that technical, tactical and operational decisions would serve as explanations for any inconsistency between military and political priorities. Piecemealed low-level decisions were assumed to unintentionally diverge bottom- up perceptions and create tensions if the politico-military interaction is not fully functional or if the politicians do not fully comprehend the implications of their decisions. The empirical findings suggest differences in the consistency of the politico-military leadership when comparing Sweden with Norway and Finland. For Sweden, the findings suggest a relative good politico-military adherence regarding values and threat perceptions. However there is a disparity in the views on what strategy to adopt and the military leadership has a more offensive mindset than the political leadership. The empirical data has primarily been collected from processes. To provide a better explanation for the findings the structure of security policymaking has been adopted in a new conceptual model based on Edward Luttwak's 'vertical dimension'.

This thesis is about the conflict between participation and bureaucracy. This conflict is illustrated by a case study within the Swedish Armed Forces under the activity that preceded the 1996 Resolution on Defence. More closely it focuses on the decision-making process that led to the Swedish Armed Forces report that were handed over to the Government in March 1996. In this decision-making process the Supreme Commander tried different ways to create participation among all the high- ranking officers, from local up to Headquarters level, to make them participate in the process. The thesis answers the question if it is possible to create participation in a bureau­cratic organisation such as the Swedish Armed Forces, and the conclusion that I draw is that participation is hard to establish. First there is a conflict within the bureaucratic form itself, since a bureaucracy implies a diversification of assignments and responsibilities in different functions and at different levels in a hierarchy. Every level has its own task to fulfil and this states how reality is to be understood. In the Swedish Armed Forces the bureaucratic structure is reinforced by the fact that the officer is promoted to a higher rank after his or her military training. Both the bureaucratic structure and the military training will lead to a differentiation between individuals, and they will be placed in different skills and status levels within the organisation. Besides this, individuals will gather information mostly from their own level, which will further fortify the difference between the levels. Furthermore there are also individual factors connected to the bureaucratic structure that have shown to complicate participation. For example individuals choose not to participate since they experience that they lack necessary competens for the task, that they do not have time, that they have not been consulted or that they consider the task to be solved at a higher level. So even if the military decision-making model encourages and advocates partici­pation, there is a big difficulty to break the bureaucratic design. Leaders often show inability to go from a bureaucratic leadership style to a democratic one. At the same time the subordinate support their leaders when they act as a traditional leader. ; digitalisering@umu

The report examines the issue of the deployability abroad of the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, at present and in terms of future-oriented defence reforms. It notes that the Bundeswehr is growing in terms of GDP spending though not yet in numbers, that there are novel ideas about how to further develop German military doctrine toward its use in international military operations within as well as alongside NATO, and that mechanisms for identifying and closing military capability gaps through procurement are coming into place. At the same time, there are a number of industry-related, legal and political constraints in place, some of which appear poised to continue exert influence over the entire sector for years to come. Absent a very conscious effort on the part of the government and the respective ministries and institutions to alter the status quo, especially in conjunction with aggravated security and defence challenges in Germany's vicinity, it appears unlikely that these modest steps will yield substantive results in the short to mid-term.

Three tense events involving the US Army and the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache nations in Oklahoma in the decades after the end of the Great Plains Wars seemed destined to end in violence: The Ghost Dance in 1890−91, the death of three Kiowa boys in a blizzard in 1891 and the transfer of Geronimo and around three hundred Chiricahua Apache Indians to Oklahoma in 1895. In all of these events a US Cavalry officer, Hugh Lenox Scott, played a key role as a soldier-diplomat. Through his linguistic skills and inter-cultural competence, Scott, assisted by Iseeo, a Kiowa army scout and close friend of Scott's, managed to prevent the three situations from erupting in violence. These outcomes are in stark contrast to what happened around the same time in the Northern Plains, where violence erupted on several occasions, most conspicuously at Wounded Knee in December 1890, when US troops killed between 150 and 200 Lakota Indians. The purpose of this micro historical study is to highlight how the military, in concrete action, could promote peace and development in their dealings with American Indians and to explore the significance of personal relations, tolerance and trust for the maintenance of peace. These factors were crucial for the more peaceful development on the Southern Plains compared with in the north. In promoting peace, moreover, Scott not only acted as a diplomat in relation to the Indians; he also successfully advised his superior commanders not to send troops into the field in order to uphold order and quell any possible unrest. Such deployment of troops, Scott was convinced, was like putting a keg of gunpowder in front of an open fire and risked sparking uncontrolled and lethal violence between the soldiers and the Indians, to the detriment of the latter, as happened at Wounded Knee. Based on his long service as a soldier-diplomat, Scott later in life developed a general theory about the military as a peacemaking institution. According to Scott, it was politicians and the people who made war and the task of the military was to conquer the peace. His styling of the US soldier as the "harbinger of peace and mercy", however, depended on Scott ignoring the many instances when the US military had failed to maintain peace and order, both in relation to the American Indians and in colonies overseas. ; Förmedlare i imperialistisk expansion: Möten och kontakter i USA:s gränsland (1876−1916)

During the 2000s, Sweden has pursued an active foreign and security policy. This has meant participation in several international military operations and has left many Swedish soldiers and officers with combat experience. Thus, the Swedish parliament decided in 2010 on a political reform of the veterans area, with more extensive societal support, war decorations to express the government recognition of personal sacrifices made in the service and a new medal for courage in combat. Considered as a reward system, it functions as an immaterial and emotionally established incentive, in contrast to the financial and bonus reward systems that are otherwise common. From a governance perspective, this setting is fundamentally interesting. The complexity of military operations and the demands for efficiency in armed combat are in contrast with the democratic state's need to guarantee the rule of law, even from a distance and under difficult conditions. Traditional government is not sufficient because the situation is characterized by high contextual uncertainty and therefore requires more situational adaptive control. Organizing in a professional model implies autonomy for military officials, and this means that there is a form of gap in terms of civilian control. In the dissertation, a concept and an analytical model are formulated to understand this phenomenon, entitled soft norm governance, that also form one of the main results. The model combines four levels of analysis to describe the dynamics of the steering mix: organizational metagovernance, rule control, policy work and professional ethics. One conclusion is that professional ethics has a two-way function in the chain of implementation steering, both as a decisive factor for concrete decision-making, but also as an objective for the government's soft norm governance. Thus, this control gap does not mean absence of control, but that other value-based norm systems govern our actions. In this way, soft norm governance also reaches beyond the scope of the law. The theoretical framework is metagovernance, the idea that the modern state is steering at a distance and with subtle methods, such as by organizational measures. It opens for the importance of soft law, social norms and ethics in governmental steering. The case study of the veterans policy and medal of courage contributes empirically to the specification of these theories. Furthermore, new institutionalism adds an explanatory value with a rationality of action for the officials, a so-called logic of appropriateness based on the professional role and on adaptation to the situation at hand and to applicable rules. Theoretically, the thesis contributes by supplementing with a logic of values, which takes into account the profession's ethical and moral rationality of action, which is particularly important in situations such as armed conflict. The methodological approach combines a structural statistical perspective with a qualitative and understanding-oriented perspective and can, with the support of the analytical model, illuminate both pattern and function. The material base is a total selection from the medal preparation of eight contingents in Afghanistan during the years 2008-2012, i.e. FS16-FS23. It consists of the archive material from the nominations as well as in-depth interviews with responsible commanders at the international units and at the national headquarters, including the Commander-in-Chief.

The starting point for this analysis is that there is no 'business as usual' when considering the consequences of the Brexit referendum: there is either the question 'if Brexit?' or the question 'if-not Brexit?' because there is no turning around or comfortable retreat to established positions. Starting with an analysis of the British debate this 'policy-brief paper' looks at the consequences of the Brexit referendum for transatlantic security relations and in particular the consequences for Sweden. The most important arguments are, in brief: (1) That the value conflict inherent in the British debate, essentially between Eurosceptic nationalism and pro-EU integrationism, is mirrored in several European nations and remains a challenge to the EU; (2) that while Britain remains a European power regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the British geo-political outlook is differs from that of other European nations and will have to be taken into account when considering transatlantic security relations; (3) that NATO is likely to be even more important if Britain leaves the EU but that a strengthening of NATO's European pillar is likely regardless of the outcome of the referendum, among other things because of US demands on European nations to improve their military capacity; (4) that Sweden in the case of Brexit is likely to lose influence over the development of European security cooperation in general but might nevertheless be able to gain in influence mainly as a result of Sweden's geo-strategic position. ; Rapport inom ramen för "Transatlantisk säkerhet" som ingår i Forskning för regeringens behov (FORBE)

The oldest unit of land assessment in Sweden is the attung (lat. octonarius). It is first mentioned in written documents from the late 12th century. When, where and why it was introduced has been much discussed. In this study an investigation of documents mentioning the attung until 1376 is presented together with a statistical processing of data from an earlier work (Dovring 1947). The distribution of land assessed in this unit is restricted to the south-eastern part of the medieval Swedish kingdom. According to an evaluation of some records not discussed before in this context the taxation of real estates in attung units dates from the late 11th century. Most probably the original purpose of the taxation was to create an adequate base for the military levy system. Several indications show that the attung originally corresponded to one family's normal holding of land. The usefulness of the attung for other purposes was soon realised. Besides taxes it also became the base for tenant's land rent, tithes to a particular hospital, compensation for plowing of fallow fields but also for the subdivision of common fields on a pro rata basis. The right to an easement could also be connected to the attung. At the same time a subdivision of the attung unit in several fractions was created which facilitated the trading of landed property. A drastic fall in prices on real estates assessed in the attung unit is observable just after the Black Death. The overall conclusion is that the multi functionality of the attung was something that developed gradually in response to socio-legal ideas from the continent as well as progress in domestic agricultural technology, economy and society.

This study deals with the issue of democratization in Latin America during the 20th century, and in particular the role of the left in this process. The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the role of the left as a political actor in the process of democratization toward the deepening of the democratic rule in Latin America. The research questions are: what role did the left have in the transitions to electoral democracies during the 20th century in Latin America? Why did the left have the role it had in the transitions? How does the left's view of democracy affect the transition to electoral democracy, and the further democratization to deepen democratic rule? What structural constraints affect the left's ability to deepen democratic rule? A comparative qualitative method and different theoretical concepts of democracy, democratization, elite perspective, mobilization and organizations have been used, and examples from different Latin American cases are given. One empirical conclusion is that the role of the left in the transitions to electoral democracies varies from participation with active left leaders, collective left actions, to not have any significant role at all. A second empirical conclusion is that in cases where left wing governments have tried to enforce a model of participatory democracy, the result has been " coup d'état" or rebellions conducted by military forces and supported by the economic elite and the United States of America. In other cases when left parties in government instead have remained within the framework of an elite democracy, the result has rather been stabilization of the liberal democratic rule. The main theoretical conclusions are as follows: the theoretical discussion about democratic consolidation and the deepening of democracy have to consider that different actors' (in this study the left) preferences for various models of democracy differ; the actors' view of democracy matter in the game of democratic development and democratic consolidation; and the relations between the elite actors' preferences for different models of democracy determine the outcome of a specific form of democratic model (in this study electoral democracy, liberal democracy or participatory democracy).

It is rather often assumed that Swedish foreign policy debate is largely characterized by consensus and that foreign policy goals often are material (for example security or economic welfare). Despite this, it is possible to identify disagreement among political parties about ideological goals – i.e. the promotion of values – in Swedish foreign policy debates. This raises questions about the nature and importance of these ideological goals in such debates. To study this closer I investigate foreign policy debates about the military conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq. The purpose of the dissertation is to describe and explain the content and relative importance of the ideological goals expressed by Swedish parliamentary parties in both party and public arenas. Four parties are included in the study: the Left, the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The theoretical framework is made up of two main parts. First, I develop a classification scheme to identify and sort the goals found in the empirical material. This scheme includes four goal types: ideological, security, economic, and other. Second, insights from literatures on foreign policy and the behaviour of political parties are used to analyze the content and importance of ideological goals. The research design used in the dissertation is comparative case studies. The empirical material is composed of documents from the internal party arena (meeting minutes, congress material, etc), the parliamentary arena (debate material) and the official arena (press material). The material has been analyzed mainly qualitatively with the help of ideational and argument analysis. In order to estimate the relative importance of ideological goals quantitative content analysis has also been used. As regards the content of ideological goals during debates about Vietnam, the empirical results show all parties discussed the promotion of humanity, democracy and states' rights to national independence. In the Iraq conflict, all parties expressed goals about humanity, human rights, internal security/safety, democracy and states' rights to national independence. Beyond these goals, individual or a few parties also expressed other ideological goals. However, a central result is that the parties have linked the ideological goals – which they often agree about – to different ways of reasoning. The empirical analysis also revealed that ideological goals have generally been more important than other types of goals (with the exception of the Conservative Party in the debate about Vietnam). Regarding developments over time, the importance of ideological goals was unchanged for the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party. For the Left there was a slight decrease, and for the Conservatives a significant increase. The overall conclusion about what explains the content and importance of ideological goals in the foreign policy debates studied here is that explanations at the systemic level are inadequate. Variables like the international political structure (polarity) and institutional mechanisms in the EU and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy had little explanatory power. Instead, explanations like type of foreign policy issue, party ideology and party strategy were more useful. Differences in parties' fundamental ideological views were also discussed as an important source of difference as regards the positions and arguments that expressed ideological goals.