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Despite serious concerns about possible Israeli war crimes and even "plausible" allegations of genocidal acts in its war in the Gaza Strip, the former chief of U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, has accepted a fellowship from one of Washington's most hawkish pro-Israel organizations.The Jewish Institute for National Security of America, or JINSA, announced last week that Gen. Frank McKenzie, who led CENTCOM from 2019 to April 2022, would become the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy.JINSA, which was a major promoter of the U.S. invasion of Iraq 21 years ago (when its name was the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs), has also long championed more confrontational military policies toward Iran, including providing Israel with the means to attack Iran's nuclear facilities and supporting it if it chooses to do so."We are thrilled and honored to have Gen [sic] McKenzie join JINSA," said Michael Makovsky, the group's president and CEO. "As a former CENTCOM commander and J-5, he will be an invaluable source and contributor to JINSA's work on U.S. strategic challenges and opportunities in the Mideast, and how to bolster the U.S.-Israel security relationship."JINSA's press release also highlighted McKenzie's oversight as CENTCOM commander of the "killing of Iran's Quds Force commander General Qassem Soleimani" in January 2020.Aside from promoting pro-Israel policy positions, JINSA's main work has consisted of conducting educational programs and exchanges between U.S. and Israeli military officers since its founding nearly 50 years ago. "JINSA believes that Israel is the most capable and critical U.S. security partner in the 21st century and that a strong America is the best guarantor of Western civilization," according to its current mission statement.During the current Gaza war, JINSA has produced a steady stream of webinars featuring, among others, senior Israeli retired military officers, and near-daily email updates on "Operation Swords of Iron," virtually all of which echo the Israeli government's version of its campaign. JINSA also defend Israel against growing charges by international human rights groups and U.N. experts that its armed forces are guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide evidence for which was deemed "plausible" in January by the International Court of Justice.McKenzie is the first former CENTCOM commander to associate himself formally with JINSA, although the group's roster of "experts," includes several other former regional commanders, including Adm. James Stavridis who served as commanders of both SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, and the former AFRICOM commander, Gen. David Rodriguez. Among other experts are former deputy EUCOM commander Air Force Gen. Charles "Chuck" Wald, who has published a number of op-eds in prominent newspapers over the past dozen years urging U.S. air strikes against Iran's nuclear program.Aside from retired senior military officers, JINSA's experts feature well-known neoconservatives, a number of whom served in various capacities in the George W. Bush administration and played important roles in promoting the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation. They include Elliott Abrams, who oversaw U.S. policy in the Middle East on the National Security Council, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who served as former Vice President Dick Cheney's national security adviser until his indictment for perjury, John Hannah, who succeeded Libby in Cheney's office, Eric Edelman, who served as Cheney's deputy national security adviser and then as under secretary of defense policy under then-Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, and Robert Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.Makovsky, JINSA's director, moved to Israel as a young man and subsequently worked on Iraq in the Pentagon under Rumsfeld before becoming foreign policy director at the Bipartisan Policy Center where he headed a task force that produced a series of extraordinarily hawkish reports on Iran beginning in 2008. He moved most of the BPC task force staff and advisers to JINSA when he took it over in 2013.For JINSA, McKenzie's acceptance of a fellowship amounts to a real catch, given his recent service as chief of CENTCOM, whose domain stretches from Egypt to Pakistan and Central Asia. Under his command, Israel, which had come under EUCOM's jurisdiction for decades (due to the hostility of most of the region's Arab states), was integrated into CENTCOM — a major priority for both Israel and JINSA and one made possible by the 2020 Abraham Accords under which the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel. As one JINSA report put it, Israel's inclusion "will enable strategic and operational coordination among the United States, Israel and our Arab partners throughout the region against Iran and other serious shared threats."As noted in Makovsky's announcement, McKenzie also oversaw the assassination of Soleimani, a particularly effective organizer and coordinator of Shi'a militias in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, in an operation reportedly aided by Israeli intelligence. And, of course, McKenzie's direct work with the IDF and the military brass of "our Arab partners," authoritarian regimes of the kind long favored by Israel, can only serve to enhance JINSA's work and that of its Israeli Distinguished Fellows, such as Major Gen. Amikam Norkin, a former commander of the Israeli Air Force and member of the IDF General Staff, and Major Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, a 36-year IDF veteran who also served as Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu's national security adviser and who is regularly featured on JINSA's webinars as a commentator on the IDF's Gaza war.While McKenzie was always careful not to publicly question or contradict U.S. policy while CENTCOM commander, he has been more vocal during retirement. Between the outset of Israel's Gaza war and early February, he was particularly critical of what he described as the Biden administration's "mush" response to attacks on U.S. outposts by pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq and by Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea. Recalling what he characterized as Iran's "back[ing] down" after Soleimani's assassination — others would question that characterization — McKenzie argued in the ultra-hawkish opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal that "[t]o reset deterrence, we must apply violence that Tehran understands. …Iranians understand steel." While that no doubt sounds like music to the ears of JINSA's neoconservative funders and experts, McKenzie has also sung somewhat more dissonant notes. On CBS News' "Face the Nation" last month, he clarified that he was "not advocating for striking Iran," but rather not to entirely rule that out that possibility. Even more discordant with JINSA's approach to the Gaza war, he implicitly criticized Israel's ongoing campaign — not, notably because of the appalling civilian toll and destruction it has created — but rather for its leaders' failure to conceive a "vision of an end-state when you begin a military campaign.""And I would argue that needs to be something like a two-state solution. You're going to need help from the Arab nations in the region to go in there and …do something in Gaza. I think Israeli occupation would be the least desirable of all outcomes," he said.Conversely, JINSA and Abrams' similarly hawkish Vandenberg Coalition have been hyping their recent joint plan for an "end-state." While they agreed that Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, should indeed oversee (and fund) Gaza's relief, reconstruction, and "deradicalization," security, in their opinion, should be provided by "capable national forces from outside the Middle East and/or private security contractors" in close coordination with Israel which, however, would retain its "freedom of military action throughout the Strip." Or occupation by another name.As for a two-state solution, the report agrees that endorsement of a "long-term political horizon for two states" should be recognized by all concerned. But "rushing ahead with glossy and cosmetic quick fixes, high-level diplomatic gambits, elections, and reunification of the West Bank and Gaza will almost certainly backfire across the board," according to the report, which envisions "an arduous and lengthy process" even before "a revived peace process."Meanwhile, whatever "coalition of the willing" that can be cobbled together to oversee Gaza should focus even more importantly on "strengthening shared U.S.-Israel-Arab interests in resisting Iran-led hegemony," according to the report, an approach that clearly plays to McKenzie's CENTCOM strengths.

The Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and their missile and drone launches toward Israel have gone a long way to restoring a sense of national pride among many Yemenis. This, combined with growing support from other political groups within Yemen, and in the region, mean attacks will not likely end soon — despite sustained U.S. airstrikes against them.Since January 13, the U.S. and the UK have carried out eight rounds of strikes on targets in Houthi-controlled northwest Yemen. This followed multiple warnings by Washington for the Houthis to end their attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. There are now indications that the Biden administration is preparing to carry out airstrikes for an indefinite period whilst expanding the target list.Sustained airstrikes will slowly degrade some of the Houthis' military capacity, especially their ability to launch anti-ship missiles. However, they will do little to stop the groups's use of one-way attack drones (OADs) and marine mines to target ships. The OADs and the facilities used to manufacture and assemble them are spread across northwest Yemen. Most of these facilities are either underground or located in dense urban areas. Even with a continued air campaign against them, the Houthis are in a position to keep menacing international shipping with OADs and mines for months if not years.Most significantly, Western airstrikes risk strengthening the Houthis' grip on power. Many of the Houthis' former enemies are openly and covertly expressing their support for the group now. The Houthi attacks on what they describe as Israeli and U.S.-vessels resonates with many Yemenis, and indeed, many people around the world who are decrying the Israeli actions in Gaza. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Yemenis routinely gather on Fridays in the capital of Sana'a to protest the Israeli invasion of Gaza and, more recently, U.S. and UK airstrikes. From the perspective of many Yemenis, the Houthis possess the moral high-ground, and the power of that narrative, regardless of its veracity, should not be underestimated. The Houthis' determination to lift the siege of Gaza of course is replete with irony given that they persist in blockading the Yemeni city of Taiz.However, the Houthis' domestic enemies are not making the mistake of underestimating the power of the Houthi narrative. There are indications that oppositional figures, from members of Islah to tribes and sections of tribes in contested areas, are aligning with them. Multiple Yemeni analysts and former government officials speaking to this author indicated that some factions within Islah are now providing material support to the Houthis in the form of weapons transfers. Arms smuggling is big business in Yemen. Almost all armed groups regardless of their political alignment are involved in facilitating the movement of arms and materiel into, around, and out of Yemen. It is noteworthy that the majority of the Houthis' imported weapons, as well as parts and components for their missile and drone programs, transit territory under the nominal control of Yemen's internationally recognized government (IRG). Endemic corruption and incompetence among the Houthis' primary domestic foes have, more than any other factor, contributed to their rise to power and to their continuing grip on power. The IRG's inability to grapple with corruption, including the arms trade, and provide predictable levels of security consistently undermines its authority.By comparison, Houthi-controlled areas are generally more secure and enjoy greater levels of predictability. However, this comes at a cost. The Houthis' various security services are harsh, they routinely arrest and torture opponents, and they often act with impunity. The Houthis also routinely seize businesses and property and are also engaged in illicit trade of all kinds. However, in comparison with many of their foes, corruption within Houthi-controlled areas generally serves the Houthi organization as a whole rather than particular individuals.While U.S.-led airstrikes may be justifiable, they do nothing to address the fundamental and growing power and reputational imbalances between the Houthis and their domestic rivals. Instead, airstrikes risk exacerbating these imbalances by compelling more militias to align themselves with the Houthis who are increasingly viewed as victors over not only Saudi Arabia, but also over much of the West.The Houthis' major rivals in Yemen are struggling with how to align themselves against what are viewed as Israeli atrocities in Gaza and now U.S./ UK airstrikes, while maintaining their opposition to the Houthis. The IRG, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and Tariq Saleh's National Resistance Forces (NRF) are all finding it difficult to create narratives can simultaneously condemn Israeli actions in Gaza and the Houthis' attacks on shipping.U.S.-led airstrikes on targets in Houthi-controlled Yemen have greatly complicated matters for all of the Houthis' domestic rivals. The acceptance of U.S. military aid—nothing remains secret in Yemen for long—much less the covert or overt presence of U.S. soldiers or contractors in areas controlled by the STC, IRG, and or the NRF could lead to them being painted as Washington collaborators and, by extension, linked to Israel. The only long-term answer to mitigating the threat posed by the Houthis are measured, monitored, and carefully designed programs that slowly build the capacity of viable IRG-linked forces to check the Houthis with both better governance and effective well-led fighting forces. But such programs are exceedingly difficult to execute in the current environment.Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates both provided hundreds of millions of dollars in funding, arms, and training for the various armed groups aligned with the IRG. In some cases, especially in the Hadramawt and in parts of Yemen's southern Red Sea coast with the NRF, effective fighting forces were developed. However, by and large, there is little to show for Saudi and Emirati efforts. This is why both countries, but especially Saudi Arabia, have curtailed funding and support for their various proxies. In fact, Saudi Arabia has moved away from any kinetic involvement in Yemen. This is partly the result of Saudi Arabia's inability to get the IRG and aligned militias to fundamentally reform. It is also partly due to the Houthis' ability to target Saudi Arabia with drones and missiles. Instead of pouring more money into the black hole that is a war in Yemen, Riyadh is returning to its tried-and-tested policy of appeasement, tribal engagement, and the cultivation of long-term assets in Yemen. The Saudis have already effectively made their peace with the Houthis. It is notable that the Houthis are no longer launching cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia is not allowing its airspace to be used for any attacks on Houthi targets. Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen achieved none of the stated aims, and the Saudis, indeed the world, are now grappling with the blowback. Military engagement alone will not defeat the Houthis. Their ancestors fought off the Ottoman Turks multiple times, the Egyptians, the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Saudis. They possess an innate understanding of what T.E. Lawrence came to understand: Maximum disorder is its equilibrium.Mitigating the threat posed by the Houthis will take years of careful engagement with communities and groups that oppose them, while also forcing the IRG and aligned forces to develop cohesive chains of command, counter corruption, and to meaningfully build governmental capacity. If the IRG and the other opposition groups do not reform and develop the capacity to consistently govern, no amount of support from external backers will prevent them from being defeated by the Houthis and their growing list of new allies in the years ahead.

The Houthis are creating a global shipping crisis as they draw support and tribute from other Muslim countries and peoples for standing up for Palestinians in Gaza. But how far will it go before the West punches back in defense of "world trade" and regional security?On December 18, the Department of Defense announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian. The ten-nation force aims to ensure maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb, which is a shipping chokepoint between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since October 7, the Houthis have launched more than a hundred armed drone and missile attacks — including several aimed at US warships on Saturday — claiming that they are targeting any and all vessels with links to Israel.These threats have caused global shipping companies to divert away from the Red Sea. Many are now sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, which can add over a week to sailing times and as much as 20% to shipping costs. The diversions are also impacting Egypt's fragile economy. Tolls from the Suez Canal are a significant source of hard currency for the Egyptian government. Additionally, the Israeli port of Eilat has seen its revenues decline by 80%. While the global costs of the Houthis' attacks on shipping are steadily increasing, the attacks are paying hefty political and even strategic dividends for the Houthis, who appear to be winning on the public relations front both in and outside Yemen. In Yemen, support for the Houthis, even among some enemies, has increased. In many other Muslim nations, the Houthis are viewed as being "the only Muslim group standing against Israeli aggression." The high profile attacks, including the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader, have stoked national pride among many Yemenis. The Houthis' sophisticated strategic communications operations draw all of these attacks to the attention of domestic and international audiences. According to Yemeni sources who spoke to this author, this has supercharged recruitment for the Houthis and has also led to an influx of donations to the war effort from Yemeni businesses and individual citizens. The attacks are also a demonstration of the Houthis' geographical reach and of their emergence as a regional power.The only negative consequence of the anti-Israel campaign, at least so far, has been a reduction of the number of ships docking in the Houthi-controlled ports of Hodeidah and Salif. Yemen imports well over 90% of its food and a majority of the imports arrive via Hodeidah. Duties and taxes arising from the port are an important source of revenue for the Houthis. Reduced dockings at Hodeidah and rising maritime insurance costs will begin to bite, too.However, it is the Yemeni people who will pay the heaviest price. The Houthis enjoy multiple revenue streams which include everything from a range of efficiently collected taxes, the seizure of businesses and properties, to interests in illicit activities that range from human and arms trafficking to the manufacture and distribution of various drugs.The Houthis are hardwired for resilience and adaptability. Nearly two decades of war have honed the Houthis' war fighting capabilities. After the effective fall of the Yemeni government in September 2014, the Houthis further enhanced these capabilities by grafting their organization into what remained of the Yemeni military and intelligence services. Since 2014, the Houthis have systematically taken over almost every aspect of civil governance, security, education, and the economy in northwest Yemen.While the Houthis were and remain one of the finest guerrilla fighting forces in the region, if not the world, their success on and off the battlefield in Yemen has been aided by the ineptitude and disunity of their enemies. Yemen's Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the cobbled together Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) have consistently failed to unify the dozens of militias that operate in those areas outside Houthi control. Additionally, the IRG has failed to reign in endemic corruption. A considerable portion of the Houthis' arms and materiel comes from what Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide to their proxies in Yemen. Many of these Saudi and Emirati supported militias sell weaponry into Yemen's thriving arms market where the Houthis or their agents buy the weapons. This is not to argue that there isn't corruption within the Houthi organization. There is. However, the corruption is managed and largely limited to senior members of the organization. The Houthis exercise tight command and control over their arsenals, weapons assembly facilities, government ministries, and a burgeoning economic empire in Yemen. Northwest Yemen has never had a more efficient or brutal government than the current Houthi-led regime.Since October 7, the U.S. and its allies have focused on defensive measures aimed at intercepting the Houthis missiles and drones. The costs of these measures are steadily increasing. The U.S. and its allies cannot easily continue to expend large numbers of scarce multimillion-dollar missiles to take out drones that can cost as little as a thousand dollars. The Houthis have factories, many of which are located in hard-to-target dense urban areas, which can manufacture — supplies permitting—dozens to hundreds of low-end drones per week. More sophisticated drones are produced at a slower pace, but the Houthis can still assemble several hundred of these over the course of a few months. While the Houthis have and continue to receive assistance and materiel from Iran, almost all the Houthis' drones and missiles are assembled in Yemen. The Houthis are also increasingly focused on modifying and adapting Iranian designs for missiles and drones to suite their own particular requirements.To date, the Houthis have only used a fraction of the armed drones and missiles that they currently possess. Nor have the Houthis made use of their more sophisticated longer-range drones and missiles. The Houthis also possess large numbers of naval mines, including hard to detect influence mines.The U.S.-led collation of ships that is now assembled in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, combined with the on-shore assets in neighboring countries, possesses enough firepower to degrade the Houthis' military capabilities, at least over the short term. However, such a campaign will need to be sustained for what could be months and will come at a tremendous cost for all involved. The Houthis are masters of asymmetric warfare—as clearly evidenced by their Red Sea campaign—and will respond to U.S.-led strikes by attacking energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis will also deploy more sophisticated missiles and armed drones. While U.S. and coalition warships will likely be able to defend themselves against these weapons, commercial shipping, especially tankers, will be increasingly vulnerable. The Houthis have already effectively closed the Bab al-Mandeb to many global shipping companies. Higher-intensity conflict in and around the Bab al-Mandeb could mean that Red Sea shipping traffic is diminished—or even stopped altogether—for months. The Houthis have largely achieved their objectives: impose costs on Israel and its allies, demonstrate their regional reach, and bolster domestic support. The U.S. and its allies have no good options when it comes to dealing with the Houthis. Apart from acting to constrain Israel's unrelenting offensive in Gaza, the only way of avoiding entering an escalatory loop is for the U.S. to continue to support Saudi and Omani led efforts aimed at reining in the Houthi's threats and attacks. Yet, at the same time, the Houthis only respect force. The current U.S. response is viewed as toothless by the Houthis, and many other nations and non-state groups will view the response or lack thereof in the same way. The conflict in the Red Sea is a harbinger of what the future holds as the diffusion of low-cost but increasingly capable weapons systems continues. The U.S. and its allies are inevitably going to face more and more situations in which there are no good options as the asymmetry between high and low-cost weapons systems increases.

ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria remain at all-time lows despite fears that Middle East tensions related to the war in Gaza could lead to a resurgence of the group, according to a new report by independent U.S. government watchdogs.In 2020, ISIS carried out as many as 200 attacks each month in Iraq and Syria. It now claims fewer than 40 monthly strikes. Despite calls by ISIS leaders to target Israeli and Western interests, the watchdogs report that the group now likely lacks the "intent and capability to direct attacks against the U.S. homeland."The report paints a dismal picture of the once-powerful militant group's operations in Iraq and Syria, where it controlled huge swathes of territory in the mid-2010s. "ISIS's capacity to conduct insurgent activities remained severely degraded in Iraq and Syria," the watchdogs note, adding that the group now carries out fewer attacks near cities.The group's operations now appear more akin to a failing crime syndicate than a powerful terror group. Crackdowns on ISIS finances have left the organization unable to consistently pay its fighters, according to the report. Even ISIS leaders are paid only "sporadically" with funds drawn from buried caches of money hidden in locations across Iraq and Syria.The inspectors general of the State Department, Defense Department, and USAID authored the report, which is part of a congressionally mandated series of updates on Operation Inherent Resolve, America's campaign to defeat ISIS.American cooperation with Syrian Kurdish forces has been largely uninterrupted, according to the report, while Iraq-based operations have been reduced due to the political and operational consequences related to U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza, according to the report.Iran-aligned militias carried out at least 134 attacks on U.S. forces between the outset of the Gaza war in early October and December 2023, forcing U.S. troops in Iraq to divert "resources and attention" away from the counter-ISIS mission. U.S. military advisers "cancelled [sic] or delayed engagements with key Iraqi leaders pending a reassessment of security conditions," the report notes.On the political side, Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani has faced increasing pressure to negotiate an end to the U.S. troop presence in the country, and talks aimed at securing an American withdrawal began in late January.The report provides useful data points amid debates over whether and how to withdraw U.S. troops from the region following the success of the anti-ISIS campaign.Some analysts contend that a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria could lead to a resurgence of the group. As Mona Yacoubian of the U.S. Institute of Peace recently told RS, it is not clear whether Kurdish forces in Syria could protect detention camps holding thousands of ISIS fighters in the country's northeast. If the fighters escaped, they "could quickly pose a major threat to global interests," Yacoubian argues.Efforts to reform and repatriate fighters held at these camps have continued despite regional tensions, according to the report. Roughly 1,700 detainees returned home in the last three months of 2023, leaving the camps' population at 47,000, a number that includes fighters and their families.On the other side of the debate, experts see a continued U.S. presence in Syria as part of America's "endless wars" in the Middle East and argue that America's military deployments in the country help fuel ISIS recruitment efforts and expose U.S. troops to unnecessary dangers. The recent deaths of three U.S. soldiers based near the Jordanian-Syrian border highlights these concerns.The politics surrounding a potential withdrawal will likely heat up over the next year. While a recent Senate bill calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Syria failed in a 13-84 vote, presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has long expressed an interest in pulling U.S. troops out of the country.Trump's 2018 attempt to withdraw from Syria was foiled by his own appointees. But if the former president wins reelection in November, it's hard to ignore the possibility that he could pull it off the second time around.

The Biden administration's funding request for Israel and Ukraine will be a boon for the American economy, argued Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in a high profile hearing on Tuesday."When we send our friends munitions from our stockpiles, the money to replenish our supplies strengthens our military readiness, and we invest in American industry and American workers," Austin told the Senate Appropriations Committee. "Some $50 billion of this supplemental request would flow through our defense industrial base, creating American jobs in more than 30 states."The argument has become central to the Biden administration's messaging in recent weeks as it seeks Republican support for its $105 billion request to fund aid for Ukraine and Israel; disaster relief; and border security.It is unclear whether the "jobs" argument has convinced Ukraine aid skeptics in the House, who have pushed for greater restrictions on future funding. But it resonated with many senators on the Appropriations Committee, who applauded the potential investment in America's economy and defense industrial base.Experts, for their part, argue that weapons spending is far less effective at creating jobs than other forms of government investment, including education and healthcare.On Monday, Newly minted House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) introduced a separate bill that only includes funding for Israel. Blinken argued against the move, contending that Russia's war on Ukraine and Hamas's attack on Israel are fundamentally linked. Austin added that the Ukrainian military would collapse if American support were cut off.Protestors repeatedly interrupted Blinken's remarks in the first half hour of the hearing, with at least six different demonstrators calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and accusing the White House of supporting "genocide." Multiple participants in the protest appeared to be affiliated with Code Pink, a prominent antiwar organization."I also hear very much the passions expressed in this room," Blinken said after demonstrators were removed. "All of us are committed to the protection of civilian life.""But all of us know the imperative of standing up with our allies and partners when their security, when their democracies are threatened," he added. "We stand resolutely with them even as we stand resolutely for the protection of innocent civilians."Blinken and Austin defended U.S. policy in Ukraine and Israel, frequently invoking alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces and Hamas. "Israel has not only the right but the duty to defend itself," Blinken said, echoing a frequent argument from the Biden administration in recent weeks. "No nation would tolerate" Hamas continuing to operate on their territory, he continued.Neither official directly addressed claims that Israel has violated international law through alleged disproportionate violence against Gazan civilians, use of banned munitions like white phosphorus, and efforts to prevent aid from reaching Gaza. Blinken "stressed the need for Israel to abide by the law of war" but accused Hamas of using civilians as "human shields."Blinken highlighted that Gazans "desperately need" humanitarian assistance in order to survive. He also noted that the U.S., Israel, and Egypt have established a system whereby every United Nations-operated truck "is checked by Israel" and Egyptian authorities in order to prevent Hamas from transporting weapons in aid shipments. Blinken added that no aid has been diverted to help the militant organization, which both he and Austin repeatedly compared to the Islamic State.Austin, for his part, addressed the escalation of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-backed militias, which the Pentagon has responded to with at least one set of airstrikes on a militia base in Syria. "We reserve the right to respond at a place and time of our choosing," he said. "We will do what's necessary to protect our troops and deter this type of behavior."When pressed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Austin refused to commit to a direct attack on Iran if an Iranian-backed militia killed an American soldier in a strike in Iraq or Syria.

Introduction. The process of forming zemstvo militias in defense of Tsar V.I. Shuisky and the whole country in the Moscow state began in late 1608 – early 1609 at the height of the confrontation between the Moscow and Tushino political regimes. The article examines the role of the government of V.I. Shuisky in governing the state, in particular, Perm the Great, and the participation of this remote region in military affairs. Researchers have merely addressed this aspect and come to opposite judgments. Methods and materials. We have a large complex of zemstvo correspondence at our disposal, preserved in the archives of the Solikamsk district court. Many documents were published as early as the 19th century but their detailed analysis was not carried out. Clarification of the dating and reconstruction of information both about the documents that have come down to us and the documents only mentioned, the introduction of unpublished acts into circulation allows us to restore the true picture of events. A fund-by-fund study was carried out by the method of mutual correspondence of documents. Analysis. In the course of the research, it was revealed that the first of the initiative documents that reached the Great Perm about the support of Tsar V.I. Shuisky in military affairs were formal replies from Galich and Vologda. Perm clerks F.P. Akinfov and N. Romanov received them on December 15, 1608, and they were read by the whole world. Active gatherings of military men in Perm the Great began only after January 1, 1609, when a list with a sovereign letter was brought to the Galicians. At that time the territory of Perm the Great consisted of 3 counties: Cherdyn, Solikamsk, Kaigorod. By January 10, 1609, the first gathering ended and 20 military men of Soli Kamskaya left on the way to Moscow. In Kaigorodok they were robbed, carts and weapons were taken away, the headman and worldly people did not give new carts in the ship's hut, as a result they could not continue their journey, and there was a delay. In February, together with 20 Kaigorod military men, they moved on. On March 1, 1609, 50 Cherdynians left Perm the Great. The war men of Perm the Great came to Vologda at the end of March 1609 and were assigned to further service in the militia. Results. The article shows that the complete blockade of Moscow in the fall of 1608 did not materialize. However, regular communication between Moscow and the cities of Pomorie was disrupted. For the period from January 1 to mid-April 1609 in Perm the Great on behalf of Tsar V.I. Shuisky received 5 decree letters from the Novgorod discharge order on the issue of collecting military men and sending them to Moscow to fight the Tushin people, and 3 executive orders from the Novgorod quarter order on the sovereign's treasury and sending bread to Siberian cities for salaries to service people. These documents were direct orders of the supreme power and were perceived by the order people in Perm the Great as a guide to action. In addition to them, the zemstvo correspondence with the nearest cities made it possible to find out news about the military events taking place in the country. The clerk Fedor Petrovich Akinfov and the clerk Naum Romanov tried to carry out the orders of the tsar, but they did not always manage to do this as quickly as was expected of them. There is no reason to consider the resulting delay in the dispatch of the Perm military men as unwillingness of the orderly people appointed from Moscow for 2–3 years to participate in the support of Tsar V. Shuisky and the Zemstvo movement. The delay is more likely due to the lack of clear administrative management at the local level: if in Soli Kamskoy they quickly responded to the request and sent 20 military men, then in Kaigorodok they began to put up obstacles not only in the form of robbery, but also at the level of mundane self-government, not obeying the regional leadership.

"Este artículo aborda un conjunto de fenómenos históricos que tuvieron lugar en la Nueva España durante el periodo de la restauración absolutista. El texto busca recuperar la complejidad de la etapa que transcurrió entre la llegada de las noticias del restablecimiento de Fernando VII como monarca absoluto en 1814 y la nueva puesta en marcha del régimen constitucional en 1820. Entre otros objetivos, se propone analizar el impacto de la pretendida vuelta al antiguo régimen en términos de la estructura política y militar. Al efecto, primero se analizan las particularidades de la restauración novohispana y las vicisitudes del conflicto en esos años. De esta forma, el artículo recupera la decadencia y la fragmentación de la insurgencia a partir de la caída de su líder más visible, el cura José María Morelos, y problematiza las arbitrariedades y ambigüedades que trajo consigo la abolición del régimen constitucional y las implicaciones políticas, militares e incluso fiscales que ocasionó la Restauración absolutista emprendida por el virrey Félix María Calleja. En segunda instancia se examina el significativo caso oaxaqueño como uno de los pocos pero reveladores ejemplos novohispanos de genuina reconquista militar seguida de la problemática y relativa anulación de constitucionalismo gaditano, escenario que ofrece interesantes casos de "veletismo" político y manipulaciones tendientes a la segregación de grupos y comunidades enteras. Por último se revisan tres ámbitos emblemáticos del periodo en cuestión para evaluar las políticas de la guerra: la instrumentación de los indultos como uno de los fenómenos más representativos de la continuidad entre las gestiones de los virreyes Calleja y su sucesor Juan Ruiz de Apodaca; el militarismo de los gobiernos provinciales y de las estructuras de control territorial como consecuencias palpables de la prolongación del conflicto independentista; así como el crecimiento de las milicias de realistas, cuerpos en los se puede analizar con mayor claridad la creciente militarización de la sociedad novohispana." ; "This article deals with a set of historical phenomena located in New Spain during the period of the absolutist restoration. The text is aimed to expose the complexity of the events that occurred between the arrival of the news of the restoration of Ferdinand VII as an absolute monarch in 1814 and the new implementation of the constitutional regime in 1820. Among other objectives, the present study aims to analyze the impact of the return to the Ancien Régime envisioned by Ferdinand VII in terms of the political and military structure. To this end, we will first consider the particularities of the New Spain restoration and the vicissitudes of the conflict in those years. In this way, the article reviews the decline and fragmentation of the insurgency after the fall of its most visible leader, priest José María Morelos, and problematizes the arbitrariness and ambiguities caused by the abolition of the constitutional regime and the political, military and financial implications that produced the absolutist restoration ordered by the viceroy Felix Maria Calleja. In second instance, the significant Oaxacan case is examined as one of the few but significant examples of genuine military reconquest followed by the problematic and relative abolition of Cadiz constitutionalism, a scenario that offers interesting cases of political opportunism and manipulations tending aiming at the segregation of groups and entire communities. Finally, the present article examines three emblematic problems of the period in question, which are reviewed to evaluate the policies of the war: the implementation of the pardons as one of the most representative phenomena of continuity between the viceroys Calleja and his successor Juan Ruiz de Apodaca; the militarism of provincial governments and territorial control structures as tangible consequences of the prolongation of the independence revolution and the growth of the "realistas" militias, the latter as a visible example of the increasing militarization of New Spain's society."

José María Gil-Robles siempre sostuvo que su papel en la preparación y ejecución del golpe de Estado del 18 de julio de 1936 había sido marginal; en su famoso libro de memorias, No fue posible la paz, argumentó incluso que la vía violenta para alcanzar el poder era del todo contraria a sus planteamientos políticos.Los autores, a partir de una minuciosa investigación en fuentes primarias y secundarias, especialmente en el Archivo General de la Universidad de Navarra (AGUN) y en los archivos vaticanos, rebaten que el líder de la CEDA fuera un simple espectador de los sucesos golpistas de julio de 1936. Por el contrario, sostienen que Gil-Robles cuestionó el accidentalismo y la vía legalista desde al menos 1935, lo que explica su ambiguo papel en las sucesivas crisis políticas de diciembre de 1935 y febrero de 1936. Tras el triunfo del Frente Popular sus discursos y sus actuaciones se encaminaron a deslegitimar las instituciones de la República, en disputa con Calvo Sotelo, aunque solo hacia mayo de 1936 decidió prestar su colaboración política y económica a los golpistas, siendo Francisco Herrera Oria su contacto con los generales. Aceptando que tras el 18 de julio habría una breve fase de dictadura militar, Gil-Robles aspiraba a liderar el proyecto contrarrevolucionario en un plazo relativamente corto; con ese fin redactó incluso un programa político de tipo corporativo y no democrático, al que sin embargo nadie prestó atención. Pudiendo haber sido el jefe de la Nueva España, Gil-Robles no supo jugar sus bazas: su manifiesta enemistad con otros partidos de derecha, su carácter difícil, la desconfianza que despertaba entre los generales –Franco en particular–, el limitado papel de las milicias de la CEDA en la contienda y la excesiva duración de la Guerra Civil, entre otras razones, terminaron por malograr sus planes. Aislado y marginado en Portugal, Gil-Robles rechazó la deriva totalitaria de la España nacional y terminó por desentenderse de "La Victoria", a pesar de haber sido uno de sus principales apoyos en 1936. ; José María Gil-Robles always argued that his role in the preparation and execution of the coup d'état of 18 July 1936 had been marginal; in his famous memoirs, No fue posible la paz, he even said that the violent way to achieve power was completely contrary to his political views. The authors, based on a thorough investigation of primary and secondary sources, especially in the General Archives of the University of Navarra (AGUN) and in the archives of the Vatican State, claim that the leader of the CEDA was a simple spectator of the coup d'état events of July 1936. On the contrary, argue that Gil-Robles questioned accidentalism and legalism from at least 1935, which explains his ambiguous role in the successive political crises of December 1935 and February 1936. After the triumph of the Popular Front his speeches and his actions were directed to delegitimize the institutions of the Republic, in dispute with Calvo Sotelo, although only in May 1936 he decided to lend his political and economic support to the coupmakers, Francisco Herrera Oria being his contact with the Generals. Accepting that after July 18 there would be a brief phase of military dictatorship, Gil-Robles aspired to lead the counterrevolutionary project in a relatively short time; to that end he even drew up a political program of a corporate and non-democratic type, to which nobody paid any attention. Having been the head of the "Nueva España", Gil-Robles did not play his tricks: his manifest enmity with other right-wing political parties, his strong character, the mistrust he aroused among the generals –Franco in particular–, the limited role of militias of the CEDA in the battlefield and the long duration of the Spanish Civil War, among other reasons, ended up by defeating their plans. Isolated and marginalized in Portugal, Gil-Robles rejected the totalitarian drift of the Nationalist Spain and ended up by disregarding "La Victoria", despite having been one of its main supporters in 1936.

Chapter 1: This chapter studies the effects of bilateral foreign aid on conflict escalation and deescalation. We make three major contributions. First, we combine data on civil wars with data on low level conflicts in a new ordinal measure capturing the two-sided and multifaceted nature of conflict. Second, we develop a novel empirical framework. We propose a dynamic ordered probit estimator that allows for unobserved heterogeneity and corrects for endogeneity. Third, we identify the causal effect of foreign aid on conflict by predicting bilateral aid flows based on electoral outcomes of donor countries that are exogenous to recipients. We establish that the effect of foreign aid on the various transition probabilities is heterogeneous and can be substantial. Receiving bilateral aid raises the chances of escalating from small conflict to armed conflict, but we find little evidence that aid ignites conflict in truly peaceful countries. Chapter 2: We use an excludable instrument to test the effect of bilateral foreign aid on economic growth in a sample of 96 recipient countries over the 1974-2009 period. We interact donor government fractionalization with a recipient country's probability of receiving aid. The results show that fractionalization increases donors' aid budgets, representing the over-time variation of our instrument, while the probability of receiving aid introduces variation across recipient countries. Controlling for country- and period-specific effects that capture the levels of the interacted variables, the interaction provides a powerful and excludable instrument. Making use of the instrument, our results show no significant effect of aid on growth in the overall sample. We also investigate the effect of aid on consumption, savings, and investments, and split the sample according to the quality of economic policy, democracy, and the Cold War period. With the exception of the post-Cold War period (where abundant aid reduces growth), we find no significant effect of aid on growth in any of these sub-samples. None of the other outcomes are affected by aid. Chapter 3: We combine temporal variation in international drug prices with new data on spatial variation in opium suitability to examine the effect of opium profitability on conflict in Afghanistan. District level results indicate a conflict-reducing effect over the 2002-2014 period, both in a reduced-form setting and with three different instrumental variables. We provide evidence for two main mechanisms. First, the importance of contest effects depends on the degree of violent group competition over valuable resources. By using data on the drug production process, ethnic homelands, and Taliban versus pro-government influence, we show that on average group competition for suitable districts is relatively low in Afghanistan. Second, we highlight the role of opportunity costs by showing that opium profitability positively affects household living standards, and becomes more important after a sudden rise in unemployment due to the dissolution of large armed militias after an exogenous policy change. Chapter 4: This chapter analyses how foreign military interventions relate to the internal cohesion of communities and the role of local institutions in times of conflict. I consider the case of Afghanistan where households have been exposed to conflict for decades. Given an environment where formal institutions are unstable or even lacking, the local community becomes more important. Relying on support from others in the community is thus a common strategy for households to cope with different types of shocks. At the same time, the success of security missions crucially depends on cohesion within communities as they are relevant partners in counterinsurgency and reconstruction activities. I address endogeneity by applying different estimation techniques, including a geographic regression discontinuity design. My findings suggest that households in districts where foreign military forces are present receive less help from others in their community, have less trust in community councils and participate less in those councils.

The fate of the 2,500 troop multi-national coalition force in Iraq remains uncertain as ongoing negotiations within the context of the Iraq-US Higher Coordinating Committee decide on its future.While there is general agreement that the counter-ISIS coalition in its present structure should end, both sides agree that there is a need for ongoing military assistance but in a bi-lateral framework.One of the key players in this discussion is Iraq's National Security Advisor, Qasim al Araji, a longstanding official in the Iraqi security establishment. He was trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and fought against the regime of Saddam Hussein before returning to Iraq in 2003. After the 2003 invasion, he was one of the first high-level detainees held by the Americans and released three months later, only to be detained again in 2007 and held until 2009 at Camp Bucca. Sometime after that he joined the Iranian-supported Badr Corps, was elected to Parliament in 2014 and was appointed as Iraq's Minister of Interior in 2017, and National Security Advisor in 2020. Despite a checkered relationship with the U.S. prior to 2017, his terms as Minister of Interior and National Security Advisor have won praise from foreign military and diplomatic officials who note his professionalism and willingness to work together, with the Americans in particular, on security "portfolios" of mutual concerns. In a long interview on 1 March on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, he discussed the major threats facing his country with Responsible Statecraft. Asked about his thoughts on "America's obsession with Iran", he replied with humor: "My answer? Iran is obsessed with the American influence in Iraq as well. The view of the Iraqi government is that we don't support either Iranian or American influence on Iraqi decision making." RS: What do you see as the major security challenges facing Iraq today? Al Araji: Since the defeat of Daesh, narcotics are now the biggest challenge for us. The interference of other countries is another threat to our stability. Iraq believes it should not interfere in the affairs of other countries and would expect the same from other countries. RS: Are you satisfied with the support of regional neighbors on issues such as ISIS and drug trafficking? Al Araji: Narcotics and drugs are a global challenge, so it needs regional and international cooperation, not only with our neighbors but with all the world. There is already some degree of cooperation, but I think we can do more as narcotics are a common threat to the stability and prosperity of all countries. RS: How dire is the threat posed by Daesh and how prepared are the Iraqi forces to handle it alone? Al Araji: Our battle with Daesh is primarily an intelligence battle. The information we have is that Daesh does not have many fighters in Iraq, but we should cooperate with other partners in sharing intelligence, and to fight and defeat the remaining Daesh fighters. We believe the main threat is the 10,000 Daesh foreign fighters from different countries in addition to those from Iraq and Syria. The remaining Daesh fighters in Iraq do not pose a significant threat to Iraq but they are still a threat. Iraq is capable of confronting Daesh by itself, but it needs to cooperate with others to dry up the financial support and other resources to Daesh. Last year we signed around 23 memorandums of understanding with our neighbors and other countries to deal with Daesh. I also think al Hol camp is a significant threat. We need to find a way to resolve the situation in al Hol, otherwise it will keep providing extremists for Daesh. We urge countries to repatriate their citizens as there are almost 60 countries with citizens in al Hol. There are about 4,000 Iraqi families in this camp, and Iraq has repatriated about 1,924 families, but there are many more that must be repatriated.RS: There has been concern over spillover effects from the Gaza war in the region and an escalation. What are your thoughts on how this is impacting Iraq?Al Araji: The spillover from Gaza will impact Iraq and the whole region at the same time. The war crimes happening in Gaza will impact the stability of the whole region. Humanity is rejecting what is happening in Gaza right now. The policy of starvation, the policy of killing, and the policy of displacing people is affecting the whole world, and I am wondering why the international community is unable to stop this war. Nobody can stop the sympathy toward what is happening right now to the Palestinian people in Gaza. I think you know about the American Air Force airman who burned himself to death because of Gaza. RS: There has been significant questions about the role of militias in the national security structures. Why can't the militias be demobilized and incorporated into the MOD and MOI? Al Araji: These factions are not working against the government but supporting the current government. Some of them played a role in defeating Daesh in Iraq. Yes, there isn't a legal framework for their existence in Iraq, our security institutions are very obvious, and the current government is doing its best to control the weapons that are outside of the government's control. These factions first formed during the occupation of the US troops in Iraq. Any country that feels it is occupied by another country would give rise to such resistance factions. After the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011, the country was stable with few major security problems. But when Daesh invaded and occupied over one third of our territory, these factions formed again to defeat Daesh. What is happening now in Gaza is an excuse for these factions to restart their activities, and that is embarrassing the government because the government is trying to do its best to prevent an escalation.We are in communication with them. I am personally talking to these factions and if some of them are willing to join the Iraq Security Forces, we can work on that together. The stability of Iraq depends on all weapons being under control of the State and government.RS: The US has been critical about the lack of action on attacks against their forces. Why is it so hard to capture and prosecute those responsible for the attacks?Al Araji: There are very clear orders and instructions from the government to capture and prosecute anyone who is playing a role in attacking the Americans. Those who attacked the American embassy were captured and arrested. And some of those who also attacked American advisors in the Iraqi bases are being arrested as well.RS: Do you believe it is time for the US-led coalition forces to leave Iraq or is there a compelling reason for them to remain? Al Araji: The Iraqi forces are capable of confronting Daesh and other security challenges, and this is understood by the global coalition. The relationships between Iraq and the global coalition are positive and we are looking forward to keeping these relationships friendly. We are friends and partners. They are here because we asked them to be here, and after 10 years, Iraq has the right to reassess the terms of this presence. There is an Iraqi-US Higher Coordinating Committee, and it will assess the presence of the Americans and the Coalition in IraqWe are waiting for the result of these committees and depending on the reports we will take action. Iraq wants to establish separate bilateral relations with the members of the global coalition. It already has a bilateral agreement with the Americans, and we are looking forward to strengthening bilateral relations with other countries. We really want to have bilateral cooperation with the US and all the other members of the coalition. RS: The Americans seem obsessed with the influence of Iran in Iraq. Is that a justified concern? Al Araji: (laughing) My answer? Iran is obsessed with the American influence in Iraq as well. The view of the Iraqi government is that we don't support either Iranian or American influence on Iraqi decision making. We have good relations with Iran and the US, but the conflict between both is negatively affecting Iraq. Hopefully Iraq will not be a proxy battlefield for them. I think restoring relations between the US and Iran will also help the relation between Iraq and the US and will affect Iraq positively overall.

Last month, Foreign Policy published a report that stirred the debate on U.S. Middle East policy. It claimed "the Biden administration is reconsidering its priorities" in Syria and may conduct "a full withdrawal of U.S. troops." Now, legacy media is debating the future of American involvement in Syria. Missing from this discussion is the suffering that involvement has caused.Writing for the New York Times, retired general Kenneth McKenzie warns "it's not time for our troops to leave" Syria. Mere talk of a withdrawal (let alone actually withdrawing), he argues, is "seriously damaging to U.S. interests." It "gives hope to Tehran" that Iran might rival American influence in the Middle East — which is bad, supposedly. Why Iran has less of a right to influence its own region than people thousands of miles away is unclear.McKenzie also argues that American troops must remain to "secure the prisons holding ISIS fighters." Without boots on the ground, militants might escape and the Islamist group could "rejuvenate itself." McKenzie doesn't believe the Syrian government could prevent prison breaks on its own, or even with Russian and Iranian support.This argument is highly speculative. If the Americans leave, imprisoned ISIS fighters might escape. And, if enough do, they might rebuild their organization into a force too formidable for Syrian forces to handle. Multiple unlikely contingencies must materialize to even warrant taking this reasoning seriously.But McKenzie's claim suffers a more fundamental problem. It confuses the cause for the antidote. Everyone from Noam Chomsky to Rand Paul knows American intervention created the conditions that allowed ISIS to grow. Bombing Arab nations to smithereens, toppling their leaders, and starving governments through sanctions and outright theft generated a power vacuum. As did deploying troops indefinitely, which prevented states like Syria from maintaining territorial integrity and establishing the mechanisms for self-governance.McKenzie believes the Syrian government is simply too weak to quell the increasingly small threat an ISIS in retreat poses. Assuming he's correct, it's worth asking why that's the case. The facts again point to American intervention.Nearly 13 years into its ongoing civil war, Syria is in tatters. Once a middle-income nation with respectable living standards, it's now the poorest country on Earth. More than 90% of Syrians live below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day. Their paychecks are worthless, with the Syrian pound losing virtually all of its relative value since the war began.It's not all America's fault. The Syrian government undoubtedly bears significant blame for the humanitarian crisis. But American sanctions hamstring it from improving matters. The infamous Caesar Act targets anyone who "engages in a significant transaction" with the Syrian government. Signed into law by Donald Trump, this heinous policy effectively precludes the international community from helping Syria rebuild.A bipartisan but overwhelmingly Democratic coalition of lawmakers recently voted against slapping new sanctions on Syria. Unfortunately, for every one of them, there were 12 supporters of the legislation. Dubbed the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act, it would extend the sunset of the Caesar sanctions by eight years. The bill would also expand the list of proscribed transactions.But there's more. Years ago, with America's blessing, Turkish-backed militias stole capital from over 1,000 factories in the city of Aleppo alone. This assault on the productive forces of Syria's industrial hub left its economy in tatters. But that's not all the United States and its allies stole. America's occupying troops routinely commandeer Syrian wheat and petroleum. Trump admitted as much, saying that soldiers "were staying in Syria to secure oil resources."The Syrian state is starving. More American intervention isn't what Syria needs. It needs the United States' boot off of its neck.In these discussions of states and militants, we mustn't lose sight of what matters most: the people. American militarism in Syria has wrought dire human costs. It has helped to plunge Syrians into the depths of unimaginable despair. Over 80% of them are food-insecure and a similar proportion lack sustained access to electricity. Many enjoy just one hour of it per day. Without electricity, you can't refrigerate food and it rots. That causes shortages. People have taken to eating out of the garbage.McKenzie seems to care little about this immense suffering. And why would he? His job as a general was to project American military might, whatever the costs, a position he apparently continues as a guest writer for The New York Times.

This year, there seemed to be reason for optimism among advocates of war powers reform. When the Senate voted in March to repeal the 2002 authorization for war with Iraq, many assumed the House would quickly pass the measure, which had garnered broad bipartisan support in previous years.
But that optimism may be misplaced, as a hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee demonstrated Thursday. Far from showing a desire to wrestle back their war-making authorities, most lawmakers appear determined to maintain the status quo that has seen U.S. troops carry out operations in more than 20 countries around the world.
The hearing revolved around the holy grail of war powers: the 2001 authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and any groups that harbored them. Despite concerns that the law has been stretched well past its original intent, Congress has struggled to build consensus on a replacement.
Yet Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), the HFAC chair, has made clear that he will only consider repealing the 2002 AUMF alongside a repeal-and-replace of the 2001 version. This may have been a clever attempt to prevent a straight repeal of the 2002 law, but, after a month of negotiations, McCaul now says he hopes to mark up a compromise bill by the end of October.
McCaul opened discussion on Thursday by arguing that America still faces "terrorists committed to our destruction" around the world. (It should be noted that the Department of Defense says the threat to the homeland from Al Qaida, ISIS, and Al Shabaab is "low" and possibly non-existent.)
McCaul said he would not consider putting geographic restrictions on a replacement, going against a key proposal among war powers reformers, who warn that unrestricted AUMFs are ripe for exploitation by the executive branch. Most of his colleagues — including a number of Democrats — agreed with McCaul's approach.
In fact, the only substantive point of disagreement between lawmakers was over which groups should be included in a replacement AUMF. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), the ranking member on the committee, has proposed that a new law should only cover Al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates. McCaul and his Republican colleagues argue that the new AUMF should also include the Taliban and Iran-backed militias in Iraq.
There are, of course, some developments that will be welcomed by war powers reformers. Lawmakers widely agree that any new authorization should have a "sunset" provision that would require Congress to reaffirm its support for U.S. operations abroad after a few years. (Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said the administration opposes this measure, which in her telling would allow terrorists to simply wait Washington out.) A new AUMF would also likely exclude the Taliban, providing a legal bookend to 22 years of American involvement in Afghanistan.
But this shift falls far short of ending America's so-called "forever wars." When Meeks asked witnesses what the war on terror may look like in 2045, no one could offer a concrete response. Perhaps more importantly, no official seemed ready to countenance the idea that hostilities would finally be over.
Indeed, witnesses and lawmakers gave little indication that the war on terror could ever truly end. They focused instead on a range of emerging "threats" to the United States, including the rise of terror groups in the Sahel, a sub-region of Africa stretching from Mauritania in the west to Sudan in the east.
One may hope that lawmakers would discuss whether U.S. military operations helped create the conditions for these new threats to emerge, as a range of experts and journalists have argued. But such a discussion was absent from the conversation, leaving little chance that these views will be taken into account when lawmakers hammer out the text of any new AUMF.
In a telling moment, Meeks recalled that memorable day in September 2001 when Congress passed the AUMF. The long-time lawmaker joined all but one of his colleagues in voting in favor of the resolution, hurriedly kicking off a new paradigm in which "war" and "peace" became relative terms.
"Though I carry the burden of that vote, not for one second do I regret it," Meeks said. "We needed to send a message. We needed to take action and prevent future terrorist attacks by those who orchestrated 9/11, and we did."
The world has undergone a number of major changes in the past two decades. But in Congress, it's still 2001.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Gaza war and an enraged Arab street, the future of 2,500 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq is once again in question. Despite a full withdrawal in 2011, the government of Iraq "invited" U.S. forces to return in 2014 to combat Daesh, or ISIS. But seven years after the "Caliphate" was pronounced defeated, the multinational Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve maintains a large military presence in Iraq, ostensibly to "work by, with and through regional partners to militarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, in order to enable whole-of-coalition governmental actions to increase regional stability."Despite those laudable intentions, attacks against U.S. military personnel have intensified and so has political pressure to conclude the mission, far beyond similar calls for expulsion following the targeting of Qassim Soleimani in 2020. The presence of foreign forces in general and the U.S. troops in particular is vexing to Iraq with its long history of occupation (although calling 2,500 non-combat forces an occupation is a bit of a stretch), but is also an opportunity, particularly among Iranian-backed political parties and militias, to create a strawman responsible for all of the country's ills.For many Iraqis the counter-ISIS coalition is like the guest who has overstayed his welcome."The presence of U.S. military forces on Iraqi soil has been increasingly causing problems to Iraq and its neighbors; it also gives a pretext to terrorists to resume their attacks on Iraqis," said Dhia Al-Asadi, former minister of state who headed the Al-Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc in parliament. "These forces should withdraw immediately so that a legitimate, nationalist Iraqi government can take the lead and build its military and security capacity without unsolicited U.S. interference."Yet, not all Iraqis concur with those views."Despite the considerable strength of militia forces in Iraq, surpassing that of the Iraqi national army, their calls for the withdrawal of Americans and allies are primarily rhetorical," said Nahro Zagros, editor in chief of Kurdistan Chronicle and former vice president of Soran University in Erbil. "If the decision rested with the Iraqi populace, the majority would prefer the continued presence of Americans. However, Iraqi affairs are not under Iraqi control but influenced by neighboring powers."According to Falah Mustafa, a close adviser to the president of the Kurdistan Region on Foreign Policy Affairs, "any decision [on the future of the coalition forces] must be based on national consensus.""For the Kurdistan Region, certainly we are part of Iraq and we will abide by any decision that Iraq makes, but one single group of Iraqi society cannot determine this alone, because Iraq is a diverse country. Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Christians, we all need to agree on this issue because it is about the stability, security of this country," he said.While the U.S. has sought to maintain a military presence in Iraq, arguments to keep them there do not stand up to scrutiny. There is an unspoken proposition that Iraq could be used as a launch platform for attacks against Iran or elsewhere, but this is specifically prohibited by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which remain the foundational document for the Iraq-U.S. relationship. It says, "The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq."Besides, Iraq is not needed for this purpose. The U.S. currently has a major logistical base in Kuwait with over 13,000 army troops, a naval base in Bahrain housing the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Al Udeid Air Base in Doha is the largest military installation in the region with over 8,000 troops. The Persian Gulf can fit a Carrier Battle Group with ease. These, in addition to other bases in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan and Turkey, maintain more than sufficient ground, air and naval assets to challenge any military force in the region. A second argument is the often-stated rhetorical trope that leaving Iraq would be a victory for the Iranians. While it may be a rhetorical victory for Iran, rhetoric should not be the basis for foreign policy. A military withdrawal from Iraq would be seen in Tehran as stabilizing Iran's western borders, but it must be acknowledged that the U.S. seeks the same outcome on its borders. The Monroe Doctrine has been the cornerstone of U.S. hemispheric policy for 200 years, just as Persian influence has driven similar aspirations towards Iraq for over a millennium. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif famously said, "Look at the map. The U.S. military has travelled 10,000 kilometers to dot all our borders with its bases. There is a joke that it is Iran that put itself in the middle of U.S. bases."The U.S. argument conflates influence with interference. The economies and cultures of the two societies are vastly intermingled, shown most clearly with the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims which peacefully cross the borders annually to visit Qom and Najaf. Yet, the fundamental U.S. concern should not be one of Iranian influence but of Iranian interference, of which its insinuation into the political and economic structures will continue, regardless of the U.S. troop presence.Last, some would argue for a continued U.S. troop presence, asserting that the counter-ISIS mission is not finished, and ISIS remains a significant threat to both Iraq and the international community. While there may be some validity to this argument, it begs the question whether the Iraqis need continued foreign assistance or can accomplish this mission unilaterally. A U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission has recently been meeting to analyze these and other concerns to determine the rationale for a continued military mission. Mustafa, who previously served as head of KRG's Department of Foreign Relations, said it is important to remember that "this should not be emotional; it should not be affected by other factors.""Iraqis, the U.S. — the relevant people — need to sit down together, discuss and assess the situation on the ground, review the extent of engagement, assess the threats, Iraqi capabilities and determine together the nature and shape of future arrangements and future relations between Iraq and the U.S., and the rest of coalition countries," he said.According to Al-Asadi, "Daesh, like al-Qaida before it, will not cease to exist as a threat not only to Iraq but to the region and the entire world. Names, strategies and means may change, but the masterminds and beneficiaries of such groups will always keep them ready to strike, and sometimes they serve as a hired gun."However, he added: "Iraqi forces are qualified and capable of dealing with this threat. They may need some up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation with regional and world countries who ought to share the same amount of concern about the growing danger of these terrorist groups."While the need for "up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation" is important, it could be provided by other nations' forces, contractors or remotely, rather than by the physical presence of U.S. forces.A final argument suggests the continued presence of U.S. forces is an insurance against internal Iraqi threats. According to Zagros, "the most significant danger originates from within Iraq itself, where militia forces persist in attacking fellow Iraqis and opposing factions.""I firmly believe that without the presence of Americans and their allies, Iraq and the broader region face the risk of fragmentation and collapse," he said.Yet, those same militia forces are using the presence of U.S. forces as a casus belli to wage a deadly campaign against the forces of occupation, aligning themselves with the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" to receive equipment, training and funding from the Quds Force. Counterintuitively, the very presence of U.S. troops strengthens the hands of the militias and creates instability, especially when the United States unilaterally targets militia leaders and infringes on Iraqi territorial sovereignty to do so.These four factors, alone, imply that the U.S. troop presence comes at high costs and marginal benefits. The U.S. continues to be painted as an occupier, an aggressor, a foreign agitator and the cause of Iraqi society's near-collapse since the 2003 invasion.As Al-Asadi notes, "Why does the U.S. want to negotiate its withdrawal from Iraq? If they really want to stabilize Iraq and the region, they should withdraw their military troops first, then they can diplomatically negotiate their future relations with Iraq. Given the fragility of the situation and institutional dysfunctionality, we cannot hope for a better situation. The major denominator is the existence of foreign military troops in Iraq."Since October 7, U.S. support for Israel has aggravated the anger, and has brought the question of continued U.S. presence to the fore. While some arguments for remaining may exist, and Iraq is certainly more important than Otto von Bismarck's famous quote that the Balkans are not "worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier," the U.S. should reflect, clear-eyed, on the risk to American lives, the provocation to Iran, the almost paternalistic view that the Iraqi security establishment can't succeed against ISIS on its own, or can't find other alternatives, and the significant animosity against U.S. policy throughout the region. The Counter-ISIS Coalition performed brilliantly, but it is time to say, "Mission Accomplished."

Members of Congress who have said little to nothing about the over
33,000 Palestinians dead amid Israeli bombs and artillery — two-thirds deemed innocent civilians — in retaliation for the Oct. 7 Hamas attack that resulted in the deaths of 1,200 Israelis, are swiftly calling the Iranian drone and missile attacks Saturday night a "disproportionate" response by Iran.

Iran was responding to the killing of seven of its officials in what has been deemed to be by many (except most pro-Israel Western countries)
an illegal Israeli strike on the Iranian consultate in Syria on April 1. Saturday's response by Iran has been called highly choreographed to send a message, even limited, and it was. After the missiles and drones started to fly, the Iranians literally broadcast that their message to Israel had "concluded."

On Sunday morning, the Israelis and the U.S. reported that 99 percent of the more than 300 projectiles had been shot down by U.S. and Israeli defense systems. There were no deaths, but a
seven-year-old girl remains in hospital with life threatening injuries. Her home in the Negev Desert was hit with falling shrapnel from an intercepted missile.

That hasn't
stopped howls from both Democratic and Republican members, many of whom have sat on the sidelines as tens of thousands of Gazans have been punished for Hamas's attacks — killed, maimed, starved, displaced, or left unfound under the rubble. The Palestine Red Crescent Society said this week that some 1,000 children in Gaza have lost one or both of their legs. There were an estimated 17,000 children left unaccompanied and alone, as of February.

By all accounts on the ground,
there is very little for Gazans to go back to if and when the attacks there ever stop. But Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Texas), wants you to know that what Iran did on Saturday night was "terrorism" and "disproportionate" and a threat to "the free world."






Suddenly, it is as if dozens of
AIPAC-funded members of Congress from both sides of the aisle were liberated to unleash self-righteous indignation at Iran, rushing to X and dutiful cable television cameras to outdo even themselves.

Here's Republican Sen. Marsha Blackburn (top AIPAC recipient) calling on President Biden to launch our own strikes against Iran:




Here's New York Democrat Rep. Ritche Torres (another tippity-top AIPAC recipient):




GOP Sen. Roger Wicker (another top beneficiary of AIPAC and highest ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee) had this to say
in a statement Saturday: "this is the moment for the United States to show we stand together with our allies. Our shared enemies, including Iran and their proxies, need to know our commitment is unwavering. We must join with Israel to ensure that Iran's aggression is met with resolute action and resounding strength."

Here's Democratic Sen. John Fetterman (Pa.) saying he disagrees with news that Biden has actually
drawn the line on offering Israel offensive assistance in any new Israel attacks against Iran:



It is no question that Iran funds Hamas and works closely with its leadership. But after months of debate and discussion we still do not know definitively whether Iran directly helped to orchestrate the Oct. 7 attacks. More importantly we know now that Tehran has kept open communication with Washington to ensure that the war in Gaza does not spill out via its proxies in the Middle East. They have even kept pro-Iranian militias in check when it comes to attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria (which may be rescinded if certain lawmakers have their way and Washington gets directly involved in Israel's fight).Yet a limited, consultative retaliation for the second assassination of one of its senior officers since Oct. 7 is the doing of "terrorists" and "fanatics" for whom Congress must drop everything to respond, even if it means putting our own military servicemen and women at risk in the region, if not the homeland.




Lastly, one should highly consider the opposite view when John Bolton is out there calling for the U.S. to literally fight Iran alongside Israel: Remember, he has been a key supporter if not planner behind every foreign policy/national security failure since 9/11.




If he didn't have such a
public beef with Donald Trump we could very well see Bolton on the other side of the White House or Pentagon fences again. But does it really matter, with the amount of agitation for confrontation among Democrats and Republicans today? Best grab your gas masks and food supply — this is your War Party, in high gear.

Hours after the Department of Defense announced that two F-15s engaged in "precision self-defense strikes" against a suspected weapons storehouse used by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) "and affiliated groups," the Republican candidates on stage at the presidential debate suggested it was not enough.Said Sen. Tim Scott:"If you want to stop the 40 Plus attacks on military personnel in the Middle East, you have to strike in Iran. If you want to make a difference. You cannot just continue to have strikes in Syria on warehouses you actually have to cut off the head of the snake and the head of the snake is Iran and not simply the proxies, in order for us to have a powerful response from America we have to be in a position of strength. As president of the United States my foreign policy is simple. You cannot negotiate with evil. You have to destroy it."By all accounts the Pentagon has been trying to keep the violence in Israel-Gaza from spilling over into the nearby region where it has 2500 troops in Iraq and 900 in Syria (not counting the additional forces that came with the two Navy carrier groups after the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks). It's been difficult. Its troops in both Syria and Iraq have come under repeated rocket and drone attacks, leaving more than 45 with injuries, twice as many as the DOD acknowledged last week. Then on Wednesday it was reported that an American MQ Reaper drone had been downed near the coast of Yemen, an incident that is still "being assessed." Suffice it to say, things are tense. Responsible Statecraft is tracking the U.S. military build-up, and incidents, here.These Republicans, who are so committed to looking "strong," "tough," and dedicated to destroying Hamas (their words) and by extension, Hezbollah and Iran (their words), believe that tip-toeing around (or what they called "appeasement") is for children, or, as they referred to President Joe Biden, weak leaders who aren't protecting America. Former Amb. Nikki Haley:"We need to understand this as Iran giving the green light telling them (militias) what to do. And we shouldn't be doing the tit for tat like what Joe Biden has done. We need to go and take out their infrastructure that they are using to make those strikes work so they can never do it again. Iran responds to strike. You punch them one and you punch them hard and they will back off... We don't need him (Biden) going and sitting there tiptoeing around Iran, because he thinks they're going to do something you don't respond to an enemy and a terrorist with fear. You respond with strength. When you do that, that's when the world pays attention. And that's when Iran stops."Haley said there would "be no" Hamas, Hezbollah, or Houthis in Yemen without Iran, and went on to blame China and Russia "who is funding Iran right now...the is a unholy alliance."Ron DeSantis blamed President Biden for leaving the troops out there like "sitting ducks" and said it would be "hell to pay" if he were president and they were harmed. (He did not say if he agreed they should be in Iraq and Syria in the first place, or if he would bring them home). Vivek Ramaswamy, during his turn to talk about Israel's right to defend itself (a point stressed by each of the five candidates with increasing degrees of vigor, including Chris Christie's "wipe Hamas off the map") did raise a note of caution."I want to be careful to avoid making the mistakes from the neocon establishment of the past. Corrupt politicians in both parties spent millions, maybe billions for themselves in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting wars that sent thousands of our sons and daughters, people my age, to die in wars that did not advance anyone's interests, adding $7 trillion to our national debt."He did not explain what the alternative in the Middle East might look like. Interestingly for the hyperbole expended on Israel and Iran, a slight cooling has started to set in on the GOP candidates' rhetoric on Ukraine. Whereas in the first debate it was all about full-throated support for Zelensky — "whatever it takes" — now Republicans like Scott are saying the Congress should pass Israel aid first and immediately, then debate Ukraine aid and how it should be be spent. Ramaswamy, who had warned about the lack of a clear strategy from the start, didn't let this slip from note. "I'm actually enjoying watching the Ukraine hawks quietly, delicately tiptoe back from their position as this thing has unwound into a disaster. The first half of this race I was the only person standing for it now they're actually quietly coming around to be more cautious, as they should."