Suchergebnisse

Is organization development (OD) possible in military organiza tions, where one would think the typical norms and values (openness, participation, etc.) associated with OD are in direct conflict with those found in the system? Whether or not OD is possible under such condi tions, it is most certainly being attempted. Denis Umstot, Lt. Col. USAF, is well qualified to review the extent of OD efforts in the U.S. military, although he remains appropriately cautious regarding out comes. Dr. Umstot was winner of the 1976 dissertation award given by the Industrial-Organizational Psychology division of the American Psychological Association for an experimental study of the effects of job enrichment. He has taught at the Air Force Institute of Technology since 1975 and has been active in Air Force OD efforts.

Recent literature in military sociology is reviewed in the context of theories regarding increasing rationality on the part of societies, organizations, and individuals. Models that emphasize individualistic orientations to military service are compared with models that assume a more collectivistic orientation. Attention is paid to the shift from a mobilization-based armed force to a force in being, and to the convergence between military and civilian organizations. Several consequences of the rationalization of the military are considered, including potential changes in willingness to fight, military unionization, changes in professionalism, the substitution of management for leadership, increased utilization of women, and dependence on research, including social science research.

First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Using material drawn from a case study of the 1960 Turkish military revolt & the conspiratorial group that planned & executed it, the monograph analyzes military revolts carried out by conspiratorial groups in large, bureaucratically structured military organizations. The essay focuses on 3 topics: (1) the social structural conditions producing conspiratorial military groups; (2) their recruitment base; & (3) the dynamics of conspiratorial organizations. The monograph is divided into 3 sections (A) a discussion of Turkish development showing how the impetus to military discontent stemmed from changes in Turkish social structure & the declining position of the officer corps as a SC. (B) A discussion of the officer corps as a segmentalized group in which different categories have varying interests, political outlook, & political opportunity. Social structural changes are shown to have differential effect on different segments of the officer corps. (C) A discussion of the sociology of conspiratorial military groups showing how their existence is patterned by secrecy, illegitimacy, & lack of access to normal channels of political communication & influence. There are also discussions of the dilemmas of conspiratorial group existence, recruitment, organization, leadership, ideology, strategies, & tactics. Upwardly mobile staff officers are most prone to participate in conspiratorial groups & have the greatest potential for translating sociopolitical discontent into an effective military coup. AA.

It is almost a truism to observe that the American public is ambivalent in its feelings toward the U.S. military as an organization. On the one hand, within the strong American tradition of politi­cal liberalism the military symbolizes state control and the loss of personal freedom, On the other hand, the mili­tary exists to defend freedom, as in World War II. It is clear that the public in general regards the military as more than just a necessary evil. While the military does exhibit instances of bun­gling, waste, arrogance, and irrespon­sibility 1 it also sets national examples of courage, asceticism, selflessness, and devotion to duty.

Culture has an enormous influence on military organizations and their success or failure in war. Cultural biases often result in unstated assumptions that have a deep impact on the making of strategy, operational planning, doctrinal creation, and the organization and training of armed forces. Except in unique circumstances culture grows slowly, embedding so deeply that members often act unconsciously according to its dictates. Of all the factors that are involved in military effectiveness, culture is perhaps the most important. Yet, it also remains the most difficult to describe and understand, because it entails so many external factors that impinge, warp, and distort its formation and continuities. The sixteen case studies in this volume examine the culture of armies, navies, and air forces from the Civil War to the Iraq War and how and why culture affected their performance in the ultimate arbitration of war.